

CIVIL - MILITARY RELATIONS IN INDIA

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ACRONYMS

AAP	Annual Acquisition Plan
ANC	Andaman Nicobar Command
AoB Rules	Allocation of Business Rules
C in C	Commander in Chief
CDS	Chief of Defence Staff
CISC	Chief of Integrated Defence Staff to the Chairman, Chiefs of
CMR	Civil Military Relations
CNP	Comprehensive National Power
COAS	Chief of Army Staff
COSC	Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee
DCAP	Defence Capital Acquisition Plan
DCC	Defence Committee of the Cabinet
DDP	Department of Defence Production
DESW	Department of Ex Servicemen Welfare
DIA	Defence Intelligence Agency
DMA	Department of Military Affairs
DoD	Department of Defence
DoPT	Department of Personnel & Training
DRDO	Department of Defence Research & Development
DSSC	Defence Services Staff College
GoM	Group of Ministers
HDO	Higher Defence Control Organisation

IB	Intelligence Bureau
ICDP	Integrated Capability Development Plan
IPKF	Indian Peace Keeping Force
JIC	Joint Intelligence Committee
KRC	Kargil Review Committee
LAC	Line of Actual Control
MoD	Ministry of Defence
NAS	Naval Armament Service
NDC	National Defence College
NSA	National Security Advisor
NSAB	National Security Advisory Board
NSC	National Security Council
NSCS	National Security Council Secretariat
NTRO	National Technical Research Organisation
OFS	Ordinance Factory Service
OROP	One Rank One Pension
PLA	Peoples Liberation Army
PSU	Public Sector Undertaking
QA	Quality Assurance
R&AW	Research & Analysis Wing
RM	Raksha Mantri
RRM	Raksha Rajya Mantri
SFC	Strategic Forces Command
SHQ	Service Head Quarters

SPG	Strategic Planning Group
ToB Rules	Transaction of Business Rules

ABSTRACT

National security has been synonymous with preservation of sovereignty, territorial integrity and internal stability of a nation - a responsibility primarily entrusted to the Armed Forces. Empowered and equipped to protect the state, powerful militaries, if not handled well, carry with them a risk of becoming an existential threat to the state itself. Therefore, the concept of 'civilian control of the military' assumes importance. Ideally, the concept proffers that the military remain subordinate to the civilian statesman and function within the policy and limits defined by him. In practice, however, most national security issues require an integrated strategy and approach wherein, both the civil and military must remain synergised, in planning as well as in execution. In the contemporary interconnected environment where security is viewed from the prism of CNP, this requirement becomes even more pronounced. Hence, emerges the requirement of a suitable institutional framework for smooth Civil Military Relations (CMR).

In India the military has remained professional, disciplined and subservient to civilian authority – something which is viewed as a huge success of Indian democracy. However, many strategists opine that Civilian Control has been excessive and skewed, making optimisation and synergising the CMR equation a challenge; consequently adversely affecting the national security milieu. Though, a number of attempts to institute reforms by successive regimes indicate implicit institutional recognition of the problem at hand, the pace of actionable reform had remained extremely slow.

The formidable process of appointing the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and creation of the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) in December 2019 promise to alter this anomaly. These developments not only allow the military a foot in the door to policy

making on national security but also promise to grant it adequate autonomy in many internal matters. These are encouraging steps towards a better institutional framework for smooth CMR, building trust among various apparatus of national power and consequently contributing to national security without compromising the tenets of civilian control. These reforms have the capacity to pave the way for substantial integration and augmenting efficiency in MoD.

CHAPTER-1

INTRODUCTION

- 1.1 National security has traditionally been synonymous with preservation of sovereignty, territorial integrity and internal stability of a nation - a responsibility primarily entrusted to the Armed Forces. However, in the contemporary, interconnected and globalized world where myriad non traditional threats continuously emerge, its range and scope has grown much beyond this narrow prism forcing nations to adopt a holistic, all encompassing view. Of late, Comprehensive National Power (CNP), comprising multiple facets such as leadership, economic might, diplomatic reach and coercive elements of state power defines a nation's ability to secure itself. There is growing recognition that national security problems require integrated civil and military responses - political, economic, social, military and diplomatic - both at the national and international levels. This was very succinctly spoken of by Mao Tse-Tung (1937) in his famous book "On Guerrilla Warfare" where he wrote "Military action is a method used to attain a political goal. While military affairs and political affairs are not identical, it is impossible to isolate one from the other"¹.
- 1.2 The military remains a significant and indispensable instrument of state power, particularly for a nation having global aspirations. Empowered and equipped to protect the state from external aggression and also to deal with internal strife, powerful militaries carry the risk of becoming an existential threat to the state itself, if not handled well. Therefore, in most modern models of governance, particularly democracies, the concept of 'civilian control of the

¹ Tse-Tung, M. (1937). On Guerrilla Warfare. Marxists.Org.
<https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1937/guerrilla-warfare/>

military' assumes importance. Simplistic in thought, but complex in application, 'civilian control' is subject to multiple interpretations and has been defined differently by various scholars and analysts. Suffice to say, the concept proffers that the military must be subordinate to the civilian ('statesman' need not necessarily be the one who is at the top of the command; avoid statesman' as it carries a different connotation) and function within the policy and limits defined by later.

- 1.3 In practice, however, the top Civilian authority while formulating policy and directing its implementation receives inputs from various other organs of the government besides the military. Most national security issues require an integrated strategy and approach wherein, both the civil and military must remain synergised, in planning as well as in execution. In the contemporary interconnected environment where security is viewed from the prism of CNP, this requirement becomes even more pronounced. Hence, emerges the imperative of a suitable institutional framework for smooth Civil Military Relations (CMR).
- 1.4 To fully assimilate and understand the nuances of the CMR equation the following important questions need to be answered :-
- (a) How does the Indian system compare with developed countries such as the USA?
 - (b) What restructuring/reorganisation would facilitate greater synergised responses to national security problems without compromising the tenets of "Civilian Control"?
 - (c) What has been the change brought about after the appointment of the CDS and challenges that the CDS needs to tackle?

Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) : Brief History and Introduction

- 1.4 Although the notion of creating a CDS appointment was floated after India's independence, it was officially proposed following the Kargil War through the proposal of the Kargil Review Committee. Following that, commissions like the Naresh Chandra Task Force in 2012 and the Lieutenant General D.B. Shekatkar Committee in 2016 advocated their own forms of a CDS role.
- 1.5 The failure to place the CDS earlier is frequently blamed on civilians in the MoD, who are viewed as actual advisers to the political leadership. While it is true that the civilian system typically guides the political process, there is also a fear that concentrating too much power in the hands of one military person (CDS) could lead to a coup. The book 'Core Concerns in Indian Defence and the Imperatives for Reforms' (2015) details how the three services have diverse perspectives on the creation of a CDS².
- 1.6 CDS, according to Air Chief Marshal S Krishnaswamy, Chief of Air Staff (Retired), is "an overkill," because a single centralised organisation is likely to be tardy in making decisions. General Deepak Kapoor, Chief Army Staff (Retired), on the other hand, believed that India should embrace the CDS system, which is now in use in nations such as the United States, the United Kingdom, China, and Russia. He believed that the services should rise above turf wars and establish a single point military advisor, arguing that the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) system is ineffective. General Deepak Kapoor's sentiments were shared by Admiral Arun Prakash, Cof Naval Staff (Retired)³.
- K. Subrahmanyam had once wittily observed that "politicians in India enjoy

² Misra, V. (2015). Core Concerns in Indian Defence and the Imperatives for Reforms. Pentagon Press.

³ Indian Defence Review (IDR). (2020, January 3). The Challenges Before Chief of Defence Staff. Indian Defence Review. <http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/the-challenges-before-chief-of-defence-staff/>

power without any responsibility, bureaucrats wield powers without any accountability and the military assumes responsibility without having any clear direction”⁴.

- 1.7 Prime Minister Narendra Modi proposed the creation of the Chief of Defence Staff during his Independence Day speech on 15 August 2019. The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) issued an official declaration on the creation of the Chief of Defence Staff on 24 December 2019. This was followed by General Bipin Rawat assuming the appointment of the CDS on 01 Jan 2020.
- 1.8 The CDS is a significant responsibility in today's era of hybrid warfare, as it will play a key role in enhancing coordination and combining the Indian Armed Forces' entire fighting capabilities. The CDS is a four-star officer who serves as a one-point military advisor with no military command. The Chief of Defence Staff will also serve as the commander of all tri-service command formations, with the Vice Chief of Defence Staff serving as his deputy. The Chief of Defence Staff is also in charge of the newly formed Department of Military Affairs (DMA), which will fall under the Ministry of Defence's jurisdiction.
- 1.9 National security is too vital a subject to be dealt with in watertight compartments. It is imperative that mindsets and attitudes of all stakeholders are conditioned to look beyond narrow boundaries defined by turf and instead focus on joint-ness and synergy. In the backdrop of the fast changing strategic environment and the trend in global conflicts, there is a crying need to review our national security and higher defence control systems to enable maximisation of CNP without endangering the basic tenets of our democracy.

⁴ ibid

Ordered CMR in many ways lie at the heart of a nation's security framework. While being rooted in the firm and unambiguous political control of the military, a robust and vibrant relationship empowers a leadership that is alive to the nuances of national security, and wise to effective leveraging of military power. Nations which develop the right balance in their pattern of CMR have a great advantage in their search for national security; in getting the right answers to the operative issues of state policy.

1.10 **Organisation of the Study**

Chapter-2 presents 'Literature Review'. 'Objectives, Research Methodology and Data Collection' is delineated in Chapter-3. Chapter 4 on 'Theoretical Framework for Civil Military Relations' covers various theoretical aspects of the issues central to the subject of CMR. Chapter 5 on 'CMR in India : History and Current Status' focuses on the history, evolution and existing institutional framework enabling the current environment for CMR in India. Besides, covering relevant structures, organisations and Govt. Orders dealing with the subject, it undertakes analysis of varying perceptions of different stakeholders. It also compares structures in USA, UK and France. Chapter 6 - 'National Security, CMR and Civilian Control' - deals with linkages between CMR, National security and civilian control, using examples from past events and situations. Finally, Chapter 7 : 'CDS, DMA & The Road Ahead' delineates the recent reforms in the national security architecture introduced by the Government. It presents the way forward and the recommendations that would guide the demarcation of responsibilities between the civilians and the military.

CHAPTER – 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 A detailed literature review was carried out to identify, evaluate and interpret the work produced by researchers and scholars on the subject matter of the research problem, identify the research gaps. The details of the literature survey carried out are enumerated as follows :-

- (a) ***“The Absent Dialogue: Politicians, Bureaucrats and the Military in India” by Anit Mukherjee (2019)***, is a book that examines CMR in defence policy and plans in India. The book points out that the political leadership comfortable with status quo, the bureaucracy maintains and defends its turf, increased trust deficit while the military wants more stake in policy matters. The book has overdependence on inputs from Armed Forces on evaluating CMR. It could have included many more relevant examples of CMR issues to make a better and forceful reasoning.
- (b) ***“The Civil and the Military in India : A Brief History and the Challenges Ahead” by Srinath Raghavan (2020)*** traces the history of CMR in India and discusses the challenges to CMR. The paper brings out that while tackling CMR, subjective control is the preferred mode over objective control. It also brings out that the military’s ability to operate in policy-making needs improvement. The paper has only analysed the broad contours of multiple issues and does not throw up any recommendation on the structural framework needed to improve CMR and decision making process.
- (c) ***“Civil-Military Relations - Control And Effectiveness Across Regimes” by Thomas C. Bruneau and Aurel Croissant (2019)*** has

analysed in detail the CMR scenario amongst established democracies, emerging democracies and hybrid/authoritarian regimes. The book brings out that a very interesting facet that while civilian control may be a necessary condition for military effectiveness, democratic civilian control is not. The book could have analysed the level to which nations have implemented CMR strategies and their efficacy to ascertain the challenges that lie ahead for the nations.

- (d) ***Rooks and Knights Civil-military Relation in India” by R Chandrashekar (2017)***, is a book that covers various facets of CMR in India. The book brings out that sound CMR with diplomacy are critical to overall combat effectiveness of the Armed Forces. The author has identified the institutional challenges to CMR during the contemporary period. The book could have addressed the CMR Structures in other countries as these would have given a good comparison between India and its neighbours.
- (e) ***Civil-Military Pathologies and Defeat in War -Tests Using New Data” by Vipin Narang and Caitlin Talmadge (2017)***, is a book that discusses certain “Civil-Military pathologies” - dysfunctions in the way a nation’s armed forces and civilian populations or governments relate to one another to identify the key determinants of military success in war. The book brings out that Civil-military relations, when coded properly across various dimensions, do exert a substantial influence on states’ probability of winning interstate wars. The book could have addressed role of civilian government rather than overdependence on the issue of military leaders and their role in CMR.

- (f) ***“Khaki Capital : The Political Economy of the Military in Southeast Asia” by Paul Chambers and Napisa Waitoolkiat (2017)***, is a book that discusses issues concerning CMR and the linkage between economic, military and political power in seven ASEAN countries. The book brings out that the military continues to play a very significant and leading role in the economic and political life in majority of the Southeast Asian countries. A comparative and conceptual framework could have been used in the book for greater and more effective elaboration on the different characters of ‘Khaki Capital’ in Southeast Asia.
- (g) ***“What Military Officers Need to Know About Civil-military Relations” by Mackubin Thomas Owens (2012)***, is a book that discusses points of variance between civil and military leaders on major issues and trajectory of CMR in USA post 9/11. The book brings out that the Responsibility of healthy CMR lies with the Armed Forces in equal measure. In the book, only the American perspective has been discussed and that too focussing only on lacunae in Armed Forces with regards to CMR.
- (h) ***“Fostering Sustainable Development in South Asia” by Asha Gupta (2019)***, brings out the history of CMR in India. The article gives a good historical perspective of growth of CMR in India. The author has only discussed the historical and nuclear aspects of CMR and left out many other issues that relate to CMR.

CHAPTER – 3

OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Statement of the Problem

3.1 In India, unlike many developing nations and in contrast to Pakistan, the military has remained professional, disciplined and subservient to civilian authority. Always upholding democratic values, it has never posed any threat to the country's polity despite external threats and protracted deployment on Internal Security duties – something which is viewed as a huge success of Indian democracy⁵. However, some strategists that the CMR equation in India has been problematic in so far as maximising civil-military synergy is concerned; consequently adversely affecting the national security milieu. "Indian elites show little evidence of having thought coherently and systematically about national strategy. Few writings offer coherent, articulated beliefs or a clear set of operating principles for Indian strategy," wrote American think tanker George Tanham (1992) in a paper prepared for the U.S. government⁶. Echoing sentiments of many in the military, Stephen P Cohen (1976) opines that, "not only does India have civilian control; it has almost crushing dominance over a large and powerful military"⁷. Anit Mukherjee (2020), on the other hand argues that the extant institutional framework for CMR promotes a culture where all players viz. the Polity, the

⁵ Anit Mukherjee, *The Absent Dialogue*, Oxford University Press 2020

⁶ Happymon Jacob, *A Blueprint for a National Security Strategy*, *The Hindu*, 23 May 2019, <https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/a-blueprint-for-a-national-security-strategy/article62109750.ece>

⁷ Stephen Cohen, "Civilian Control of the Military in India", in *Civilian Control of the Military*, ed. Claude. E. Welch Jr, 47 (Albany: State University of New York Press 1976)

Bureaucracy and the Military, are content to work within their respective silos attributing the resultant inefficiency to what he terms, “The Absent Dialogue⁸”.

3.2 A host of issues ranging from the operational inefficiency responsible for the 1962 debacle, to lack of adequate coordination amongst various pillars of Indian Security apparatus during Operation VIJAY in 1999, inefficient defence procurement mechanism & modernisation and the very recent administrative issues pertaining to One Rank One Pension (OROP) as well as rank & pay equivalence between civilian and military personnel substantiate this view point regarding fragile CMR in India. With the Armed Forces being just ‘attached offices’⁹ to the MoD, military officers while recognising the supremacy of the political leadership, feel that the CMR equation in India is extremely lopsided in favour of the bureaucracy. On the other hand, the traditional thought process in the corridors of North Block (houses the Ministry of Finance and the Home Ministry) and South Block (houses the Prime Minister's Office, Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of External Affairs) since independence is premised on discomfort (read fear of coup) when it comes to giving greater autonomy to the military. In the process, healthy CMR, one of the cornerstones of democracy, continues to suffer.

3.3 While the apolitical nature of the military and its self imposed isolation from direct involvement in politics and governance are hailed as success of Indian democracy, the overall CMR equation leaves a lot to be desired. The existing

⁸ Anit Mukherjee

⁹ “For Government of India (GoI) to conduct its business, the Allocation of Business Rules (AOB) and Transaction of Business Rules (TOB) both of 1961 were issued by the President in exercise of powers conferred by Clause (3) of article 77 of the Constitution (Article). The First Schedule (Rule 2) of the AOB does not even acknowledge existence of Army/Navy/Air Headquarters under Ministry of Defence. Its Second Schedule (Rule 3) makes the Department of Defence responsible for “...defence of India and every part thereof...” and Para 11 of TOB assigns this responsibility to Defence Secretary”

framework has been unable to facilitate smooth CMR due to 'excess civilian control' and has consequently prevented the national security structure from providing optimum and synergised responses.

- 3.4 That there have been a number of attempts to institute reforms by successive regimes indicates implicit institutional recognition of the problem at hand. Nonetheless, the pace of actionable reforms based on initiatives such as the GoM report on the recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee¹⁰ has been extremely slow. This reluctance to change the status quo may be ascribed to the enduring belief in the political establishment, more so in the bureaucracy that added autonomy to the military is detrimental to civilian control.
- 3.5 Much of this changed in December, 2019 with the appointment of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and institution of the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) as part of the MoD¹¹. The CDS as the single point military advisor to the Raksha-Mantri (RM) and the DMA with a military officer as its Secretary have been welcomed with considerable positivism. Apparently, both these developments, not only allow the military a foot in the door to policy making on matters of national security, but also promise to accord it a reasonable degree of autonomy in many internal matters, absent hitherto-fore. This is suggestive of encouraging signs for a better institutional framework towards smooth CMR. However, creation of a stand alone DMA without simultaneously addressing the larger issue of a comprehensively integrated MoD as

¹⁰ Report of the Group of Ministers on National Security available in pdf format at <https://www.vifindia.org/sites/default/files/GoM%20Report%20on%20National%20Security.pdf>

¹¹ Govt. of India Allocation of Business Rules, First Schedule, Ser 9(ii) inserted vide Amendment Series no. 353 dated 30.12.2019

recommended by various task forces on defence reforms has also raised some apprehensions¹². Many feel that if not handled and progressed well, these reforms could eventually end up as cosmetic and superficial. Lt Gen (Dr) Prakash Menon (2019) writes "The commendable move of the Government to create the CDS must be accompanied by a political mandate for reforms that really matter like Integration with MOD and Integrated Commands. These changes cannot and should not be left to be negotiated between the civil bureaucracy and the military and between the three services. If that transpires, the PM's announcement from the ramparts of Red Fort would have been carried away by the winds of entrenched interests which have thus far successfully resisted meaningful defence reforms"¹³.

