

American Adjustment to International Organization

WITH EACH PASSING MONTH since the Secretary of State's return from Moscow in November 1943, it has become increasingly clear that the American people have made up their minds on the central issue of our era: they definitely favor the formation of a "general international organization" and supplementary functional agencies through which the United Nations will co-operate for peace as they now co-operate for war. But evidence is wanting to show that they realize the implications for domestic organization and procedure of that national decision. We take it for granted that we are going to participate—indeed, to lead—in the establishment and maintenance of an effective system of world security and exchange. But have we considered what that participation will require of us by way of new attitudes within our own country and new departures within our own government? It seems to me we have barely begun.

Effective collaboration in intergovernmental organization depends initially upon the ability of various national representatives to reach "agreement for action" through international negotiation and thereafter upon the ready and continuous capacity of each participating government to make its promised contribution to the work of the organization. Missteps are possible at countless points along the way, any one of which may vitiate the undertaking. To light them up may lead people to think that no effort to organize independent nations for common action could possibly succeed. Yet that risk must be run. For unless we fully appreciate the difficulties that have to be surmounted in getting nations to work together effectively, we shall never muster up sufficient determination to "see things through." Only if we know how hard it will be to gain our objective will we make adequate preparation for the attempt.

Pitfalls in International Co-operation

The hazards to international collaboration about which we Americans