3.6 In light of recent developments highlighted above, it is felt that the nation stands at an inflection point for defence reforms. A deeper study in furtherance of these reforms and facilitate evolution of an efficient institutional framework enabling smooth CMR is the need of the moment. It would not only strengthen trust among various instruments of national power, but also contribute to national security without compromising the tenets of civilian control.

Research Objectives

3.7 The research objectives of the study are :-

- (a) To examine the existing institutional framework for CMR in India in light of the reforms introduced in December 2019.

¹² Anit Mukherjee, 'Three pitfalls of CDS, Dept of Military Affairs and Why It Should Make Us Sceptical', The Print, 06 Mar 20

¹³ Lt Gen (Dr) Prakash Menon, *The Chief of Defence Staff Challenge*, The Telegraph, 24 August 2019, <https://www.telegraphindia.com/opinion/the-chief-of-defence-staff-challenge/cid/1699997>

- (b) To explore whether greater integration of the military with the MoD will lead to healthier CMR without compromising the tenets of civilian control.
- (c) To explore suitable measures for reorganisation/re-structuring of the institutional framework for CMR in India so as to enable efficient, synergised and integrated civil - military responses impinging on national security.

Research Design

3.8 Research strategy adopted is qualitative to provide insights into current status of CMR in India. It will enhance understanding about the varied organisational structures in the country involved in defence and actions required to ensure a more cohesive and effective approach to handling critical matters pertaining to defence and national security. The research design adopted is descriptive.

Justification of the Study

3.9 While the apolitical nature of the military and its self imposed isolation from direct involvement in politics and governance are hailed as success of Indian democracy, the overall CMR equation leaves a lot to be desired. The CMR framework needs to empower the national security structure to provide optimum and synergised responses.

3.10 The research has sought to create a deeper understanding of CMR and reorganising/creating organisations at the National level to ensure that an important element of Comprehensive National Power (CNP) is addressed.

Research Questions

3.11 The research questions are as under : -

- (a) What are the dynamics of CMR in a democracy and its implication?

- (b) How the existing policies, rules and regulations on CMR in India have evolved?
- (c) What are the shortcomings, if any, in the existing institutional framework for CMR in India and how do these affect national security responses?

Hypothesis

- 3.12 H_0 : An institutional framework enabling greater integration of the military with the MoD will lead to healthier civil military relations.
- 3.13 H_1 : An institutional framework enabling greater integration of the military with the MoD will not lead to healthier civil military relations.

Limitations

- 3.14 The national security is multi dimensional and interlinked issues, some of which fall in the operational and classified domains. The study is limited in scope to those aspects which are unclassified and available as open source information. Further, the research is limited to CMR at the macro level and associated structures which deal with apex level decision making apparatus.

Sources of Data

- 3.15 **Primary Data** Primary data has been collected through interaction with military as well as civilian officers who have been part of the MoD, Service HQs and the National Security Architecture. A survey has also been conducted through a structured questionnaire canvassed to various serving and retired officers, bureaucrats, academia and media persons with hands on experience on the subject. Convenient Random Sampling was resorted to analyse the 252 responses received.

3.16 **Secondary Data** Books, newspaper articles, journals and previous research work on the subject available have been utilised as secondary data. A host of information on the subject is available on the internet; the same has also been utilised.

CHAPTER - 4

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS

4.1 To set the stage for this study, it is important to revisit the theoretical aspects of the issues central to the subject at hand. Aspects which merit clarity are the role of military in democracy, concept of civilian control and its various interpretations as also dynamics of CMR including enabling institutional frameworks and theories. A brief examination of institutional frameworks and structures for CMR to bring out a comparison between Reductionism vis-à-vis Holism while deciding the organisational hierarchy gives out very interesting insights.

Role of Military in Democracy

4.2 Democracy premises that military's power is legitimate only as long as it is authorized by society as a whole and that its objectives are those stipulated by the extant Government¹⁴. To fulfil the above requirement, professional militaries are groomed, trained and nurtured to be loyal to the political authority, while remaining apolitical themselves. The most lucid explanation of the professional military man is provided by Samuel Huntington in his seminal work, 'The Soldier and the State' wherein he emphasises that the "area of military science is subordinate to, and yet independent of, the area of politics. Participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism; hence they must remain politically neutral¹⁵." He also espoused that "the decision to wage and conduct of war is the responsibility of the Statesman while the military's role is primarily to management of violence¹⁶." In this

¹⁴ MR Van Gils, The Perceived Role of the Military, Rotterdam University Press, 1971

¹⁵ Samuel P Huntington, The Soldier and the State, Harvard University Press, 1957

¹⁶ Ibid

context, he comprehensively defined the responsibilities of a professional military commander towards the State in the following three statements¹⁷:-

- (a) Keep the Political Authority informed of the minimum requirements for military security.
- (b) Advice from military point of view, the implications on alternate courses of state action being considered by the State Authorities.
- (c) Explicitly implement state decisions pertaining to military security regardless of personal military judgement or advice.

4.3 Notwithstanding, democracy also demands that while armed forces be subject to civilian control, ‘those civilians who control the military and police must themselves be subject to the democratic process¹⁸.’ Therefore, situations may arise where the military commander is divided between his own judgement towards the state and that of the constitutionally elected civilian government, if the latter abrogates the constitution rejecting democratic values embodied therein. History is replete with cases of coups and military leaders turning autocrats on the premise of acting to ‘safeguard the national interest’. Speaking on the subject, ‘The Role of the Military in the Evolution and Maintenance of Democracy’ in an International Conference on Military and Governance in the Asia-Pacific Region in 2010, Alun A Preece brought out that in the 20th Century, there were only six states which escaped autocratic rule or forced change of Govt. Therefore, in every democracy there is a latent fear of the protectors themselves turning tormentors, if not managed well – stemming the need for ‘civilian control’ of the military.

¹⁷ A survey conducted by the author indicated that that 60% of respondents felt that these responsibilities remain unaltered even in the contemporary environment. About 30% disagreed while others were either unsure or partly concurred.

¹⁸ Dahl, Robert A. (1985). Controlling Nuclear Weapons : Democracy versus Guardianship.

Civilian Control of the Military

4.4 Closely linked to the role of militaries in democracy is the concept of ‘civilian control’ which is considered a critical necessity for effective democratic governance. Many democracies even take pride in clear demarcation of roles between civilian and military functions¹⁹. However, the relationship between a country’s political leadership and its military is complex, dynamic and conditioned by a number of factors.

4.5 **Traditional Thoughts & Concepts** Samuel Huntington considers ‘civilian control’ in terms of relative power of the civilian vis-à-vis military groups – the primary objective being to minimise military power. Outlining a general definition, he suggests two variants of Civilian control; Subjective Control by maximising civilian power and Objective Control by maximising the professionalism in the military²⁰. For many years Objective Control represented an ideal order wherein the military was expected to explicitly execute policy defined by the civilians while the civilians were to stay out of the military realm, allowing the military a free hand in execution. There is supposedly, a clear demarcation of responsibility between the civilians and the military²¹.

4.6 However, in the real world, this demarcation is no longer watertight. As unrestricted and hybrid warfare permeates new arenas outside the traditional battlefield, this clear line of demarcated responsibilities is blurring by the day -highlighting the paradox of civilian control. At one end, the civilian must control the military so as to prevent it from becoming a Frankenstein which

¹⁹ Chambers & Waitoolkiat, Khaki Capital - The Political Economy of the Military. Nordic Institute of Asian Studies. 2017

²⁰ Op.cit. Samuel Huntington

²¹ Op.cit. Ankit Mukherjee

threatens the very existence of the state it is required to protect. At the other, it must be empowered to perform when required. Empowerment not only demands a fair degree of autonomy but also informed oversight. Deficiency in expertise and experience among civilians on matters military severely impedes their capability to supervise the professional military while lack of trust prevents them from granting autonomy; causing friction in CMR. Apropos, having been dominated by ideational and norm-based justifications for over four decades, fresh research on CMR is now focused on the rationalist and interest-based aspects instead.

- 4.7 **Contemporary Viewpoint** In this context, three modern points of view are germane. A model professed by Michael Desch (1999) allows a slender, permeable demarcation between political ends and military means. As per Desch, there exists, in exceptional circumstances, sufficient space for civilians to intercede in what would normally be the military domain - as also the military to act politically. So long as civilians prevail in the event of diverging preferences, civilian control is believed to have been achieved²². Peter Feaver (1999) contends that civilian control, although aimed at ensuring that “civilians get what they ask for, even if it is not what they really want as they have a right to be wrong,” there is enough room for bargaining by the military to maximise its influence, as also for the civilians to monitor so as to maximize control and prevail²³. Eliot Cohen (2003), on the other hand, in his ‘Supreme Command : Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in Wartime’

²² Michael C. Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military : The Changing Security Environment*, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999 17 Peter D. Feaver, *Civil-Military Relations*, *Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.* 1999. 2:211–41 Copyright © 1999 available at <https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.211> 18

²³ Peter D. Feaver, *Civil-Military Relations*, *Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.* 1999. 2:211–41 Copyright © 1999 available at <https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.211>

argues for a type of control which is more intimate as against the one that is starkly compartmentalised. He professes that the Generals must be open to a dialogue wherein political leaders may freely subject them to probing, prodding, interrogation, provocation and even bullying to achieve the desired results²⁴.

- 4.8 **The Salience of Dialogue** All three modern variants of 'civilian control' described in para 4.7 are distinct from the traditional belief which relies on clearly demarcated and compartmentalised domains for the civil and the military. Instead, these allow both actors to transgress into each other's conventional turfs through dialogue and debate - by allowing the military to have a say in policy formulation on one hand, while permitting the civilians to prod, probe and question the military experts' plans for executing it, on the other. Despite these transgressions, the primacy of civilian authority remains uncompromised. In the event of divergence, the civilian view invariably prevails. Cohen termed this as "the unequal dialogue."

Theories for CMR

- 4.9 Relationship between the civilian democratic government and its armed forces requires fine balance which in turn depends on various factors such as areas of decision making by the civil government, cross flow of information, inputs, advice and counsel in deciding roles and tasks, the responsibility for success or failure in their execution etc. Each nation develops its own syntax of defining conditions that vary according to the nation's or its military's size, its level of development and its ability to provide for military wherewithal. Perhaps, of utmost significance is the intensity of social and cultural milieu

²⁴ Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command : Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership In Wartime, Anchor, 2003

with which the society views and is impacted by national security issues. An understanding of various theories that help frame CMR is considered useful at this stage.

4.10 **The 'Institutional' Theory** Samuel P Huntington's *The Soldier and the State*,

describes the diversion between the liberal 'civil' and the conservative 'military' as being two worlds with their own values, traditions, concerns, work ethos and roles. The balance between the two is




Figure 4.1 : The Huntington Relationship Model

achieved through 'Objective Civilian Control'. In most societies the relation between power, professionalism and ideology is dynamic and maintaining equilibrium between power and ideology is difficult²⁵.

4.11 **The 'Convergence' Theory** Propounded in 1960s by Janowitz, it espouses

a liberal 'civil' and a conservative 'military' as two distinct worlds. Janowitz argues that over time, either a 'civilianisation of the 'military' or a militarisation of the 'civil' occurs, though certain basic characteristics are retained by each and 'dilution' of conservatism of the military would reduce the 'attitudinal distance' between the two worlds and result in better CMR²⁶.

4.12 **The Agency Theory**. Peter Feaver (1999) advocated that policy was the

prerogative of the civil while the military was a subordinate, which executed the tasks when called upon to achieve the desired ends of that policy. The theory originated as fallout of the US Military's failure in the Vietnam War due to needless Civilian interference. He considered the role of the Military

²⁵ Op.cit. Samuel Huntington

²⁶ Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier, a Social and Political Portrait*, 1960 1964

defined as that of an 'Executive Agent' with limits to the extent civil authority would apply the levers of control. He added that the military may either 'work' or 'shirk' in carrying out its tasks. In circumstances where civilian control is excessive and intrusive, 'shirking' by the military may affect national objectives. From the military 'Agent's' perspective, shirking is inversely proportional to the costs of punishment²⁷.

- 4.13 **Concordance Theory** The Concordance theory, unlike others, does not treat the Civil - Military paradigm as two distinct pillars playing out their respective roles as determinants of policy and its executors. Instead, it views an alternate that theorizes 'Concordance' between three cardinal stakeholders, i.e. the Political Class, the Military and the Citizens, who cooperate to safeguard and promote the national cause. This cooperation is focused on four areas to be addressed conjointly to enable a harmonious and conflict-free relationship. They are the political decision making process, the social composition of the officer corps, the recruitment of personnel into the military and the military methods and 'style' of conduct. As long as all three stakeholders were in agreement over these three issues, military intervention would be unlikely²⁸.

Framework for CMR

- 4.14 **Defining the Civilian** That the civilian position must remain supreme for effective civilian control is well established. However, any discourse on the subject would be irrelevant without a clear definition of the term 'civilian' in the lexicon of CMR when referring to 'civilian control' of the military. This is

²⁷ Peter Feaver, *Armed Servants*. London: Harvard University Press, 2005

²⁸ Rebecca L. Schiff, *Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance*, First Published October 1, 1995, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X9502200101>

predominantly vital in democracies where all arms of the government other than the military itself essentially comprise civilians.

- (a) Classically, the term civilian refer to the 'people of the state' and hence, naturally extrapolates to their 'elected representatives'. Huntington uses the term 'statesman' to accord clarity to the issue. Peter Feaver and other contemporary strategists have also adequately endorsed this explanation²⁹.
- (b) Having stated this, empirical studies reveal that statesmen in democracies across generations have invariably sought advice and inputs from other arms of the government (bureaucrats, economists, academia or scientists) on matters military. Depending on the CMR equation, prevalent organisational climate, extant situation of relative peace or crisis and nature of inputs required these could be in addition to those provided by the military or in isolation.
- (c) Often, civilian inputs have been/ are accorded more weight than those from the military. In some nations, due to lack of time, inclination, mis-prioritisation or downright lack of strategic competence and ability, the function has been delegated to the subordinate functionary (read bureaucracy). At times, this delegation is by design, stemming from insecurity due to natural lack of trust (perceived or otherwise) of the political leadership in the armed forces.

²⁹ Op.cit. Peter D. Feaver where he articulates, "This reflects the deeply embedded assumption of modern democratic theory, that it is the popularly elected government, and no other body or person, that is wholly responsible for deciding what policies are to be pursued in the name of the people. In so doing, the government is constrained by the limits to action set out under the law of the constitution, and is ultimately held accountable for its activities and decisions when it faces the judgement of the people at the polls".

4.15 **Institutional Framework** CMR vary across democracies, and are defined by the process of interactive exchange between the military and other government institutions developed over a period of time. The quality of this exchange is dependent on multiple factors – historical evolution, prevalent threat environment and above all a nation’s strategic culture. Personalities, both civilian and military also play a part. Outlines of basic structures, also called Higher Defence Organisations (HDO) are discussed.

- (a) **Ministry of Defence (MoD)** Most modern nations have the MoD as the fountainhead which connects the statesmen to the generals and from where military policy and direction flow. MoD concept is relatively new as most nations followed the USA, the first to establish the Department of Defence in 1947 after World War II. The staffing of the MoD is the primary determinant of its working culture; it may be military dominated, civilian predominant or integrated. While each nation has its unique CMR ecosystem, empirical evidence demonstrates that military dominated ministries are generally associated with weak ‘civilian control’ whereas, in civilian dominated frameworks the degree of ‘military autonomy’ is often a cause of friction in CMR. Most mature democracies have evolved an integrated MoD structure which proves to be more efficient due its collegiate approach to decision making as also greater degree of information symmetry emanating from adequate mix of expertise and authority.
- (b) **Empowered Entities** In addition to the MoD, different nations have various high powered councils in the shape of National Security Councils; comprising senior officials, serving generals, strategists,

academia and professionals as advisory bodies to the political leadership. Senior political leaders also form high powered committees like the Cabinet Committee on Security in India and the House Armed Services Committee in the USA. There are also Tri Service bodies such as the Chiefs of Staff Committee in India and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the USA.

4.16 **Applicability of Concepts of Reductionism vs. Holism to CMR**

Frameworks A little theorisation about MoD structures, especially in civilian dominated hierarchy is considered appropriate at this stage. Most structures are designed for simplistic demarcation of responsibility, usually following the popular model of Objective Control – overall strategic direction and financial control retained by civilian dominated sections of the ministry while delegating the execution to Service HQs. This model vis-à-vis the integrated MoD, wherein almost all sub departments are jointly manned, can justifiably be related to the concepts of reductionism and holism, respectively³⁰.

- (a) **Reductionism** Represented by the compartmentalised MoD structure, this indicates an approach where the system is broken down to pieces to reason about it from the properties of these pieces. It tries to analyse and describe complex phenomena in terms of parts that exist on a simpler or more fundamental level. It is advantageous because it allows the perceived complexity of the surrounding world to be captured in a form of elements and aspects that are easier to work with. This could become a bane too, as it runs the risk of finding suboptimal rather than sophisticated solutions to complex problems.

³⁰ Aga Szóstek, Are you a reductionist or a holist in your design approach?, Jul 2018 available at <https://medium.com/nyc-design/are-you-a-reductionist-or-a-holist-in-your-design-approach-d0d829967e38>

- (b) **Holism** In relation to the integrated MoD structure, Holism conceptualises that any system and its properties must be visualised as wholes, not as an assortment of parts. It attempts to contextualise the elements as part of the whole system environment and views each entity as a part of a larger whole. Since it accords greater importance to its components, the solutions and responses to problems are more likely to be comprehensive. However, the organisational structure being heterogeneous, demands high degree of professionalism, mutual understanding and cooperation among verticals.

Parameters of Assessment : National Security Responses

4.17 Assessment of national security responses for the future especially in terms of military effectiveness is a challenging prospect. However, being a key component of this study, it is important to identify some parameters to assess the effectiveness of such responses. At the macro level where healthy CMR affects synergy, the following broad issues are considered pertinent and will be utilised for the purpose of this study³¹:-

- (a) Provision of strategic guidance to the military.
- (b) Capability Development.
- (c) Autonomy in execution of operations.
- (d) HR issues affecting training and morale of stakeholders.

³¹ National Military Responses and their outcomes are intangibles and difficult to quantify and measure. Therefore, based on parameters used by different scholars in their respective studies on CMR, a list of parameters was shortlisted and further validated through the survey conducted by the author. Survey Questionnaire is at Appendix E.

CHAPTER - 5

CMR IN INDIA : HISTORY AND CURRENT STATUS

5.1 To analyse the complete gamut of CMR, it is important to focus on the history, evolution and existing institutional framework enabling the current environment for CMR in India in addition to all relevant structures, organisations and Government Orders dealing with the subject.

Genesis of HDO

5.2 **Genesis** Like most colonial Armies, the British Indian Army was hard-wired to be more loyal to the regime, rather than the people. Further, at the time of independence, the Armed Forces were commanded by British officers as Chiefs, officered by Indian officers who had not been part of the freedom struggle and soldiered in rank and file mostly by men from a few martial races. As a consequence, the Congress leaders were convinced that the highly unrepresentative military, a legacy of the divide and rule policy, was a threat to the newly formed democracy and that its powers needed to be curtailed. In September 1946 Nehru, the newly appointed External Affairs Minister of pre-independence India wrote to the then Commander-in-Chief outlining his thought process and the need for radical defence reforms and restructuring. It was in this backdrop of distrust that the template of India's post-independence Higher Defence Organisation (HDO) was conceived³².

5.3 **Defence Committee of the Cabinet : 1947** The structure of the HDO, and methodology for interaction between the Armed Forces and the political hierarchy was conceived by Lord 'Pug' Ismay³³ keeping in mind the

³² Steven Wilkinson, *Army and Nation: The Military and Indian Democracy since independence*, Harvard University Press 2015

³³ General Hastings Lionel Ismay, 1st Baron Ismay KG, GCB, CH, DSO, PC, DL, nicknamed Pug, was a British Indian Army officer and diplomat, remembered primarily for his role as Winston Churchill's

turbulence at that time. It aimed at firm political control of the military while catering for first hand military advice from the Service Chiefs to the Political authority. The architecture also provided for sufficient inter-service interaction. The first HDO of Independent India involved the constitution of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) on 30 September 1947. The DCC was chaired by the Prime Minister (also at the time the External Affairs Minister) with the Deputy Prime Minister (Home Minister), the Finance Minister and Defence Minister as its members.

- (a) **Lord Ismay's Proposals** In addition to the DCC and the MoD, Lord Ismay recommended a set of subordinate offices which would not only support the DCC but also provide a robust graded structure for coordinated decision making at various levels. These included the Defence Minister's Committee, Defence Secretary's Committee, the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) and the Military Wing of the Cabinet Secretariat. These were supported by a number of sub-committees which were of two types; political and military. These proposals included a provision for the Service Chiefs having a 'direct access' to the DCC, if necessary, through the Defence Minister's Committee which when objected to by then Defence Secretary, Shri HM Patel, was declined.
- (b) **Service HQs** Despite the initial praiseworthy response of the military during the Kashmir skirmishes of 1947, the politicians' mistrust of the military led to the overbearing civilian dominated CMR architecture under a Defence Minister assisted by bureaucrats. The Service

chief military assistant during the Second World War and his service as the first Secretary General of NATO from 1952 to 1957, He later served as Mountbatten's COS before retiring in 1951.

Headquarters were declared 'Attached Offices' in 1952, significantly 'diluting' their position of the Armed Forces. Later, from 1955 the appointment of Commander in Chief was abolished and reduced to only the Chief of Army Staff³⁴. Almost, simultaneously, the bureaucrats were removed from various military committees isolating the Service HQs completely.

(c) **Allocation of Business (AoB) and Transaction of Business (ToB)**

Rules 1961 In 1961, the President of India issued the AoB and ToB Rules 1961. There is no mention of the Service Headquarters or their Chiefs in these Rules or their Appendices. The eventual responsibility for the defence of India or any part thereof was vested with the Defence Secretary. The latest AoB and ToB are not being appended as they are downloadable at Gol Cabinet Secretariat website (<https://cabsec.gov.in/>).

(d) **MoD as the Conduit Between the Politician and the Military**

Important fallout of the way Indian HDO evolved was that the Service HQs were gradually isolated from the polity with the MoD becoming a powerful intermediary. With the political committees now manned by politicians and bureaucrats while the military committees were exclusive to service officers, the Services were denied direct access to the politicians and forced to operate through the bureaucracy. Even the COSC, the highest decision making body of the Services had no direct access to the DCC and had to operate through the MoD which implied

³⁴ Steve Wilkinson in his book *Army & Nation* highlights a few incidents to indicate efforts to downgrade the status of military officers. Earlier Nehru himself had moved into the Teen Murti Bhavan, the official residence of the Commander in Chief, one of the many symbolic gestures to reduce the visual presence of the military in the corridors of power. Reduction in status of military officers as per Warrant of Precedence was another such measure.

that any matter approved by this committee was liable to scrutiny by even the lower bureaucracy. The importance given to the MoD reflected a growing alliance between India's political leadership and the bureaucrats, while isolating the Services³⁵. There was no National Security Council at that time, the function being performed by the Principle Secretary to the PM.

5.4 **Prognosis** An analysis of the genesis of Indian HDO reveals a few salient aspects. First, to the credit of the government of the day, a fair degree of attention was accorded to defence reforms, albeit limited to transition of the colonial British Indian Military to one that would owe allegiance to democratic India. Second, a multi-layered Institutional Framework customised to the requirements of the time was put in place. Third, a mechanism for firm civilian control was established. Fourth, the Institutional Framework, by design isolated the military from the political leadership while encouraging a closer relationship between the bureaucrat staffed MoD and the political leaders. Lastly, and most significantly, most of the efforts were directed towards setting up the structures focused on delineating military responsibilities from the civilian. The emphasis clearly was to establish a structure that would keep the military as subservient as possible to the statesman. In the process the major responsibility of formulating a defence policy for the nation was lost sight of. This would prove to have far reaching implications in later years.

Evolution of CMR Structures in India

5.5 Evolution of CMR in independent India may be studied in distinct phases separated by three inflection points, namely – Independence from British rule

³⁵ Stephen Cohen, Indian Army: Its contribution to the Development of a Nation, Oxford University Press, 1990

in 1947, the Indo-China War of 1962 and the Nuclear tests of 1974 and 1998 followed by the Kargil War.

- 5.6 The initial phase, though credited with setting up the institutionalised framework for HDO, may be criticised for almost no worthwhile output with regard to defence policy or direction to the military. There was hardly any modernisation too, as justifiably the focus was on economic reconstruction and poverty alleviation. Quite ironically, at the time even while the civilians had little expertise in defence matters, the military was isolated from any kind of decision making which was a detriment to policy and decision making in matters military. While Nehru did requisition the services of a British expert, PMS Blacket to suggest defence reforms, which indicates his desire for an effective military (though subservient) the report submitted was not acted upon³⁶. As a consequence of all these factors, the period saw very fragmented CMR. The Indo-China War of 1962 which followed proved to be a sharp wrap on the knuckles. Poor decision making at the strategic level by Nehru and Menon coupled with disregard to military advice by Thimmaya as also uncalled for interference in operational management of the conflict cost us the war. While our troops fought bravely, they were ill equipped and logistically constrained. Yet to its credit the military remained loyal and subservient to the national leadership during and after the crisis – typically conforming to Huntington's 'Subjective Control'. Requirement to involve the military in shaping policy was a big lesson.
- 5.7 In the phase that followed, India's HDO should have alluded to the wakeup call. Unfortunately it did not happen in the desired manner. Though there was

³⁶ Op.cit.

adequate focus on modernisation and making up the inadequacies of the Services within economic constraints, hardly any lessons were learnt with respect to CMR. The only noticeable change was that the impermeable line between the civil and the military became even more rigid. Having burnt their fingers in 1962, the political leadership further alienated itself from military affairs. This led to an unhealthy and skewed equilibrium, where the operational matters were left to the military while the policy making, budget control and modernisation was controlled by the bureaucrat dominated MoD; marking a shift from 'Subjective to Objective Control'. Over a period of time this would prove to be comfortable for both parties – they were happy as long as their turfs were not transgressed. The fact that the next two conflicts with Pakistan in 1965 and 1971 were success stories further lulled the establishment into a false sense of belief that all was honky dory, while in effect it was not. Visible fruits of success in both conflicts allowed the inadequacies at all levels to be swept under the carpet without lessons being learnt. At the strategic level, many feel that the gains of 1971 were frittered away as we could not leverage our success in the East to resolve issues on the West. "Unfortunately, many a time we have failed to convert sacrifices and hard-won operational achievements into long-term politico-strategic successes." remarks ex COAS, General VP Malik³⁷.

5.8 Internally, within the Services, the plans and operations continued to remain Army centric without much institutional joint planning. Disinterest among the politicians, lack of expertise in the bureaucracy and relative comfort zones of the Services incentivised the status quo. However, the bigger lesson

³⁷ General VP Malik (Retd – ex COAS Indian Army), Past Perfect, Future Tense, <https://forceindia.net/guest-column/guest-column-v-p-malik/past-perfect-future-tense/>, Jan 2017

regarding the need to involve the military in policy making had been ignored, as also the requirement for informed oversight by the civilians and necessity for synergy with other civilian agencies like the IB and R&AW. There are a few examples to elucidate this point of view. First, the 1971 operations. India's success is attributable to Manekshaw's rapport with Mrs Gandhi and the RM, Shri Jagjivan Ram. However, had he not been allowed access, this would not have been possible. Further, what is less known is that three Service Chiefs' plans were subject to great scrutiny, questioning and dialogue by Mrs Gandhi supported by her team of informed bureaucrats KB Lall and DP Dhar³⁸ - akin to Cohen's concept of Civilian Control. It is also less known that the proposal to institute the CDS was almost approved after the war but had to be dropped due to lack of consensus among the Services³⁹. Next instance which merits mention is the non-involvement of the Indian Military in India's Nuclear tests in 1974⁴⁰. Despite strategic overtones of the programme – though futuristic and classified, it speaks volumes regarding prevalent CMR that the military was not even invited as an observer let alone consulted. To their credit, the military remained unconcerned. Third example is regarding General Sunderji's personal equation with Mr. Arun Singh, MoS for Defence and Rajiv Gandhi, the PM in the late 80s. Perhaps, it was during this period that the military enjoyed maximum say in the Government's decision making regarding defence matters. Gen Sunderji's advice was largely responsible for Operation Brasstacks as also giving a nod to the Government for IPKF deployment in Sri Lanka. Both operations did not give India the desired dividends, the former almost bringing the nation to war and the latter costing us many avoidable

³⁸ Op.Cit. Ankit Mukherjee

³⁹ Ibid 34

⁴⁰ Op.cit. Ray

lives. That the operations were not a success is not as much of a concern, but the fact that there was no informed civilian oversight or advice is. All these examples substantiate the 'salience of informed dialogue and oversight' in CMR; National Security Responses were efficient where it existed, and adverse in its absence.

- 5.9 Dr Ayesha Ray, in her writings argues that it was the Nuclear Tests of 1998 and the Kargil War of 1999 brought the requisite attention to the thought process for desired change in the CMR. The fact that India had conducted the nuclear tests and indicated her intent for a strategic programme, there emerged an inevitable need to involve the military to raise and prepare the Strategic Forces. Secondly, the Pakistani incursions in Kargil brought to fore multiple inadequacies in our National Security Infrastructure at the highest level and set into motion the reforms process.

Start of the Beginning?

- 5.10 **Defence Reforms** Most major reform attempts were scuttled by one or more stakeholder in favour of the status quo. For the 1965 operations, LB Shastri, the then PM, gave an almost free hand to the Services in tactical decisions⁴¹. Similarly, YB Chavan, the then RM, started the Defence Minister's morning meetings. Later Indira Gandhi established the Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs⁴² and a Policy Requirements Committee for feedback during the 1971 war. While the desire to initiate reform was indicated at various stages, the attempts were either cosmetic, limited in scope, half hearted in intent or piecemeal without major impact. However, it was only in the late 1990s that real intent for defence reforms emerged. Though proposal for the National

⁴¹ Kotera Bhimaya, Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia - CMR and Decision Making, Asian Survey 34 No7, 1994

⁴² Sinha, Of Matters Military

Security Council (NSC) was mooted way back in 1988, it was finally established in November 1998 along with the first National Security Advisor (NSA) with Brijesh Mishra as the first incumbent under PM AB Vajpayee⁴³.

The following initiatives followed:-

- (a) **The Kargil Review Committee (KRC), 1999** The KRC, set up under the Chairmanship of Mr K Subrahmanyam in 1999 in the aftermath of the Kargil operations, recommended that the entire gamut of national security management, apex decision making and the structural interface between the MoD and the Armed Forces Headquarters be comprehensively studied and re-organized. He recommended periodic briefing and information sharing between the military and other agencies as also direct briefing of the Cabinet Committee on Security by Chiefs and C-in C rank officers. Key recommendations are at Appendix A⁴⁴.
- (b) **The Group of Ministers (GoM) Report, 2000** Subsequent to the presentation of the Kargil Committee Report to the Parliament, the then PM, constituted a GoM on 17 April 2000 to review the national security system in its entirety and to implement the recommendations made by the KRC. The GoM, while agreeing with the KRC on the need for restructuring of the defence apparatus, differed on its implementation. At the centre of the reforms was the need to create the positions of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS), creation of a tri-services command at Andaman & Nicobar Command (ANC) and the Strategic Forces Command (SFC). It also

⁴³ Website of NSC, <http://www.allgov.com/india/departments/ministry-of-youth-affairs-and-sports/national-security-council?agencyid=7599#overviewcont>

⁴⁴ <https://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/KargilRCA.html>



recommended no dilution in the role of the Defence Secretary as the 'Principal Defence Adviser' to the Defence Minister.

Refer Appendix B for salient aspects (Full report at <https://www.vifindia.org/sites/default/files/GoM%20Report%20on%20National%20Security.pdf>).

- (c) **Naresh Chandra Task Force** In 2012, another task force was set up under the Chairmanship of Naresh Chandra on the follow up of the GoM report. Though the report's recommendations are not available in public domain, in various unofficial discussions it emerges that the Task Force made some incremental recommendations including integration of the Service HQs and MoD by cross posting of officers, the appointment of a Permanent Chairman of the COSC. It also endorsed revamping of Intelligence as also setting up of Tri Service Commands for Space, Cyber and Special Operations. Refer Appendix C for key recommendations.

- 5.11 **Progress of Defence Reforms** Despite number of committees and their recommendations, implementation of these reforms was tardy and half hearted. As far as HDO is concerned, HQ Integrated Defence Staff, a Tri-Service Joint HQ raised in 2001 has been the only tangible outcome of the KRC and GoM reports besides the semantic renaming of Service HQs as Integrated HQs of MoD. With no operational role and lacking authority due to non existence of a CDS, HQ IDS remains, at best, a coordinating HQ performing routine staff functions. It was only on New Year's Day 2020 that the Government announced the appointment of the first Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) to enable his functioning.

detailed analysis of the Charter assigned to the new department and the CDS will be discussed later. However, to enable further discussion, the current Indian HDO is outlined in the Figures 5.1 & 5.2.



Brief Comparison – Foreign Models

5.12 Models of CMR followed in the USA, UK & France were studied as all three are mature democracies with governance structures similar to ours. Relevant details are at Appendix D. Study of all the models indicate few salient aspects relevant in the Indian context:-

- (a) Pursuit of war has posed similar challenges elsewhere in the world, demanding equal attention from soldiers as well as statesmen, diplomats and bureaucrats.
- (b) Almost all modern democracies have evolved suitable CMR models which promote healthy dialogue among the civilians and the military, have an integrated MoD with single point Civilian and Military Advisors (of equivalent status) on defence matters.
- (c) In all cases, the MoD is headed by a Cabinet Minister and both the Civilian Bureaucrat dealing with defence and the CDS/ Joint Chief of Staff report directly to him. Invariably, the Armed Forces are an integral part of the Ministry/ Department.
- (d) All models, in some form conform to the Concordance Theory resulting in smooth CMR without compromising basic tenets of 'Civilian Control'.

5.13 A comparison with different global models indicates that while other nations have evolved their CMR through intense debate and discussion, we have failed to do so despite recommendations of so many committees and Task Forces, perhaps due to systemic inertia and lack of political will⁴⁵.

5.14 In this backdrop, the appointment of the CDS and the DMA has ushered in a glimmer of hope.

⁴⁵ Response to Survey Questionnaire substantiates this viewpoint.

CHAPTER – 6

NATIONAL SECURITY, CMR AND CIVILIAN CONTROL

- 6.1 It is important to examine the system especially those issues that lie at the core of military aspects of national security viz. position of the military as an instrument of state power in the contemporary milieu, strategic direction and oversight, capability development, morale of the military and jointness within various arms of the armed forces would be examined. The linkages between CMR, national security and civilian control will be studied using examples from past events and situations in order to establish that healthy CMR lead to stronger synergetic joint responses to national security without affecting tenets of 'Civilian Control'.
- 6.2 **Analysis of the Structure** In order to make an objective assessment of the extant Institutional Framework for CMR in India as an enabler of useful interaction between stakeholders, there is a need for critical analysis. Since the DMA and the office of the CDS have been in the decision making cycle for only two years, the same is not being factored in at this stage.
- (a) **Flow of Authority & Rules of Business** At the apex is the CCS headed by the PM who exercises authority over the RM. The RM, has under him five verticals i.e the DoD, DRDO, DESW and DDP each headed by a Secretary from the Civil Services and the DMA headed by a four star Armed Forces Officer. The Defence Secretary who is responsible for the defence of India was acting as the senior most coordinator among the four departments headed by the Civil Service Officers. The three services are attached offices, earlier with the DoD and now with the DMA. None of the verticals of the MoD except the

DMA are institutionally manned by service officers, though some officers are posted on limited task based deputations. While the Secretaries, as heads of departments have complete financial powers, as also direct access to the RM, the Service Chiefs despite their relatively higher position in the 'table of precedence' vis-à-vis Defence Secretary are required to move all approvals through the DoD. With the DMA in place, some aspects as per re-distributed charter are being routed through the CDS/DMA. The same channel is followed for plans and proposal. Quite similar to the upward flow, the executive orders also follow the same route. It may be noted that unlike in countries like USA where the Chief of Army is directly reporting to the Secretary of the Army, the Service Chiefs have had no direct access for sanctions and orders even to the RRM/RM, let alone the PM, Cabinet or the Parliament, unless specifically called.

- (b) **Planning & Advice** For the purpose of planning and advice towards policy formulation on matters related to national security, the forums available are the CCS and the NSC⁴⁶ led by the NSA. Under the NSA

⁴⁶ Domestic and foreign security, conventional and non-conventional defence, military matters, counter-insurgency, aerospace and advanced technology, economics, counter-terrorism, and the ecology are all handled by the NSC. The NSC is divided into three levels. The three tiers are Strategic Policy Group (SPG), National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) and the Secretariat represented by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). NSC members apart from the NSA are : Deputy National Security Advisor (DNSA), Minister of Defence, Minister of External Affairs, Minister of Home Affairs, Minister of Finance and Deputy Chairman of the NITI Aayog. The military has no representation in this tier. The Strategic Policy Group is the first level of the NSC structure. It is headed by the NSA and includes the chiefs of staff from the Army, Navy and Air Force, the governor of Reserve Bank of India, Secretaries of the ministries of Home, Defence, External Affairs, Finance, Foreign Affairs, Revenue, Research and Analysis Wing of Cabinet Secretariat, Dept. of Atomic Energy, Department of Space, Department of Defence Production and Supplies, Scientific Advisor to the Defence Minister, and several other secretaries of union ministries and the Director of the Intelligence Bureau. Other invitees can be added as required. The Strategic Defence Review — a draft of short- and long-term security threats and defence problems for the apex body to evaluate – is published by the SPG. At the second level of the NSC structure, lies the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB). The constituting members are “persons of eminence” outside the Government with expertise in external security, strategic analysis, foreign affairs, defence, the armed forces, internal security, science and technology and economics.

is the Strategic Planning Group (SPG) (previously headed by the Cabinet Secretary) and now being chaired by the NSA. Formally the three service Chiefs are only members of the SPG while they may be invitees to other forums. Thus their advisory capacity on matters of national security to the political leadership is highly curtailed. The NSAB and the NSCS headed by the Dy NSA are manned by civilians, serving officers of the rank of Colonels and some retired officers. It also has the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC).

- (c) **Internal Interaction** For interaction within the MoD there are no formalised committees at the Service Chief's level other than those specifically for acquisitions. For joint and tri-service matters there are various committees with COSC as the highest. It is only after the establishment of the DMA that the COSC enjoys direct access to the RM, albeit only on matters falling under charter assigned to the DMA. Though HQ IDS is a joint HQ, it has not been effective so far due to lack of authority. Even as per the current charter, with no operational role assigned to the CDS and acquisition remaining with the DoD, its effectiveness would be limited till further reforms are affected. There is no tri-service forum for Joint Operational Planning and with the Chiefs still in charge of service specific operations, the CDS lacks sufficient authority for the same.
- (d) **Political Control Vs Bureaucratic Control** An assessment of almost all factors listed in Paras 6.1 (a) to (c) indicates that military's

The council's think tank is the NSAB. On referral from the NSC, it holds monthly meetings to offer solutions and policy challenges to policymakers. The third level is the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). Modelled on its British counterpart, the JIC is responsible for directing the national intelligence organizations and analysing intelligence data functions under the NSC.

denial of access to the political leadership has replaced the concept of 'civilian supremacy' with a distorted version which actually establishes 'bureaucratic control' over the armed forces. To make matters worse, the dialogue so essential for healthy CMR is almost non-existent.

- (e) **Status of the Armed Forces** If the relegation of SHQ to 'attached offices' was an 'act of commission', which made the military subaltern to the bureaucrat, it was followed by an equally damaging 'act of omission'. This was the failure to accord recognition to the functions and status of its armed forces. Article 312 of the Constitution created the IAS and IPS (later also the Indian Forest Service) as 'All India Services'. Another category known as the Central Civil Services, consisting of 89 Group A and B services was inherited from the British. While the 'All India' as well as Group A and B services are recognised by the Gol, the armed forces and their Chiefs find no mention in the Constitution of India or any Act of Parliament. Even the Gol Allocation of Business (AoB) rules ignored them till recently. Ironically, amongst the Group A & B services are the Indian Defence Service of Engineers (IDSE), Indian Defence Accounts Service (IDAS), Indian Defence Estates Service (IDES), Border Roads Engineering Services (BRES), Defence Research & Development Service (DRDS), Naval Armament Service (NAS), Indian Ordnance Factories Service (IOFS) and Defence Quality Assurance Service (DQAS); all of them, created to provide support services to the military.

6.3 **Ability to Support National Security Responses** The institutional framework on this aspect as per the identified parameters is analysed below.

- (a) **Provision of Strategic Guidance to the Military** For planning to deal with emerging external and internal threats the military needs strategic guidance in form of National Security Strategy and Planning Guidance. Other than limited assessments by the NSC, which are more in advisory capacity, the current institutional framework is inadequately structured to provide such guidance. Despite the DoD being responsible for the defence of the country, the department manned solely by generalist bureaucrats remains severely constrained in this regard. Conversely, with India gaining stature and influence in the new world order and harbouring aspirations of a net security provider in the South Asia, national security responses have to be viewed in terms of CNP. It is imperative that the military is periodically updated on new developments and its professional advice sought for policy formulation. In this context, periodic interactions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Congressional Committees in the US, is a useful framework to emulate. While various intelligence committees like the IB, JIC, NTRO and DIA do have some convergence at the NSC, a formal institutionalised mechanism is yet to be put in place for sharing of information and briefing the stakeholders. The Chinese overtures in 1962, the Kargil incursions in 1999, the Mumbai attack in 2008 and the recent transgressions by PLA along the LAC point towards this deficiency. Our military response in each of the operational scenarios could have benefitted

by a more cogent policy response. Since, a proper well oiled decision making structure was lacking, the military response was also slow to pick pace although local military commanders performed admirably in their areas of responsibility. For example, non-usage of optimal air power in 1962 and 1999, only resulted in tactical disadvantages to the nation. A more congruent and well informed decision making structure might have made the decision to fully utilise air power and thereby achieve tangible military successes. Last, but perhaps the most significant deficiency in this regard is the ability of the MoD to provide operational oversight to the military during operations or times of crises. This responsibility, as in March, 2022, rests solely with the NSA who has limited staff with cross domain experience.

- (b) **Capability Development** Stephen Cohen, in his famous book, 'Arming Without Aiming'⁴⁷, succinctly highlights this issue which is problematic at multiple levels. The author argues that India is building up its military strength in the absence of a clearly articulated strategic direction. The political leadership in India has historically emphasised "strategic restraint." The concept is vague and leaves the armed forces rudderless. Resultantly, the three services orient their strategic thinking as per their own interpretations and threat perceptions. Firstly, the issue of prioritisation of capability development plans, both within and between Services. In the absence of strategic guidance and national security requirements, the Services are left to themselves to plan as per their own priorities. Secondly, there is no

⁴⁷ Stephen P Cohen, Arming Without Aiming

authoritative forum for joint planning responsibilities, there are competing demands on the acquisition budget. Thirdly, as crucial stakeholders, the armed forces have focused only on maintaining 'current combat capability', thereby ignoring the future of our defence-industry. In absence of adequate expertise at the MoD, its ability to correctly point out such issues is limited. In fact, the only recourse followed is to raise multiple observations based on the financial aspects rather than professional evaluation. The sequential decision making process followed, wherein a generalist official can return a file endorsed by Service Chiefs with even frivolous observation does not help in this regard. Fourthly, the three SHQs are excluded from DRDO's decision-making and budget allocation, giving Secretary DRDO complete freedom to propose, approve and dispose of proposals, many times on demonstration of technologies with little bearing on military capabilities. No instrumentality exists for independent review of scientific proposals, cross-checking exaggerated claims, or pinpointing failure to deliver weapon systems on time, cost and performance for the DRDO as well as Defence PSUs and OFB. No heads have ever rolled, because they remain shielded by the DDP bureaucracy.

- (c) **Autonomy in Execution of Operations** Compartmentalisation of civil military responsibilities which gained prominence in the Indian context after the Indo-China War has in fact provided a free hand to the Services in executing operations. While, most service officers are content with this arrangement, it is detrimental in the contemporary

security milieu on two counts. Firstly, as proven during Operation Brasstacks (1986) and Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) deployment in Sri Lanka, stand alone military assessments may go wrong in absence of informed oversight. The MoD with its current structure and staffing is not capable of providing this oversight. Further, due to this 'unchecked' autonomy in operations, coupled with lack of joint planning structures and HQs, there is no incentive for the Services to think and plan jointly. The late entry of the IAF during Kargil operations of 1999, its initial setbacks and spectacular synergy with the Army thereafter, is testimony to this assumption. The COSC, which hitherto had a Chairman on rotational basis, has also come under severe criticism for not being effective on this count.

(d) **HR Issues Affecting Training and Morale of Stakeholders**

Perhaps the most vexing of all is this issue of HR, morale and training of stakeholders. At the forefront have been the controversies over one-rank one-pension, rank equivalence and pay commission anomalies which are all symptoms of deeper problems. This absence of recognition and lack of defined status of the military has worked to the detriment of India's military in many ways. Successive Pay Commissions, using arbitrary equivalences, have depressed the Armed Forces, relative to the Central Civil Services as well as All India Services. The Chiefs actually have no *locus standi* in the structure of the GoI, and the SHQ can be overruled at any level of the MoD. Secondly, while there is talk of cross posting of officers to different departments for an integrated MoD, the moot question is,

“are there enough officers adequately trained and experienced for such duties?” For the civilians, who have little experience in military matters, there is felt need for training and in some cases, specialisation for performance of their duties. Similarly, for prospective service officers to be cross posted to the MoD, training and experience would be a constraint. For senior officers to be proficient enough to render professional advice on policy and strategy related to national defence, fair amount of situational awareness and knowledge on matters beyond the military would be necessary. A healthy two way dialogue between the military and the political leaders was lacking due to want of a suitable institutional platform – the COSC not having access, the RM’s morning meetings being too informal and the Chiefs not attending critical CCS meetings; all led to an information void detrimental to national security responses. The Kargil War highlighted the marked difference in synergetic functioning of the HDO and consequent decision making during peace time with that followed during the Kargil crisis. While it was not very difficult to extend the same system after the War was over, intransigence of the civilian bureaucrats coupled with the lack of political will precluded the same.

Cross Linkages – National Security, CMR and Civilian Control

6.4 Much of what needs to be done to rectify the anomalies has been amply highlighted in the recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee Report and that of the GoM, as highlighted earlier in this study. Institution of the CDS and establishment of the DMA have already kick started the much needed

reform process. What is essential at this stage is maturity by the Services and the bureaucracy to accept the need for change, overcoming narrow turf based mindsets and the political will to pursue these reforms till their logical conclusion. In order to smoothly undertake this transition, it is important to revisit the linkages between National Security, CMR and Civilian Control.

- 6.5 **CMR, National Security Response** Peter Feaver considers CMR to be highly vexing as it involves balancing two essential yet conflicting societal desiderata. On the one hand, the military must be strong enough to prevail in war as its very purpose is the requirement to either attack potential enemies or to defend their attacks. It needs to be ever prepared, organized and sized appropriately to meet the envisaged threats. On the other, it must have inbuilt institutional checks so that it does not use its strength to threaten the very polity it is required to protect. Hence, the need for civilian control without impeding its capabilities as it “serves no purpose to establish a protection force and then to vitiate it to the point where it can no longer protect.”⁴⁸ Hence, the operative word in this equation is balance. Excessive control, as demonstrated during the Sino-Indian war in the Indian context, promotes a divided and supine military leadership. One may recall the famous snub delivered by Pandit Nehru when General Cariappa, warned him of the Chinese threat in 1951. Cariappa was told; “It is not the business of the Commander-in-Chief to tell the Prime Minister who is going to attack us

⁴⁸ Op.cit. Peter D. Feaver, Civil-Military Relations, Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci 44 George K Tanham, Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretive Essay, 1992, <https://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R4207.html> 45 One central hypothesis of the study is that political dominance and high preference divergence generate flawed strategic assessment. These values produce weakness in strategic coordination in that the oversight mechanisms used by political leaders truncate conversation and debate about strategic assessment. Furthermore, powerful political leaders elevate like-minded individuals and marginalize dissenters. Risa Brookes, The Civil-Military Politics of Strategic Assessment, Security Studies Program Seminar, Northwest University, Sep 2006

where. In fact the Chinese will defend our eastern frontier.” George Tanham⁴⁹, a RAND Corporation researcher highlighted the role and status of the military in India as a manifestation of lopsided strategic thinking. Commenting on “tight civilian control of the military”, Tanham points out that India has pursued this policy to a point, “where the military have almost no input at all in the formulation of higher defence policy and national strategy.” He further goes on to quote “Prime Minister Nehru...neglected the military, giving it few resources and downgrading its top leadership....while increasing the status and pay of both civil servants and the police.” Such relations obviously do not serve the nation well. The need for a strong, ethical climate that discriminates between ‘pliant-going-along’ and the ‘principled-professional opposition’ is often the difference between a defeat and victory. Another example, so relevant in the contemporary milieu, used by Risa Brookes is that of the US strategic assessment failure in post conflict planning of the Iraq War. She highlights that the quality of information exchange, coordination, robust military structural and the authorisation process directly affect effective strategic decision making⁵⁰.

6.6 In contrast, Eliot Cohen in his book, Supreme Command, while exploring the interaction between four wartime statesmen (Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill and Ben-Gurion) and their generals quotes:-

⁴⁹ George K Tanham, Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretive Essay, 1992, <https://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R4207.html>

⁵⁰ Risa Brookes, The Civil-Military Politics of Strategic Assessment, Security Studies Program Seminar, Northwest University, Sep 2006 (One central hypothesis of the study is that political dominance and high preference divergence generate flawed strategic assessment. These values produce weakness in strategic coordination in that the oversight mechanisms used by political leaders truncate conversation and debate about strategic assessment. Furthermore, powerful political leaders elevate like-minded individuals and marginalize dissenters.)

“Interestingly enough, none of these men dictated to their subordinates. They might coax or bully, interrogate or probe, but rarely do we see them issuing orders or acting like a generalissimo. Each tolerated, indeed promoted men who disagreed with them, forcefully. (Generals) Grant, Foch, Brooke and Yadin were not weaklings and did not hesitate to argue ... What occurred between president or prime minister and general was an unequal dialogue – a dialogue, in that both sides expressed their views bluntly, indeed, sometimes offensively, and not once but repeatedly – and unequal only in that the final authority of the civilian leader was unambiguous and unquestioned – indeed, in all cases stronger at the end of a war than it had been at the beginning”.

6.7 **Integration and Civilian Control** Coming to the other end of the balance which deals with the military’s loyalty to the society, Finer and Welch⁵¹ argue that civilian control techniques fall into two broad groupings: those that affect the ability of the military to subvert control and those that motivate it into obedience. The first category employs legal frameworks or means to keep the military small in size, weak and away from centre of power. Promoting verticals based on specializations also keep the military divided and coup proof; so do the raising of counter veiling institutions such as paramilitary forces in strength. Peter Feaver, however, argues that since these measures weaken the military and reduce its effectiveness, the correct methodology lies in motivating the military into obedience. This may be translated into practice by either adjusting the recruitment characteristics so as to be populated by people inclined to obey, or incentivising the soldiers into obedience. In the

⁵¹ Finer 1962, Welch 1976

Indian context, a combined mix of almost all techniques alluded to above have been applied to good results in so far as nurturing a military with unflinching loyalty to the nation is concerned. Retrofitting this thought to basic CMR theories throws up interesting comparisons. The Civilian, be it the Politicians or Bureaucracy, have largely relied on the 'Agency' theory in dealing with the Military, keeping it both apart and subordinate. The central fault in India's CMR today is not that of civilian control, but more about bureaucracy-military relations. Clearly, it is time now that 'Concordance' theory which underlies not only the aspirations of the Indian Armed Forces but would also enable synergised national security responses is applied. In establishing an institutional framework supporting the professional military would continue to motivate and incentivise it into obedience. Such an approach when viewed in the context of the theories of Reductionism and Holism, conforms to that of Holism, leading to a systems response rather than a fragmented and narrow one.

- 6.8 How the healthy interaction between the professional expert in Manekshaw, and the informed civilians in the team represented by Indira Gandhi, Jagjivan Ram, KB Lal and PN Dhar ultimately ensured victory for the nation in 1971 War by facilitating better national security response has been highlighted in para 5.8. The same thought is empirically reinforced by Eliot Cohen's observations on the wartime 'unequal dialogue' quoted at Para 6.6 of this study. Therefore, there are no two thoughts that a suitable platform or Institutional Framework enabling professional interaction results in healthy CMR and consequently, synergized and effective national security responses without compromising civilian control.

CHAPTER – 7

THE CDS, DMA AND THE ROAD AHEAD

7.1 The recent reforms (December 2019 onwards) in the national security architecture, appointing the CDS and establishing the DMA have been discussed in various seminars in several think tanks such as The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) and the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) (to name a few). These discussions have tried to analyse the impact of these reforms in addressing the concerns raised by previous committees and task forces on defence reforms.

The Big Reform

7.2 The Cabinet Committee of Appointments approved the post of the CDS and instituted the DMA under the MoD on 30 Dec 2019⁵². The appointment of the CDS, having been recommended by various Task Forces such as Kargil Review Committee (1999) and the Naresh Chandra Task Force in 2012 was on expected lines (discussed in detail in these committee reports appended at Appendix A and B). However, the DMA, being a unique organisation without precedence anywhere else emerged as a surprise, though a welcome one. For the military in particular and the larger issue of healthy CMR in general, these developments represent monumental reforms which not only offer a host of opportunities to correct many wrongs (referred to earlier on para 5.3 and para 5.6) of last seven decades, but also bring with them a host of challenges. It is important to analyse their charter.

⁵² Inserted vide Amendment Series no. 353 dated 30.12.2019 in Schedule 2 Ser 9 of the AoB 1961

7.3 **CDS.** As per the press release by the GoI on 24 Dec 2019⁵³, the CDS is to hold the rank of a four-star General with salary and perquisites equivalent to a Service Chief. He will also head the DMA, to be created within the MoD and function as its Secretary. He will also be the Permanent Chairman of the COSC. He will act as the Principal Military Adviser to RM on all tri-services matters while the three Chiefs will continue to advise RM on matters exclusively concerning their respective domains. CDS will not exercise any military command, including over the three Service Chiefs, so as to be able to provide impartial advice to the political leadership. As the Permanent Chairman, COSC he will be responsible for the following functions:-

- (a) Tri-service agencies/organisations/commands related to Cyber and Space will be under his command.
- (b) Member of Defence Acquisition Council chaired by Raksha Mantri and Defence Planning Committee chaired by NSA.
- (c) Function as the Military Adviser to the Nuclear Command Authority.
- (d) Bring about joint-ness in operation, logistics, transport, training, support services, communications, repairs and maintenance, etc of the three Services, within three years assuming office.
- (e) Ensure optimal utilisation of infrastructure and rationalize it through joint-ness among the services.
- (f) Implement Five-Year Defence Capital Acquisition Plan (DCAP), and Two-Year roll-on Annual Acquisition Plans (AAP), as a follow up of Integrated Capability Development Plan (ICDP).

⁵³ <https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseDetail.aspx?PRID=1597425>

- (g) Assign inter-Services prioritisation to capital acquisition proposals based on the anticipated budget.
- (h) Bring about reforms in the functioning of three Services aimed at augmenting combat capabilities of the Armed Forces by reducing wasteful expenditure.

7.4 **DMA** The complete charter of the DMA is available at <https://www.staffnews.in/2020/01/allocation-of-work-and-staff-between-dod-and-newly-created-dma.html> . Broadly, the same can be outlined as follows:-

- (a) The Armed Forces of the Union, namely, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force.
- (b) Integrated Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence comprising Army Headquarters, Naval Headquarters, Air Headquarters and Defence Staff Headquarters.
- (c) The Territorial Army
- (d) Works relating to the Army, the Navy and the Air Force.
- (e) Procurement exclusive to the Services except capital acquisitions, as per prevalent rules and procedures.

7.5 In addition to the above, the mandate also includes promoting jointness in procurement, training and staffing for the Services through joint planning and integration of their requirements, facilitation of restructuring of Military Commands for optimal utilization of resources by bringing about jointness in operations, including through establishment of joint/theatre commands and promoting use of indigenous equipment by the Services⁵⁴.

⁵⁴ Lt. Gen. AK Singh PVSM, AVSM, SM, VSM (Retd.) and R Chandrashekhar, Appointment of Chief of Defence Staff and Creation of the Department of Military Affairs – A Gamechanger, 01 May 2020, <https://www.claws.in/appointment-of-chief-of-defence-staff-and-creation-of-the-department-of-military-affairs-a-gamechanger/>

Prognosis

7.6 **Deciphering the New Mandate** At the first instance, these reforms, appear to be incomplete as satisfactory answers to all the questions alluded to at various points in the study are not available. This demands an in-depth study. An analysis of the defined charter indicates that the functioning of the DoD has been divided into three primary power verticals. Firstly, the DoD itself; it retains most of the support functions for the Services as also the larger issue of defence policy and with it the responsibility of defence of the country. It also continues to retain the final responsibility for capital procurements while the prioritisation of the same has been assigned to the DMA. The Services, while remaining attached offices (now under the DMA instead of the DoD) are operationally, still under command their respective Chiefs. Virtually all other functions regarding the Services have been brought under the CDS. At the macro level, the underlying intent of the GoI may be interpreted as under:-

- (a) The DoD has been split into two sub departments, the operational half headed by the CDS and the facilitator part headed by the Defence Secretary.
- (b) Both verticals have been granted independent and direct access to the RM.
- (c) At this stage, the intent of the Government appears to be to usher in further reforms to enhance operational efficiency, promote jointness, remove duplicities to downsize and curtail expenditure. These being joint and Tri-Service functions related to operations, the responsibility has been assigned to the CDS.

- (d) In order to allow the CDS to retain impartial focus on GoI priorities alluded to above as also to ensure that operational readiness of the defence forces does not suffer during this transition, the CDS has been assigned minimum operational responsibilities at this stage.
- (e) Accordingly, the three Service Chiefs retain operational control of their respective Services, as also service specific advisory role.
- (f) The CDS however, has been vested with operational command of the tri-service entities. This would not only assist him in approaching his responsibility towards setting up of the Joint/ Functional Commands in a better manner, but would also allow his HQ/ HQ IDS in gaining much needed Tri-Service operational experience.
- (g) Keeping in view the time bound mandate assigned to the CDS and the DMA, these reforms and current responsibilities appear to be the first stage of a series of incremental reforms to follow, depending on the progress achieved.

7.7 **Implications on CMR** In the context of recommendations of numerous Task Forces, it is pertinent to find out - “what has changed and what has not. .” The following issues are germane:-

- (a) There is definite shift in the degree of autonomy, the government intends to grant to the armed forces. Consequently, this portends an improvement in the status of the Armed Forces and consequently progress towards healthy CMR leading to improved national security responses. However, with the Services continuing to remain as attached offices, and no recognition of the Armed Forces personnel in the Constitution, considerable ground is still to be covered.

- (b) Fair degree of autonomy for financial approvals as also single point military advice mark a welcome shift from “bureaucratic control” to “civilian control” in the true sense.
- (c) Sets the stage for a greater role in policy making for the military. However, inclusion of the CDS in the NSC would have accorded a formality to the role.
- (d) While the DMA would be jointly manned, the issue of a fully integrated MoD remains unaddressed as other verticals of the ministry would continue to be constrained by a largely generalist bureaucracy without informed expert advice. Similarly, DRDO and OFB would continue to be plagued by lack of informed Service advice as well as oversight and accountability.
- (e) Making the CDS responsible for prioritisation of capital procurements.
- (f) There has been no mention of a more inclusive NSC and a formal institutionalised mechanism for information sharing with other agencies.

7.8 **Inadequacies** The above analysis indicates that although there has been progress in defence reforms, considerable ground still needs to be covered with regard to a completely integrated MoD, recognition of the Services as part of the government, inclusion of military leadership in the NSC and change in overall responsibility for defence of the country, presently with the DoD. Till such time the CDS is kept out of defence policy formulation and resource allocation with the Defence Secretary driving the agenda, the organic problems will remain unaddressed. Greater autonomy to the Services and an inclusive role in defence policy formulation are indispensable for optimising

the National Security related decision making loop, an imperative for efficient and responsive responses commensurate to India's position in the current world order.

7.9 **Challenges** The GoI has reposed immense faith in the Services in instituting these reforms, overcoming decades of inertia and intransigence. Therefore, not only is it incumbent upon the Services in concert with other stakeholders to achieve the mandate set by the GoI, it is imperative to ensure that the reforms succeed so that progression to the next envisaged stage may follow. Nonetheless the task ahead is well cut out with numerous challenges.

(a) **Establishing the DMA.** The DMA has hit the road running, in that it has already assumed its charter concurrently with its raising. This presents challenges similar to a large corporate start up, but since the DMA deals with critical issues of national security the option of failure is non-existent. At the conceptual level, it involves demarcation of duties and responsibilities with the DMA which is not simplistic. For the CDS personally, the requirement of wearing multiple hats as the Secretary DMA, the Chairman COSC and the Commander of Tri-Service Commands would be extremely demanding and he would need to delegate some duties to HQ IDS and CISC.

(b) **Selection and Staffing.** Among other issues, selection and training of suitable staff, hands on formulation and refining of SOPs and establishing vertical and lateral working relationships would be a major responsibility. Without previous experience, this could prove to be an imposing task especially for officers trained in career specific duties, conditioned to work in different environment and above all, constrained

by short tenures managed by personnel branches as per career profile of officers.

- (c) **Shedding Parent Service Baggage.** DMA is premised on a nationalistic organisation whose success hinges on discard of past baggage. Therefore military personnel manning various billets must perform their duties objectively without coloured vision ruthlessly shunning Service loyalties. Expectations from bureaucracy are similar.
- (d) **Pragmatism and Professional Honesty.** While the GoI has laid down a time-bound mandate for Joint Service Commands and rightsizing, the approach to successful completion of such tasks must be pragmatic and with professional honesty. In our exuberance to complete the mandate, the final outcome must not be lost sight of, lest it is detrimental to overall national security – the very inadequacy which was the *raison d'être* for this reform. All responsibilities must be fulfilled with utmost fairness and actions above reproach.

The Way Ahead

7.10 Considering the prognosis arrived at, it would serve the objective of this study to suggest recommendations and way ahead. A questionnaire with various thoughts and ideas on the subject was floated to an informed peer group to ascertain their views (refer Appendix F). 250 responses were received. Pertinent recommendations are elucidated below:-

- (a) Being the first step to further reform the defence architecture of the nation, raising of the DMA be completed at the earliest along with the demarcation of responsibilities with DoD. (Suggested distribution of broad responsibilities is at Appendix E).

- (b) Restructure HQ IDS as an operational Tri-Service HQ directly under the DMA, to initially support establishment of the DMA, subsequently control the extant Tri-Service entities with an ultimate aim of supporting the Tri-Service Commands, once raised and functional.
- (c) Focus on creation of Tri-Service Commands catering for the turbulence and disruptions and their impact on national security responses during transition. The approach should be firm, capability centric and outcome based with pragmatic timelines keeping in mind selection and preparation of joint staff without compromising operational effectiveness. Setting up of the alternate command chain and apex Joint HQ must be concurrent.
- (d) Once the DMA is functional, the process for complete integration of the MoD must commence. This would pose challenges for selection and training of officers (both civil and military) for cross posting for which experience of staffing of DMA should be fully utilised.
- (e) All branches of the MoD and the Service HQs must have both military and civilian officers at appropriate level with independent channel of command terminating at the Head of the Department.
- (f) A formal mechanism for selection and training of officers for cross posting be formalized among the Services as well as the DoPT. To cater to training needs, syllabi and vacancy structure (for both students and faculty) at the DSSC, Service War Colleges, IIPA, NDC, Civil Service and Police Academies and IPA be revisited.
- (g) Structures and organisation responsible for Strategy formulation at National Level be revisited for more inclusiveness and institutional

meetings/ briefing/ sharing of information be formalised. The NSC to be expanded to include the CDS as member and Tri-Service Commanders as attendees. An appropriate forum for Tri-Service Commanders to interact with the RM whenever required must be formalised.

- (h) In order to enable defence expertise and military oversight by non-military officers at the MoD and NSC, a specialist cadre qualified in appropriate areas like cyber, space, strategy, nuclear issues, International Relations and country specialists etc may be considered.
- (i) An appropriate quota of 5-10% in central civil services be reserved for ex military officers to serve the dual purpose of incentivizing SS entry in the Services and availability of hands on experience from 'Tour of Duty' to the civil services.
- (j) The Service HQs be recognised as departments/ sub departments in the MoD/ DMA.
- (k) Government orders be appropriately amended to recognise military officers as per their appropriate status in the Gol.
- (l) The rank structure of the CDS, CISC(Dy CDS), C-in-Cs of Joint Commands and their Component Commanders be reviewed commensurate to their counterparts in the civil to cater for long outstanding cadre review, as also to compensate for reduction in Service specific Commands.
- (m) On finalisation of Joint Commands, respective Chiefs be divested of operational responsibility with channel of command shifting to the CDS.

- (n) **Revised MoD Structure** The proposed structure indicated at Figure 4 aims towards co-ordination of effort, integrated planning, shared procurement and a reduction or elimination of inter-service rivalry. It will also provide unity of command, conforming to modern military thought. Individual Services would change from relatively autonomous war fighting entities into organisational and training hubs, responsible for acquisition, modernisation, force structuring and deployment and operational readiness as a component of the Integrated Armed Forces HQ and as per the Joint Directives and Doctrines issued by the CDS. (Refer Appendix F).




Figure 7.1

7.11 There can be no doubt that the armed forces, after decades of clamouring, have been accorded an historic opportunity to usher-in reforms. It is imperative that this opportunity is appropriately leveraged to ensure that the armed forces, as vital instruments of state, are firmly integrated with the apex

structure of the central government. Having established its position as an integral part of the GoI, the DMA must ensure that the basic flaws which have disempowered the military, since independence, are remedied. Concurrently, the DMA must formulate a time-bound roadmap for bringing about integration and right-sizing of the armed forces with the aim of enhancing combat effectiveness and effecting economy. The DMA must move with due deliberation, and after consultation with all stake holders. It is imperative to get it right in the first time.

Research Questions and Answers

7.12 Dynamics of CMR in a Democracy and its Implication

- (a) In democracies, militaries exist to protect the state and its people and therefore must be subservient to the Govt of the day. Hence, 'civilian control' of the military is imperative. However, excessive control could result in tensions in CMR and consequently, suboptimal security responses.
- (b) 'Civilian control' has many interpretations – from Huntington's traditional 'Objective Control' which allocates compartmentalised operating space to the civil and the military to Cohen's modern thought on 'Unequal Dialogue', which offers room for transgression into each others' domain while retaining the civilians' right to prevail. Dialogue is vital, not only for healthy CMR but robust security response options.
- (c) The civil and the military interact via a formal Institutional Framework, in most cases the MoD, as per various theories. Ministries may be military dominated, civil predominant or integrated.

- (d) While integrated ministries are likely to have healthier CMR, effective civilian control is a challenge in military dominated ones. On the other hand, civilian predominant ones are likely to suffer from friction due to lack of capability for informed oversight as also limited 'military autonomy' arising from trust deficit.
- (e) Provision of strategic guidance to the military, degree of its capability development and modernisation, extent of autonomy to Armed Forces in execution of operations and HR issues affecting training and morale of stakeholders are four broad parameters that have been used in this study to assess the quality of national security response.

7.13 **CMR in India : Evolution of Existing Policies, Rules and Regulations**

- (a) An analysis of the evolution of existing policies, rules and regulations with regards to CMR in India, indicates beyond doubt that civilian control in the Indian context has a different connotation. In India's unique system of democracy, a layer of civilian bureaucracy has interposed itself between the political leadership and an isolated military establishment.
- (b) The term 'civil-military', thus, implies a three-cornered relationship encompassing political and bureaucratic players on one hand and the military on the other. This relationship has, over the years, evolved into a triangle of discord, tension and indifference; whose most damaging impact has been a stasis in national security affairs.
- (c) While the effects of this unhealthy CMR were evident as far back in history as the 1962 Indo-China war, the system failed to correct itself. Instead it further plunged into compartmentalised zones of demarcated

responsibility between the civil and the military instead of an integrated system geared for synergized responses.

- (d) The period between 1962 and 1998, where India conducted two successful military operations (1965 and 1971 wars with Pakistan), did not provide room for much introspection, further cementing the flawed CMR framework. It was only after the nuclear tests of 1998 and the limited war in Kargil that the national leadership displayed intent to reform.
- (e) Consequent to that, various committees setup have recommended a host of reforms – most important being the appointment of the CDS. In this context, the appointment of the CDS and the DMA has provided lot of optimism towards a better future for Indian CMR.

7.14 Shortcomings in Existing Institutional Framework for CMR in India and Affect on National Security Response

The core problem related with CMR in India is that the military, politicians, and bureaucrats function in separate silos and as a result of this domain segmentation there is inadequate meaningful interaction between the civil and military components of the Indian state. The fact that the silos themselves are separated internally further complicates things. There are significant intra-service and inter-service differences at play. The absence of civilian knowledge in military affairs at both the bureaucratic and political levels, as well as the lack of an institutional design that places the military under strong bureaucratic supervision, are two fundamental flaws in CMR.

7.15 The CMR architecture in India is highly compartmentalised and skewed, precluding optimal synergised response to national security problems. This

has had negative implications for national security. Two of the most pronounced affects are :-

- (a) Military strategy and doctrinal innovation frequently run afoul and during times of temporary crises or wars, contradictions in political and military objectives make a seamless implementation of political and military strategy considerably more difficult. Indian civil–military relations are complicated as a result of the friction in long term military plans and the requirement for clearly specified military objectives is evidenced by India's recurring border confrontations with Pakistan/China. As a result, Indian military responses must be calibrated in a way that incorporates the success of India's long-term political and military goals.
- (b) The bureaucracy's role as an intermediate agency between the political leadership and the military is severely impeding direct civil–military communication. It is also allowing a growing sense of and disappointment with regards to civilian policy, especially on issues of defence procurement and defence reorganisation.

Conclusion

7.16 Given the regional security context, India's military and national security preparations must be able to respond quickly to security challenges. As a result, a strong CMR is essential to ensuring that the Indian military is well-equipped, trained, and has clarity from the civilian government on its broader military objectives.

7.17 It is also vital to understand that India's march towards regional superpower is based on the country having a strong economic stability and for that the

security scenario needs to be conducive. A well thought out security strategy based on well delineated processes of CMR is a must to achieve this goal.

7.18 Healthier civil–military relations will provide a wide ranging positive thrust to a forceful national security strategy and improved synergy and cooperation among the three armed services.

7.19 Based on the aforementioned facts, inputs received and analysed, 'H₀' is accepted and therefore it is inferred that better civil-military cooperation will result from an institutional structure that allows for greater military-MoD integration.

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Appendix A

(Refers to Para 5.10(a) of Chapter 5)

THE KARGIL COMMITTEE REPORT (EXECUTIVE SUMMARY)

1. Against the backdrop of an animated public discussion on Pakistan's aggression in Kargil, the Union Government vide its order dated July 29, 1999 constituted a Committee to look into the episode with the following Terms of Reference:
 - To review the events leading up to the Pakistani aggression in the Kargil District of Ladakh in Jammu & Kashmir; and
 - To recommend such measures as are considered necessary to safeguard national security against such armed intrusions."
 - The Committee comprised four members namely K. Subrahmanyam (Chairman), Lieutenant General (Retd.) K.K. Hazari, B.G. Verghese and Satish Chandra, Secretary, National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) who was also designated as Member-Secretary.
2. The Committee's Report comprises 14 Chapters in addition to a Prologue and an Epilogue. Important documents referred to by the Committee are enclosed as annexures with the main Report. Other relevant documents, Records of Discussions and source materials have been put together in 15 volumes and appended to the Report. The Findings and Recommendations of the Committee are set out in the succeeding sections of this summary.

Findings**I - Developments leading to the Pakistani aggression at Kargil**

3. XXXXXXXXX

II - Intelligence

4. XXXXXXXXX

III - The Nuclear Factor

5. XXXXXXXXX

IV - CI Operations, Kargil and Integrated Manpower Policy

6. XXXXXXXXX

V - The Technological Dimension

7. XXXXXXXXX

VI - Media Relations and Information

8. XXXXXXXXX

VII - Was Kargil Avoidable?

9. XXXXXXXXX

Recommendations

10. The Findings bring out many grave deficiencies in India's security management system. The framework Lord Ismay formulated and Lord Mountbatten recommended was accepted by a national leadership unfamiliar with the intricacies of national security management. There has been very-little change over the past 52 years despite the 1962 debacle, the 1965 stalemate and the 1971 victory, the growing nuclear threat, end of the cold war, continuance of proxy war in Kashmir for over a decade and the revolution in military affairs. The political, bureaucratic, military and intelligence establishments appear to have developed a vested interest in the status quo. National security management recedes into the background in time of peace and is considered too delicate to be tampered with in time of war and proxy war. The Committee strongly feels that the Kargil experience, the continuing proxy war and the prevailing nuclearised security environment justify a

thorough review of the national security system in its entirety. Such a review cannot be undertaken by an over-burdened bureaucracy. An independent body of credible experts, whether a national commission or one or more task forces or otherwise as expedient, is required to conduct such studies which must be undertaken expeditiously. The specific issues that require to be looked into are set out below.

National Security Council

11. The National Security Council (NSC), formally constituted in April 1999, is still evolving and its procedures will take time to mature. Whatever its merits, having a National Security Adviser who also happens to be Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, can only be an interim arrangement. The Committee believes that there must be a full time National Security Adviser and it would suggest that a second line of personnel be inducted into the system as early as possible and groomed for higher responsibility. Members of the National Security Council, the senior bureaucracy servicing it and the Service Chiefs need to be continually sensitised to assessed intelligence pertaining to national, regional and international issues. This can be done through periodic intelligence briefings of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) with all supporting staff in attendance.

Intelligence

12. Kargil highlighted the gross inadequacies in the nation's surveillance capability, particularly through satellite imagery. The Committee notes with satisfaction that steps have been initiated to acquire this capability. Every effort must be made and adequate funds provided to ensure that a capability of world standards is developed indigenously and put in place in the shortest possible

time. It is for consideration whether a two-stream approach - civil and military - in regard to the downloading and interpretation of the imagery may not be a better alternative than depending on a single agency. Some countries have created a national surveillance command. Since the Indian system is still in the initial stages, decisions taken at this juncture will have long term implications.

13. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) also known as Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs), are extremely useful and effective in surveillance, especially if they have night vision and thermal imaging capabilities. Efforts should be made for the acquisition of high altitude UAVs. Institutionalized arrangements should be made to ensure that the UAV imagery generated is disseminated to the concerned intelligence agencies as quickly as possible. UAVs could also prove effective in counter-insurgency operations. They may replace WASO patrols in the long run.
14. The most spectacular intelligence coup of the Kargil operations was the interception of a series of high level Islamabad-Beijing telephone conversations. This highlights the capabilities of communication intelligence which in India is fragmented among a number of agencies and is not adequately funded. The equipment needs to be modernised in keeping with the advances made by Pakistan in inducting advanced communication technologies. There has also been a gross shortage of direction-finding equipment which could contribute significantly to counter- insurgency operations. The United States has grouped all its communication and electronic intelligence efforts within a single organisation, the National Security Agency (NSA). The desirability of setting up a similar organisation in India with adequate resources for this extremely important and non-intrusive method of

gathering technological intelligence calls for examination. Adequate attention has not been paid to developing encryption and decryption skills. The centralized communication and electronic intelligence agency should feed all the information it generates to the country's premier national intelligence agency which should in turn disseminate this material to all concerned users. While the effort to build up adequate communication and electronic intelligence capability should be tailored to suit India's particular needs, parochial departmental interests should be effectively countered.

15. In many advanced countries, technological intelligence collection is undertaken by an integrated Defence Intelligence Agency with adequate resources. In India, the defence intelligence effort is limited in relation to the role assigned to the external intelligence agency (RAW) except for limited tactical and signal intelligence. The resources made available to the Defence Services for intelligence collection are not commensurate with the responsibility assigned to them. There are distinct advantages in having two lines of intelligence collection and reporting, with a rational division of functions, responsibilities and areas of specialisation. The Committee is of the view that the issue of setting up an integrated defence intelligence agency needs examination.
16. The Committee has drawn attention to deficiencies in the present system of collection, reporting, collation and assessment of intelligence. There is no institutionalized mechanism for coordination or objective- oriented interaction between the agencies and consumers at different levels. Similarly, there is no mechanism for tasking the agencies, monitoring their performance and reviewing their records to evaluate their quality. Nor is there any oversight of the overall functioning of the agencies. While taking note of recent steps to

entrust the NSCS with some of these responsibilities the Committee recommends a thorough examination of the working of the intelligence system with a view to remedying these deficiencies.

17. All major countries have a mechanism at national and often at lower levels to assess the intelligence inputs received from different agencies and sources. After the 1962 debacle, the then existing JIC under the Chiefs of Staff Committee was upgraded and transferred to the Cabinet Secretariat. It was further upgraded in 1985 with the Chairman being raised to the rank of Secretary to the Government. The Committee finds that for various reasons cited in the Report, the JIC was devalued, its efficacy has increased since it became part of the National Security Council Secretariat. However, its role and place in the national intelligence framework should be evaluated in the context of overall reform of the system.
18. In other countries, intelligence agencies have developed large 'White Wings' of high quality analysts for in-house analysis. They also contract studies with university departments and think tanks with area specialisation. This is sadly neglected in India. The development of such country/region specialisation along with associated language skills is a time consuming process and should not be further delayed. It is necessary to establish think tanks, encourage country specialisation in university departments and to organize regular exchanges of personnel between them and the intelligence community.

Counter-Terrorist Operations

19. There is general agreement that in the light of the new situation of proxy war and large scale terrorism that the country faces, the role and the tasks of the para-military forces have to be restructured particularly with reference to

command and control and leadership functions. They need to be trained to much higher standards of performance and better equipped to deal with terrorist threats. The possibility of adopting an integrated manpower policy for the Armed Forces, para-military forces and the Central Police Forces merits examination.

20. The Army must be young and fit at all times. Therefore, instead of the present practice of having 17 years of colour service (as has been the policy since 1976), it would be advisable to reduce the colour service to a period of seven to ten years and, thereafter, release these officers and men for service in the country's para-military formations. After an appropriate period of service here, older cadres might be further streamed into the regular police forces or absorbed in a National Service Corps
21. The para-military and police forces have their own ethos and traditions and might well be chary of such lateral induction as has been proposed. This objection might be overcome were the para-military forces to undertake recruitment on the basis of certain common national military standards and then send those selected for training and absorption in the Army for a period of colour service before reverting to their parent para- military formations. The Committee is aware of the complexities and sensitivities involved in any such security manpower reorganisation. Nevertheless, national security dictates certain imperatives which the country may ignore only at its peril. The proposed reorganisation would make a career in the armed forces attractive on the basis of the lifetime employment offered by the two or three-tiered secondment formula.

Border Management

22. Border management has become immensely more complex over the years. It is now handled by the Assam Rifles, the Border Security Force and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police. Border fencing in Punjab has produced positive results. Elsewhere, vested interests have come in the way of effective border management. The smuggling of narcotics, man-portable arms and explosives, illegal migration and the infiltration of trained mercenaries have all exacerbated border management. Narcotics is dealt with by the Finance Ministry while other aspects are handled by the Home Ministry. If the country is to acquire increased capabilities for area surveillance and electronic fencing, the present structure and procedures for border patrolling must be reviewed. The Committee is therefore of the view that the entire issue needs detailed study in order to evolve force structures and procedures that ensure improved border management.

Defence Budget and Modernisation

23. A number of experts have at various times suggested the need to enhance India's Defence outlays as budgetary constraints have affected the process of modernisation and created certain operational voids. The Committee would not like to advocate any percentage share of GDP that should be assigned to Defence. This must be left to the Government to determine in consultation with the concerned Departments and the Defence Services. Among aspects of modernisation to which priority should be given is that of equipping infantrymen with superior light weight weapons, equipment and clothing suited to the threats they are required to face in alpine conditions.

National Security Management and Apex Decision-Making

24. India is perhaps the only major democracy where the Armed Forces Headquarters are outside the apex governmental structure. The Chiefs of Staff have assumed the role of operational commanders of their respective forces rather than that of Chiefs of Staff to the Prime Minister and Defence Minister. They simultaneously discharge the roles of operational commanders and national security planners/managers, especially in relation to future equipment and force postures. Most of their time, is, however, devoted to the operational role, as is bound to happen. This has led to a number of negative results. Future-oriented long term planning suffers. Army Headquarters has developed a command rather than a staff culture. Higher decisions on equipment, force levels and strategy are not collegiate but command-oriented. The Prime Minister and Defence Minister do not have the benefit of the views and expertise of the Army Commanders and their equivalents in the Navy and Air Force so that higher level defence management decisions are more consensual and broad-based. The present obsolete system has perpetuated the continuation of the culture of the British Imperial theatre system of an India Command whereas what is required is a National Defence Headquarters. Most opposition to change comes from inadequate knowledge of the national security decision-making process elsewhere in the world and a reluctance to change the status quo and move away from considerations of parochial interest. The status quo is often mistakenly defended as embodying civilian ascendancy over the armed forces, which is not a real issue. In fact, locating the Services' Headquarters in the Government will further enhance civilian supremacy.

25. Structural reforms could bring about a much closer and more constructive interaction between the Civil Government and the Services. The Committee is of the view that the present obsolete system, bequeathed to India by Lord Ismay, merits re-examination. An effective and appropriate national security planning and decision-making structure for India in the nuclear age is overdue. The Committee therefore recommends that the entire gamut of national security management and apex decision-making and the structure and interface between the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces Headquarters be comprehensively studied and reorganized.

India's Nuclear Policy

26. XXXXXX

Media Relations and Information

27. Kargil was the first war which Indian correspondents covered by going to the front in significant numbers. It was also the country's first television war and one in which the Indian Army had to handle the media right on the battlefield. This has been a learning experience for the Government, the Armed Forces and the media. The media should avail of this opportunity so that there is a cadre of trained war correspondents at any time. Simultaneously, media relations and the techniques and implications of information war and perception management must form a distinct and important module at all levels of military training. It must also be recognised that the media has to be serviced at many levels - national, local and international. While dealing with the information issue, the Committee would also like to draw attention to the fact that Indian security forces are deployed year round in very difficult and inhospitable terrain ranging from high mountains to dense forests and sandy

deserts. The Government should seriously consider dedicated facilities for the Indian Armed Forces.

28. This Report brings out the vast gap between the actual policies pursued by the Government and developments on the ground on the one hand and popular perceptions derived from public pronouncements on the other. In a democracy, it is incumbent on the Government to reduce any such gap. In the case of Defence policy and insurgency situations, sufficient public information is not available. There is no single, comprehensive official publication containing details of the Kashmir question, the UN resolutions and why they could not be implemented, as well as of more recent developments in Kashmir through the years of proxy war, terrorism and ethnic cleansing together with Pakistan's involvement in all of these. The Government must review its information policy and develop structures and processes to keep the public informed on vital national issues.

29. XXXXXX

Technology

30. The longstanding controversy between the Services and the DRDO on drawing the line between "make" or "buy" resulted in the formulation of a new Procurement Policy in 1995. This liberalized the procedures for the import of equipment as against its indigenous development. However, this policy needs periodic review in the light of changing circumstances. A true partnership must be established between the Services and the DRDO to ensure that the latter gets full backing and funding from the Services and the former, in turn, get the indented equipment they require without undue delay. The design and development of special materials as well as Defence stores and equipment

often entails working at the frontiers of technology. It is therefore possible and desirable to harness national talent wherever it lies - in the Universities and IITs, and in the private and public sectors - and not only within the DRDO and designated defence undertakings. Casting the net wider would be advantageous and would ensure a greater degree of competition and technological spin-off into the civil sector. This would also facilitate Defence exports, the better utilisation of highly sophisticated industrial capacity and related manpower and enable Defence laboratories and Defence undertakings to concentrate on those areas which cannot be hived off to the civil sector, public or private, on grounds of high security or limited applicability of end use for civilian purposes.

Civil Military Liaison

31. The establishment of a civil-military liaison mechanism at various levels, from the ranking Command HQ to the operational formations on the ground. Division) Brigade or Battalion, is most necessary to smoothen relationships during times of emergency and stress, like war and proxy war, and to ensure that there is no room for friction and alienation of the local population. Situations of no-war-no-peace call for norms and procedures that avoid delay and endless red tape. Relocating villages behind the Army's forward defence line in J&K can best be done through an initially limited experimental move and further action on the basis of policies evolved as a result of that learning experience. Likewise, steps should be taken to issue ID Cards to border villagers in certain vulnerable areas on a priority basis, pending its extension to other or all parts of the State. Such a policy would also be relevant in the North-East, Sikkim and part of West Bengal.

Declaratory Policy for LOC

32. More attention should be given to monitoring and analysing developments and trends in "Azad J&K" and the Northern Areas which are in ferment and whose fate and future cannot be divorced from any consideration of the Kashmir Question. Likewise, the Kashmiri diaspora overseas must be kept better informed about the situation in J&K and what happened in Kargil.
33. Misperceptions and ambiguities about the Siachen/AGPL sector need to be dispelled and the facts of "cartographic aggression" here made known. There is no warrant for departing from the logic of extending the LOC from NJ 9842 and "thence north to the glaciers" as set out in the delineation of the Ceasefire Line under the Karachi agreement of July 29, 1949 which was subsequently converted into the Line of Control by the Simla Agreement in 1992. This broadly upholds the current Actual Ground Position Line. The fallacy of showing the LOC as running northeast to the Karakoram Pass must be exposed.
34. The country must not fall into the trap of Siachenisation of the Kargil heights and similar unheld unpopulated "gaps" in the High Himalaya along the entire length of the Northern border. The proper response would be a declaratory policy that deliberate infringement of the sanctity of the LOC and wanton cross-border terrorism in furtherance of proxy war will meet with prompt retaliation in a manner, time and place of India's choosing. Pakistan and the world must know that India's defence of the integrity of its own territory, including that within its own side of the LOC, is not and cannot be held to be escalatory and that the aggressor and his victim cannot be bracketed and placed on par.

35. Such a declaratory policy must be backed with credible measures in J&K to win back alienated sections of the population, attend to genuine discontents, political and economic, and enable the victims of ethnic cleansing to return to their homes in the Valley or elsewhere in the State with security and honour. To this end, the Union and State Governments must jointly initiate a twin policy of reform and devolution to and within J&K and a dialogue with Pakistan. India's commitment to maintaining the sanctity of the LOC/AGPL and the international endorsement of this position won during the Kargil crises has within it the seeds of a larger, long-term settlement that can bring enduring peace and tranquillity to J&K and stable and cooperative Indo-Pakistan relations on the basis of the Simla-Lahore process within the framework of SAARC.

Epilogue

36. The Committee's review brings out many lessons that the Armed Forces, Intelligence agencies, Parliament, Government, media and the nation as a whole have to learn. These have been set out in the preceding findings. These should stimulate introspection and reflection, leading to purposeful action. The Committee trusts that its Recommendations will be widely discussed and acted upon expeditiously so that the sacrifices made will not have been in vain. The best tribute to the dedication of those killed and wounded will be to ensure that "Kargils" of any description are never repeated.
37. There is both comfort and danger in clinging to any long established status quo. There will be many who suggest the most careful deliberation on the report. Procrastination has cost nations dear. Others will no doubt advocate monumental change. Half measures will not do; synergy will be lost. The

Committee has after very wide interaction sign-posted directions along the path to peace, ensuring progress, development and stability of the nation. How exactly the country should proceed to refashion its Security- Intelligence- Development shield to meet the challenge of the 21S' Century is for the Government, Parliament, and public opinion to determine. There is no turning away from that responsibility.

Source: <https://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/KargilRCA.html>

Appendix B

(Refers to Para 5.10(b) of Chapter 5)

MAY 23, 2001

GROUP OF MINISTERS' REPORT ON "REFORMING THE NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM"

1. A comprehensive systemic overhaul of the country's security and intelligence apparatus in keeping with the technological revolution and the need for integrated management structures was unfolded by the Group of Ministers (GOM) in a report submitted by them to PM on February 26, 2001. The GOM had been set up in April 2000 to review the national security system in its entirety and in particular to consider the recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee and formulate specific proposals for implementation. The GOM under the Chairmanship of Shri L.K. Advani also included the Defence Minister, External Affairs Minister and Finance Minister.
2. The GOM held 27 meetings in all. In order to facilitate its work, it had set up 4 Task Forces one each on Intelligence Apparatus, Internal Security, Border Management and Management of Defence. These Task Forces were multi-disciplinary in character and were made up of acknowledged experts.
3. The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) considered the GOM report on 11th May, 2001 and decided that the recommendation in respect of the institution of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) be considered later, after Government is able to consult various political parties. It accepted all other recommendations contained in the GOM report.
4. The establishment of an Intelligence Coordination Group (ICG) and Technology Coordination Group (TCG), working in close tandem with National Technical Facility Organisation (NTFO), are among the major elements

recommended in the area of Intelligence. The ICG will provide for systematic intelligence oversight at the apex level and inter-alia deal with:

- (a) Allocation of resources to the intelligence agencies
 - (b) Consideration of annual reviews on the quality of inputs
 - (c) Approve the annual tasking for intelligence collection
 - (d) Oversee the functions of intelligence agencies
 - (e) Examine national estimates and forecasts
5. The Technology Coordination (Group will coordinate and regulate plans for acquisition of all new costly major strategic facilities/equipment by the intelligence agencies and generally oversee the TECHINT capabilities of the intelligence agencies as well as examine issues relating to allocation of funds for this purpose. The NTFO will. inter-alia plan design set up and operate any major new strategic and expensive TECHINT facilities as approved by TCG keeping in view the rapid convergence now taking place among hitherto different technologies.
6. The appointment of a Chief of Defence Staff, with administrative control over India's Strategic Forces Command, as the focal point for military advice to the Government, a holistic 15-20 year Defence Perspective Plan, subject to rigorous inter and infra service prioritisation backed by a Defence Procurement Board that gives it teeth, and the creation of a joint Services Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) are among other critical elements in the new higher defence management structure. In addition, the progressive decentralisation of decision making and delegation of powers to Service Headquarters is envisaged with the latter becoming Integrated Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence rather than "Attached Offices".

7. Defence information relations are to be revamped at headquarters together with quick-responding media cells in field formations.
8. The establishment of a National Defence University will help imbue governance with an appropriate strategic culture.
9. "Civil defence" and the mobilisation of civil society have not been ignored. The Economic Intelligence Council is to be refurbished and given a wider mandate. The State Police and Central para-military forces are to be modernised with a new orientation being given to weapons, equipment and training. :
10. Border Management is to be re-fashioned on a one-border-one-force principle so as to obviate problems of conflict in command and control and Sack of accountability arising from a multiplicity of forces on the same border. They are to be used exclusively for border guarding activities and not, as a rule, withdrawn for internal security disturbances etc. They are furthermore to be appropriately strengthened, trained and equipped with weapons on par with related army units when deployed on similar tasks. The Coast Guard is to be strengthened and a specialised Marine Police to be raised in all coastal States and island territories. Sanctity of Indian airspace is to be safeguarded inter-alia through procurement of additional low level transportable radars, integrated air command and control systems, integration of national radar resources, revamp of airspace management of coastal and island territories etc.
11. These structures will be backed up by a rejuvenated Civil Defence Organisation, village and ward defence committees and a revamped criminal justice system backed by laws and regulations appropriate to emerging circumstances. The programme to institute a multi-purpose National Identity Card is to be vigorously pursued, commencing with all border districts.

12. Modalities are to be evolved for involving youth in national service in conformity with the spirit of Article 51 A(d) of the Constitution quite apart from expanding the NCC and Territorial Army.
13. In a remarkably short span of a little more than a year since the Kargil Review Committee reported, the GOM and the four Task Forces set up by it, have completed a very intensive and exhaustive analytical exercise through an interactive and participatory process involving field operatives, users, the scientific community and civil and military decision-makers. What has emerged therefore is a closely deliberated and widely accepted programme of action, parts of which are already on the ground or in the process of implementation. These touch on the most sensitive and complex issues and institutions of national security in its widest sense and position the country to meet the security challenges of the 21st Century.
14. The new structures anticipate current and emerging security threats: nuclear-missile, cyber-information, technological innovation and, not least, international Terrorism, low intensity conflict and proxy war. These are new and innovative organisational platforms capable of flexible responses and not just upgradations of yesterday's systems. The participation of key political players, National Security Adviser, Cabinet Secretary, the Services, Paramilitary, Police and Intelligence Chiefs, and the Principal Scientific Adviser to the Government in the entire exercise ensures the necessary political will, financial commitment and operational backup to secure what constitutes radical systemic change.

Source:

<http://pibarchive.nic.in/archive/releases98/lyr2001/rmay2001/23052001/r2305200110.html>

Appendix C

(Refers to Para 5.10(c) of Chapter 5)

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS : NARESH CHANDRA TASK FORCE

1. The high-powered Naresh Chandra Task Force, appointed by the government last year, submitted its detailed report to the Prime Minister a couple of months ago but so far there is no indication that the report will be made public soon. We do not even know if within the government deliberations have begun on the recommendations given by the Task Force. All that is available in public domain so far is a glimpse of some key recommendations made by the task force that too through media reports obviously based on conversations with some members of the task force. For instance, the task force has apparently recommended:
 - (a) Appointment of a Permanent Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee (CoSC)
 - (b) Integration of Service HQ and Ministry of Defence by allowing more cross-postings
 - (c) Shifting focus of India's national security strategy from Pakistan to China
 - (d) Better Intelligence Coordination between all agencies
 - (e) Creation of dedicated financial Institution for access to energy, rare earths and raw materials from across the world
2. From some of the occasional interaction that this author has had with a few members of the Task Force, before and after the submission of the report, one aspect is very clear: There was no consensus on the creation of the post of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), leading to, what one believes, a half-hearted

recommendation to appoint another four-star officer as permanent chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (CoSC).

3. According to the Task Force, this officer will be in charge of the two existing tri-services commands - the Strategic Command Force (SFC) and the Andaman Nicobar Command (ANC)-- while the three service Chiefs will continue command and lead their respective services, the Task Force said.
4. The Permanent Chairman CoSC, according to the recommendation of the Naresh Chandra Task Force, will have a fixed tenure of two years and will be rotated among the three services. This officer will be assisted by the existing Integrated Defence Staff (IDS), headed by a three star officer from any of the three services.
5. Over the past decade, the IDS has evolved in a barely workable tri-services structure with over 300 officers drawn from the three services trying to function as a cohesive unit tasked with evolving "jointness." On ground however, jointness or inter-operability has remained at best patchy.
6. The new recommendation seeks to overcome these differences. The Naresh Chandra Task Force has also recommended the creation of a separate Special Operations Command on the lines of the US structure since asymmetric threats are seen as the main challenge to India's national security in coming decades.
7. The new post, the Task Force is hoping, will also bring in synergy in major acquisitions for all the three forces. Often, the three services have worked independently in procuring same set of equipment, duplicating work and creating separate infrastructure when synergy would have saved hundreds of crores of rupees.

8. However, critics of the new system say the recommendation to appoint Chairman CoSC is nothing but old wine in new bottle. It is a 'no go' because the Chairman will remain ever dependent on each of the services Army, Navy & IAF for its personnel requirements. Personnel of each service will be 'lobbyists' of respective Chiefs. Yet another opportunity, they say, to reform has been lost. National Security System does not have to depend on seeking Least Common Multiple (LCM)-solutions. It does not have to seek to appease lobbies and turfs.
9. The solution, some in service officers say, lies in divesting the three Chiefs of operational command of forces. Let them be Chiefs of respective Staff - 'resource providers to joint operational/ strategic commands' - content with recruiting, training of personnel; holding and maintaining equipment; and executing related administrative functions.
10. Appointment of CDS is however the prerogative of the apex political authority, namely the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS). It can choose from panel of names forwarded by the three Services. There should be no rotation to appease services. Choice of apex political authority has to be final.
11. In absence of a common meeting ground on deciding to appoint a CDS, the Naresh Chandra Task Force recommendation can however be utilised in the interim in creating more cohesion among the services. For instance, the Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee, who will have a fixed two year tenure can be made in charge of making net assessment about the strengths and weaknesses of India's adversaries—China and Pakistan—in a holistic manner, taking into consideration inputs from all the three services and cross-referencing those inputs with other agencies like the Defence Intelligence

Agency (DIA) and RAW. Currently, the three services send their individual assessments just to complete formalities to the IDS where it remains buried in files that never see the light of the day.

12. Moreover, if the Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee is going to lead the proposed Special Operations Command why not create two more tri-services commands and give him some more work?
13. Given the frequency of cyber-attacks on India's IT infrastructure, creation of a cyber-command is only a matter of time. An aerospace command is inevitable sooner than later. Along with the creation of the proposed Special Operations Command, why not create these two additional tri-service commands? And let the Army, Air Force and Navy be the lead service for a particular command? And let the Army, Air Force and Navy be the lead service for a particular command?
14. The proposed Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee can remain the head of these three commands with each of them being led by an Army Commander level officer. Given the experience and expertise available with the Army, it can take charge of the Special Operations Command, the IAF, with its domain knowledge, can take over the aerospace command and the Navy can lead the cyber command. The heads of these commands can have their second rung manned by two-star officers from each of the services so that they continue to have the benefit of expert advice from across the services but the overall responsibility must remain with the designated service.
15. Given that the existing tri-services commands go through painful changes each time their Commanders-in-Chief get rotated, making each of the service

responsible for the proposed new commands will make their the working smoother and more efficient.

16. Over a decade after a CDS was recommended by the Group of Ministers (GoM) in the wake of the Kargil conflict, there is no unanimity on that issue yet. Given the strong differences within the services as well as in the political class, could this be the best arrangement for now? Or is it too impractical?

Source:

<https://www.vifindia.org/article/2012/july/16/naresh-chandra-task-force-s-report-on-national-security-an-appraisal>

Appendix D

(Refers to Para 5.12 of Chapter 5)

CMR : COMPARISON WITH FOREIGN MODELS

1. Every nation goes through its learning curve and this is true for CMR too. It is therefore necessary that appropriate changes are incorporated so as to adopt a structure which is based on our needs, requirements and systems rather than popularity. In this context it is prudent to study the evolution of CMR in some democracies to arrive at apposite recommendations in the Indian context.

United States of America

2. As soon as WW II ended, US politicians, deeply concerned about military shortcomings, took up the issue of defence reforms. A wide-ranging national discourse, accompanied by intense political debate resulted in the National Security Act of 1947 whose main objective was to implement lessons of WW II, and modernize the nation's defence setup by unification of the armed forces under civilian leadership.
3. This Act created the Department of Defence, to be headed by a minister, designated Secretary of Defence. The Army Air Corps was made a separate Service, and became the US Air Force. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) which had existed as an adhoc body was enshrined in law and the position of a Chairman JCS was created. Although he took precedence in rank above all other officers, the Chairman was denied command over the JCS or over any forces.
4. The 1947 Act created Unified Combatant Commands (CCMD), which had a broad and continuing mission and were composed of units from at least two

services. The commands were headed by four-star combatant commanders, who reported directly to the JCS. The Service Chiefs, remained members of the JCS, but were divested of operational responsibilities, which were now given to the Combatant Commander (CCDR).

5. These commands were organised either on a geographical or on a functional basis. Today, the US has eleven unified combatant commands; of which seven have regional responsibilities, and four are functional. While a geographical command will have units or 'components' from all three services, each headed by a 'Component Commander,' a functional command could have troops from a single service. After the first incumbent, the Chairman JCS has always been a 4-star Gen/Adm. All CCDRs are 4-star officers.
6. In the US, between 1958 and 1980, the US national security establishment repeatedly came in for adverse attention because of failures and fiascos in policy-making as well as operations. Aside from the humbling Vietnam experience, there were many other crisis situations (Lebanon, N Korea, Iran, Grenada) whose handling invited criticism. An intense public debate raged in both houses of the US Congress for four years over military shortcomings and culminated in the passage of the 'Goldwater-Nichols Act 1986.' Focusing, largely, on issues relating to jointness in the armed forces, it increased the powers of the Chairman JCS, and elevated him to be the 'principal military adviser' to the President. The chain of command of Combatant Commanders run through the Secretary of Defence to the President. The structure of DoD is given below⁵⁵

⁵⁵ Organization and Management of the Department of Defense, Resource Guide v3.2, page 10
<https://irp.fas.org/agency/dod/org-man.pdf>




Figure -D1

7. The Act also specified, in great detail, requirements for officers appointed to Joint duty billets, as well as criteria for promotion to flag & general rank, thereby ensuring that Joint assignments were eagerly sought after - and not avoided.

United Kingdom

8. In the British system, post-WW I, national defence was looked after by three ministries, each of which subsumed the respective Service HQs. The British did create a Chiefs of Staff Committee, way back in 1923; but it remained a disharmonious and dormant body. During WW II, it was Churchill's personal leadership as Defence Minister that synergized the functioning of the three Services and resulted in the Allied victory.
9. As soon as the war got over, British politicians, just like their US counterparts, launched a process – lasting several decades - which brought about radical reform of defence structures. Overcoming strong single-service resistance, the

British introduced; first, a Permanent Chairman COSC; then gave him the additional portfolio of CDS and finally, empowered the CDS (a four star general from 1997) to be the stand-alone 'Principal Military Adviser' to the government.

10. The Thatcher era saw defence acquiring higher priority in government thinking and she appointed separate MoS for the Armed Forces and Defence Procurement, emphasizing on functional responsibilities rather than single service responsibilities. Michael Heseltine the then Secretary of State for Defence articulated his vision through a document 'MINIS and the Development of Organization for Defence' in March 1984⁵⁶ which laid the broad construct of the organization as it is today as well making The PUS and CDS the principal advisers to the Secretary of State (S of S). The identities of the three Services and the respective Service Chiefs were retained being responsible for the efficiency and morale of the Services and the CDS made the sole adviser for military and operational strategy. The PUS was the adviser on political and financial policy. The Service Chief's would report to the S of S through the CDS just as the CSA and the Chief of Defence Procurement (CDP) would report through the PUS. They also however could provide their advise through their respective service boards (Admiralty Board, Army Board and the Air Force Board) having clarified that the MoD would continue to contain the headquarters of the three Services and carry out its complimentary functions as Department of State and the Headquarters of the Armed Services. A unified Defence Staff was created that was responsible to the CDS for military aspects and the PUS on aspects of political and parliamentary work. Notable, amongst other changes, were:-

⁵⁶ Wg Cdr R Venkataraman Ph D, India's Higher Defence Organisation and Management (New Delhi: KW Publishers Pvt Ltd in association with Centre for Air Power Studies New Delhi, 2011), 132.

- (a) Creation of a Permanent Joint HQ, resulting in a significant enhancement of jointness.
- (b) The role and importance of the Service Chiefs diminished, even though their access to the PM remained intact.
- (c) Equilibrium was ensured between the military and the civilian bureaucracy, by bringing the Permanent Under-Secretary on par with the CDS, as 'Principal Civilian Adviser on Defence' to the government.




Figure – D2

11. The organisation structure of MoD UK is given above⁵⁷.

France

- 12. Post World War II, the Ministry of War and the Ministry of Marine were merged to form the Ministry of Defence, under a Minister for National Defence who is now referred to simply as the Minister of Defence since 1974.
- 13. A wide ranging review of French defence was undertaken in 2007-08. This review was aimed at defining French strategy for the next 15 years and went

⁵⁷ Nowa A. Omoigui, Inter-service Relations: Imperatives for Jointness (Part 3), 27 January 2006, <https://www.dawodu.com/omoigui68.htm>

beyond defence policy to shape the premiere document giving out France's national security strategy overseen by a new Conseil de defense et de securite nationale (CSDN) headed by the President. The defence policy as a whole is the responsibility of the President and the responsibility of national defence rests on the Minister of Defence under the authority of the Prime Minister⁵⁸, who in turn is assisted by:-

- (a) The Chief of Defence Staff (CEMA) for plans and directives concerning the organization and deployment of the armed forces.
- (b) The National Armament Director (DGA) for armament related issues including production and research.
- (c) The General Secretary for Administration (SGA) who is responsible for issues related to financial affairs, legal affairs and Military service and Civilian Personnel.




Figure – D3

14. The armed forces are headed by their respective chiefs of staff under the directions of CEMA, who in turn functions as an interface between the military and the political authorities. Training, long term planning, resource allocation

⁵⁸ Ibid, 155.

including participation in preparation of the budget⁵⁹ are some responsibilities of the respective Service Chiefs.

⁵⁹ Ibid, 156.

Appendix E

(Refers to Para 7.10 (a) of Chapter 7)

SUGGESTED RE-DISTRIBUTED RESPONSIBILITIES AND CHARTER OF**VERTICALS : RESTRUCTURED MoD**

1. Of the various recommendations made by the GoM, two significant recommendations were instituting the appointment of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and the restructuring of the Ministry of Defence (MoD). The former has since been implemented. However, while appointing a single point military advisor was imperative, equally important are accompanying reforms in the defence architecture and its systems and processes to make the appointment and the defence establishment effective.
2. **Areas of Concern** There are three main issues of concern, among many, which are relevant to the subject. First is the manner in which the concept of civilian supremacy has been distorted, resulting in imprecise and indeterminate definition of duties of bureaucrats and military officers. Many analysts feel that the civil bureaucracy seems to enjoy authority and responsibility without corresponding accountability. Second, due to the hierarchal nature of the defence establishment, many in the uniformed fraternity feel that the elected representatives are not as easily accessible as they would prefer. Third, Defence Secretary is responsible to the Defence Minister for the provision of advice on most matters concerning defence policy and for management of defence resources. The Secretary and civilian staff officers chair most of the defence committees, have privileged access to the minister and to the information flowing to and from the minister, and tend to serve in key positions much longer than either military officers or the minister. These three issues, in

the opinion of some senior military officers, have a negative impact on the operational preparedness of the services and management functions.

3. **Division of Responsibility between the DMA and DoD** While the CDS is in place, there has not been much deliberation regarding the 'hows and whys' of the functioning of the appointment or the relationship he would share with the Defence Secretary. Possible role, responsibilities and authority of the single point military advisor and the Defence Secretary and the possible relationship the two can share in defence organisation would lead to clarity regarding a restructured and integrated MoD.
4. An attempt is being made to deliberate on these very issues based on a presumptive MoD structure. In the hypothesised structure, the offices of the CDS and the Defence Secretary i.e the DMA and DoD will form part of the MoD. The structural reforms will also aim to integrate the three Service HQs, headed by their respective chiefs, within the DMA to form three of its sub departments. The CDS in the reformed organisation would head the three services and all the organisations responsible for planning and allocating resources, management of defence, and provision of strategic direction to military operations. The single-point military advisor will be assisted in his duties by the reformed HQ Integrated Defence Staff (IDS). The Defence Secretary, in the reformed defence organisation, will head departments and branches responsible for policy formulation (suggested to be a joint responsibility) and financial planning.
5. The various branches within the MoD, in the reformed structure, will be jointly staffed by civil and military officers. While the government has initially instituted the appointment of the CDS without command over the Services, the final

objective is to have the appointment of the CDS at the helm of the three services. The structural reforms would mandate the government to formally articulate the rules for interaction between the civil bureaucracy and the military officers including between the heads of the two services. It is under these set of conditions that an attempt is being made to define the role and tasks of two verticals of the MoD.

6. The organisational structure of the defence establishment and the relationship between the Defence Minister, Defence Secretary and the CDS, in the proposed organisation, will be unique and without parallel to any other relationship in any other department of the government. This is so because the department will have, the CDS and the Defence Secretary, sharing responsibilities of the MoD, while in all other departments the Secretary is solely responsible to the Minister, for the working of the department.
7. **Concept of Relationship Between the Chief of Defence Staff and Defence Secretary** It is proposed that the relationship between the two appointments should be so defined that it harnesses the complementary abilities of the two services, the military and the civil bureaucracy, to achieve the desired objectives of the government. The complementary abilities should enable the CDS to exercise unfettered focus to command the three services while the Defence Secretary is made responsible for provision of resources, making policy, and accountability functions of the department. The division of responsibilities between the CDS and the Defence Secretary would be done in the context that the CDS will be the operational commander of the Armed Forces and the Defence Secretary will be the 'enabler' for the Armed Forces. The CDS and the Defence Secretary as co-leaders of the department will have

specific, unequal, and overlapping responsibilities. In order to achieve the desired end-state, this article recommends that the CDS be designated as the 'principal military advisor' and the Defence Secretary as the 'principal civil defence advisor' to the government.

8. The two appointments would be permitted equal and similar access to the Defence Minister. The two appointments are recommended to be designated as 'lead appointments' in their respective areas of competencies and for some tasks they should share joint responsibilities. In the case of joint responsibilities, the staff below them should report to them equally. The two appointments would thus have similar and equal access to the staff below them and to the Defence Minister above. As postulated earlier, equal and similar access to the Defence Minister, MoD staffed by civil and military officers to support the two appointments, and co-location of their offices in the ministry would assist to a very large extent to achieve and maintain the equilibrium not only between the two appointments but also between the military officers and civil bureaucracy at large. The relationship between the CDS and the Defence Secretary is not just about civil–military relations; it will also shape and influence the relationship between the CDS and the Chiefs of the three Services. The appointment of CDS should enable greater centralisation of authority of strategic policy-making, authority to allocate resources, and control of military operations and increased focus on joint operations. HQ IDS would be required to enhance its capacity to undertake integrated military planning. All this will augment the role and the responsibilities of the CDS at the expense of the chiefs. Many of the tasks which were earlier performed by the chiefs will

now be undertaken by the CDS and the chiefs will become capability managers of their respective services.

9. **Role and Responsibilities of Chief of Defence Staff, Defence Secretary, and Service Chiefs** The genesis of the appointments and the reforms being recommended lie in the problems which have been identified and the lessons learnt from the various wars and conflict situations that India has been involved in and the various peace-time management issues. As referred earlier, the CDS will be responsible for developing and implementing the defence policy and the day-to-day management of the activities of the Armed Forces. The Defence Secretary will play the role of an enabler and will assist the Defence Minister to promulgate policies and earmark resources for the CDS to function. It is recommended that the role and responsibilities of the appointments and other facets of their functioning must be promulgated and prescribed in the Act of Parliament. Thereafter, should there be any requirement of clarification or amplifications to the Act, ministerial directives can be issued from time-to-time. The relationship between the CDS and the Defence Secretary is not just about civil– military relations; it will also shape and influence the relationship between the CDS and the Chiefs of the three Services.
10. **Chief of Defence Staff** The CDS shall be the commander of India's Armed Forces. In this capacity, he shall exercise command and control over the three services, plan and conduct military operations, and raise joint organisations. As a single point military advisor to the government, the CDS will be responsible to tender advice on military implications of strategic developments, on military strategy and development of capabilities and disposition of the Armed Forces. The CDS will be the Permanent Chairman of the COSC. The officer will also

be responsible for leading relationship with the Armed Forces of friendly foreign countries. He will also be responsible for the promotion and postings of senior officers of major general (equivalent) rank and above.

11. **Defence Secretary** The Defence Secretary will be the principal defence civilian advisor to the government. His primary responsibilities will include policy formulation and financial planning. He will be responsible for financial planning and programming of all elements of defence outlay, and financial administration and control of expenditure. The Defence Secretary will provide policy advice to the Defence Minister, will be responsible to interact with other government departments, and will be personally responsible to the Parliament for the economic, efficient, and effective use of defence resources. He will also be responsible for the organisation, management and staffing of the defence establishment.
12. **Joint Responsibilities of CDS and Defence Secretary** The two appointments will be jointly responsible for strategic assessment, long-term capability planning and liaison with other departments on security matters.
13. **Service Chiefs** As a result of the reforms being recommended, there will be redistribution of the roles and responsibilities amongst the CDS, the Chiefs and some of the newly created senior appointments. The Chiefs, as a result of reforms, will become advisors of their respective services to the CDS on operational matters but will retain accessibility to the RM on Service related training, personnel and administrative issues. They will be capability managers responsible for raising, training, introducing and sustaining equipment and personnel and will also be responsible for ethos, morale, etc., for their service.

14. **Likely Areas of Discord** The articulation of the concept of relationship and the roles and responsibilities of the appointments is the first step at demystifying and reforming the organisation. This attempt may sound simplistic, but can become labyrinthine and can befuddle the decision-makers when translating the concept into directions. The distribution of authority between the CDS and the Defence Secretary cannot be mathematical and will always be open to criticism by one interest group or the other. Discussed in the following paragraphs are some of the issues which have the potential to cause discord. No readymade solutions are being offered and it may be worth its while for the reforms committee to deliberate on the issues to obviate problems in the future.

(a) **Clarity in Role and Tasking** Even though it may seem that the distribution of duties between the appointments is straight forward; some may feel the asymmetry when the authority is actually exercised. The CDS will be responsible for the command of the Armed Forces of India including combat support arms and services. The chiefs are being envisaged to be the capability managers of their respective services while the Defence Secretary is being recommended for provision of resources to the Armed Forces. The military may stake claim that the logistics, force development, and resource allocation are the rightful prerogative of the CDS as the commander of force, while the Defence Secretary may also forward similar assertion as the chief 'enabler' of the Armed Forces. There is a potential for conflict of interest between the appointments and their staffs, if there is lack of clarity and common

understanding of the issues involved. The reforms team will have to clearly demarcate responsibilities of the appointments in this regard.


- (b) **Policy Advisor versus Military Commander** The CDS as the military commander would be expected to operate under the limits of the approved policy of the government and subject to the resources allocated. The Defence Secretary is likely to play a lead role in policy formulation and resource allocation although the CDS would be expected to provide inputs on the subject. This to some may seem like the dominance of the Defence Secretary and his staff necessitating deliberation by the decision-makers.
- (c) **Dominance of the Civil Bureaucracy** The nature of the role and task may dictate that the key policy advisory committees are either chaired by the Defence Secretary or his representatives. It is also likely that the agenda of the committees will also be set and controlled by the civil bureaucracy. In all possibility, the Defence Minister is likely to get involved in the process of policymaking towards the very end and all the issues of disagreement may not be put up to him, by the concerned appointments, in the manner desired by other stakeholders. Moreover, the minister may not have the time or the resources or inclinations to study all aspects of disagreement. All these are issues which require deliberation before the reforms are finalised.
- (d) **Career Management of Civil Bureaucrats** Another issue which has the potential for discord would be the decision on the career management of senior military officers and civil bureaucrats. At present the promotions and postings of senior military officers are vetted by the

civil bureaucracy in the MoD. Subsequent to the integration of civil and military officers in the various branches of the MoD, the assertion that the CDS and military officers have similar authority in relation to civilian staff is likely to be an issue which may cause consternation in the civil bureaucracy.

- (e) **Senior Civilian and Military Officers** In the Indian Army, there is a system wherein in certain appointments of combat support arms and services are answerable on certain aspects of their job profile to two different 'bosses', viz., to their seniors in chain of command and to the seniors of their own arm or service. This is reflected in the annual confidential reports where there is provision for technical reporting in addition to the chain of command reporting. In the reformed higher defence system, when integration of civil and military officers takes place and the CDS and the Defence Secretary are made jointly responsible for some of the tasks, there may be a case for a similar arrangement wherein officers of both civil and military services are made responsible and responsive to two different appointments. The extent of the authority of the senior to discipline, conditions of service, etc., is a subject of greater deliberation. Informal procedures and mechanisms may also have to be designed to facilitate mutual consultation and reconciliation of the views of the stakeholders.

15. In keeping with the norms outlined above, the suggested verticals of restructured MoD and its various departments are indicated in Figure 4 below. There are three main verticals, namely the DMA headed by the CDS, DoD led by the Defence Secretary and the Technical Vertical under the RRM. The DMA

would have under it the HQ IDS, Service HQ and SFC. Tri-service organisations would be operationally controlled by HQ IDS. The DoD would primarily comprise of a Policy Wing, a Finance Wing (Department of Defence Finance) and Department of Ex Serviceman Welfare (DESW). The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and the Department of Defence Production (DDP) would comprise the Technical vertical. All three verticals would have both civilians and military officers as per domain specialisation.



ANALYSIS OF CIVIL - MILITARY RELATIONS IN INDIA

*Required

1. 1. Name & Designation (Optional)

2. 2. Email/Mobile Number (Optional)

3. 3. Type of Service (Mark only one) *

Mark only one oval.

- Armed Forces
- Civil Services
- Defence Civilian
- Academia
- Other

4. 4. Current Status (Mark only one) *

Mark only one oval.

- Serving
- Retired

The
Concept
of
Civilian
Control
of The
Military

The role of the Military in society is often discussed in terms of 'Civilian Control'. As per Huntington, "the Military point of view must always be subordinate to that of the Statesman as the conduct of war is the responsibility of the latter. Policy creates the war, policy is the intelligent faculty - war only the instrument".

5. 5. 1. In the context described above, do you believe that the concept of Civilian Control of the Military is central to healthy CMR towards ensuring National Security in India? (Mark only one) *

Mark only one oval.

- Agree
- Disagree
- Neutral
- Other: _____

6. 6. 2. Civilian control concerns the relative power of civilian vis-a-vis military groups in a society. What do you understand by justifiable Civilian Control of the Military in a democracy? (Mark only one) *

Mark only one oval.

- Civilian control with the aim of maximizing civilian power i.e Subjective Control
- Civilian control with the aim of maximizing military professionalism i.e Objective Control
- Civilian control with the aim of maximizing military professionalism with a provision to allow civilian intervention in military affairs to ensure integration of political goals with military means
- Not sure
- Other: _____

7. 7. 3. What in your opinion is the best methodology through which Civilian Control may be executed in a democracy? (Mark only one) *

Mark only one oval.

- A military guided by established professional ethics controlled by the Political Authority, concurrently advised by other Govt Institutions
- A military aligned to the ruling dispensation controlled by the Political Authority, concurrently advised by other Govt Institutions
- A military controlled by the Political Authority through a designated civilian institution e.g the bureaucracy
- Other: _____

Military's Ability to Ensure National Security

8. 8. 4. To ensure its security, the responsibilities of a professional military commander towards the State are comprehensively defined in the following three statements a) Keep the Political Authority informed of the minimum requirements for military security. b) Advise from military point of view, the implications on alternate courses of state action being considered by the State Authorities. c) Explicitly implement state decisions pertaining to military security without regard to his own military judgement or advice. Your opinion? (Mark only one) *

Mark only one oval.

- Agree
- Disagree
- Not sure

9. 9. 5. How would you rate (on a scale of 1 to 5, 5 representing highest degree of importance) the following parameters as indicators of the military's ability to ensure National security at the macro level ? (Mark only one per row) *

Tick all that apply.

	Column 1	Column 2	Column 3	Column 4	Column 5
Clear and timely Strategic Guidance coupled with effective oversight mechanism by the Government	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Capability development to including Force structuring, equipping, degree of modernisation and preparedness commensurate to contemporary threats	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Jointness in planning and operations among the Services	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Degree of open dialogue on matters defence between Military leaders, other Govt Institutions and the Political Leadership	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Quality of Human Resource (in Civilian Govt Agencies) based on efficient planning & delivery of outcomes	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Quality of Human Resource (in Armed Forces) based on efficient planning & delivery of outcomes	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Morale of the professional soldier based on freedom of advice, equivalence, status and growth opportunities	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Institutional Framework for CMR in India

The three Services are part of the MoD as attached offices under the newly created Department of Military Affairs (headed by the Chief of Defence Staff) which has been assigned the following charter:-

1. The Armed Forces of the Union, namely, Army, Navy and Air Force.
2. Integrated Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence comprising of Army Headquarters, Naval Headquarters, Air Headquarters and Defence Staff Headquarters.
3. The Territorial Army.
4. Works relating to Army, Navy and Air Force.
5. Procurement exclusive to the Services except capital acquisitions, as per prevalent rules and procedures.
6. Promoting jointness in procurement, training and staffing for the Services through joint planning and integration of their requirements.
7. Facilitation of restructuring of Military Commands for optimal utilisation of resources by bringing about jointness in operations, including through establishment of joint / theatre commands.
8. Promoting use of indigenous equipment by the Services.

In addition, the DRDO, Department of Def Production and Department of Ex-Servicemen Welfare are the balance three verticals in the MoD.

In India, besides the CDS's access to the RM, and the presence of Chiefs as members on the NSC there is no institutional framework which allows direct access for Military Commanders to the political leadership, or even the apex level Cabinet Committee on Security

10. 10. 6. Does the existing institutional framework of CMR in India conform to your idea of ideal execution of Civilian Control? (Mark only one) *

Mark only one oval.

- Yes
- No
- Not Sure

11. 11. 7. Does the existing institutional framework of CMR in India facilitate the professional Military Commander to fulfill the responsibilities outlined at Q4 above? (Mark only one) *

Mark only one oval.

- Yes
- No
- Not sure

12. 12. 8. Keeping in view the indicators of military effectiveness alluded to at Q5 above, do you feel that the existing institutional framework of CMR in India contributes positively to each of them? (Mark only one per row) *

Mark only one oval per row.

	Yes	No	Not sure
Clear and timely strategic guidance coupled with effective oversight mechanism by the Government	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Capability development to including Force structuring, equipping, degree of modernization and preparedness commensurate to contemporary threats	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Jointness in planning and operations among the Services	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Degree of open dialogue on matters defence between Military leaders, other Government Institutions and the Political Leadership	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Quality of Human Resource (in Civilian Government Agencies) based on efficient planning & delivery of outcomes	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Quality of Human Resource (in Armed Forces) based on efficient planning & delivery of outcomes	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Morale of the professional soldier based on freedom of advice, equivalence, status and growth opportunities	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

DMA
and
CDS

The Government has instituted a monumental reform by not only appointing India's first CDS, but also establishing the Department of Military Affairs headed by him. Now, the CDS, not only has access to the Raksha Mantri as the single point Military Adviser on Tri-Service issues but also executive powers of clearing files pertaining to his assigned charter, either independently or through the Raksha Mantri without reference to Defence Secretary. In this context, please opine on each of the following questions of this section.

13. 13. 9. This reform in itself will bring about a huge change towards healthier CMR and consequently, efficient functioning of the military (Mark only one) *

Mark only one oval.

- Agree
- Disagree
- Neutral
- Other: _____

14. 14. 10. This is a step in the right direction and part of more changes to come. If handled well, would pave the way for more integration once confidence on handling of Higher Defence Functions by Military Officers builds up (Mark only one) *

Mark only one oval.

- Agree
- Disagree
- Neutral

15. 15. 11. This reform is cosmetic as bulk of the important issues continue to remain with the Defence Secretary without addressing the core issue of cross posting of Military Officers to MoD and vice versa (Mark only one) *

Mark only one oval.

- Agree
- Disagree
- Neutral

16. 16. 12. Establishment of the DMA is against the tenets of 'Civilian Control' (Mark only one) *

Mark only one oval.

- Agree
- Disagree
- Neutral

17. 17. 13. Establishment of the DMA does not support the cause of integration as it opens up yet another vertical in the already fragmented structure of the MoD. (Mark only one) *

Mark only one oval.

- Agree
- Disagree
- Neutral

18. 18. 14. "Verticals within the MoD, such as DMA, Department of Defence, DRDO, DESW & DDP could co- exist with cross staffing from all branches/ institutions falling under the MoD and continue to be delegated powers to deal with relatively routine matters under their respective domain. However, decisions affecting defence policy, structures and management of conflict would need to be taken at the Apex level by the highest Political authority only after considering advice (in equal value) from officials staffing each of these verticals. This arrangement would represent an ideal Institutional Framework for healthy CMR in India" (Mark only one) *

Mark only one oval.

- Agree
- Disagree
- Neutral
- Other: _____

19. 19. 15. Various important reforms regarding the Institutional Framework for CMR have been suggested by numerous committees such as the Kargil Review Committee, Naresh Chandra Task Force for Defence Reforms and successive Parliamentary Standing Committees on Defence. However, implementation of these has been slow and sluggish. Your opinion on possible impediments. (Mark only one per row) *

Mark only one oval per row.

	Bureaucratic reluctance to cede control	Turf battles within the Services	Lack of Political Will	Lack of professional competence in the Services as well as the Bureaucracy to evolve a way ahead	All of the above
Appointment of CDS	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Cross posting of Military and Civilian officers for an Integrated MoD & Service Headquarters	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Establishment of Tri Service Commands including Special Operations, Cyber & Space Commands	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Enhancing effectiveness of Headquarters IDS and Joint Staff at intermediary Headquarters for better Force Structuring & Joint Planning	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Establishment	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

of National
Defence
University

Introduction
of specialist
civilian cadre
in MoD

Fast tracking
modernisation
and right
sizing

Enhancing
efficiency of
DRDO and
Defence PSUs

20. 20. 16. In the context of the propositions at Q15, your opinion on the following statements outlining the way ahead (Mark only one per row) *

Mark only one oval per row.

	Agree	Disagree	Neutral
The timeliness in appointment of the CDS is very important	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
HQ IDS be merged into the DMA and cross relationship with SHQs and responsibilities be finalised concurrently Cross posting of Military Officers to departments of the MoD other than DMA and vice versa must commence concurrently	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The DRDO and Def PSUs under DDP be subject to independent oversight and qualified Military Officers be appointed in their Boards	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
A specialist, qualified civilian cadre be gradually instituted to staff the MoD and all its verticals	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Suitable modification in apex level national security apparatus to allow equitable representation and voice from bureaucracy and military on matters relating to National Security	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The process of rightsizing the military as also redundant defence establishments, raising Tri Service and Operational Commands must commence, preceded by formulation of policies for staffing and efficient functioning	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Establishment of National Defence University must be hastened alongwith specialist training & deputation for selected military and civilian officers	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Staffing & Training

The Military exists to serve the state and must draw its guidance and direction from the highest political authority. At the same time, the professional soldier must be sufficiently informed to correctly interpret role of military as a subset of the prevalent political agenda towards securing the state. Therefore, the institutional framework for CMR needs to be organised into a hierarchy of competent professionals (civilian and military) at all levels in the chain of command. While there is an institutionalised system of training of military officers at, most professional courses are designed to prepare the officers only in matters military, without much exposure on the functioning of the govt as well as non military aspects concerning national security. On the other hand, civilians in the MoD and associated institutions are also majorly generalists with no formal training/ qualifications on military strategy, science or operations. In this context, kindly opine on the following suggested changes to strengthen the institutional framework.

21. 21. 17. Selection and deputation of Officers (military & civilian) as research scholars and later as faculty on matters pertaining to National Security at reputed Universities and Think Tanks (Indian and foreign) (Mark only one) *

Mark only one oval.

- Agree
- Disagree
- Neutral
- Other: _____

22. 22. 18. Introduction of Specialist Cadre in the MoD, formally qualified on matters military so as to act as an effective interface between the Soldier and the Statesman by probing the military man and rendering informed advice to the political authority. (Mark only one) *

Mark only one oval.

- Agree
- Disagree
- Neutral
- Other: _____

23. 23. 19. Selecting and cross posting of officers of various service levels (military & civilian) with aptitude to various Joint and Service Headquarters as well as the MoD & DMA to make the system effectively integrated. (Mark only one) *

Mark only one oval.

- Agree
- Disagree
- Neutral
- Other: _____

24. 24. 20. Suitably altering the syllabus of important military courses at the DSSC, War Colleges and the NDC to familiarise military officers with additional aspects of Comprehensive National Security. (Mark only one) *

Mark only one oval.

- Agree
- Disagree
- Neutral
- Other: _____

25. 25. 21. Allotting/enhancing vacancies for civilian officers on Service Courses mentioned in Q20 above as also deputing select service officers on equivalent civil courses/ capsules at IAS academy/ Management institutes along with civil service officers (Mark only one) *

Mark only one oval.

- Agree
- Disagree
- Neutral
- Other: _____

26. 26. 22. Deputing civilian officers and Defence Analysts as faculty members in DSSC, War Colleges as is done in NDC as also Service officers in Civil Service academies including IIPA. (Mark only one) *

Mark only one oval.

- Agree
- Disagree
- Neutral
- Other: _____

27. 27. 23. Institutionalising provisions for cross staffing of Military, CAPFs and Civil Services by means of special provisions e.g. reserving 5-10% seats in Civil Services for ex Short Service Officers, sending 5-10% young CAPF/Police officers for short tenures of 2-3 years to active Army units etc. (Mark only one) *

Mark only one oval.

- Agree
- Disagree
- Neutral
- Other: _____

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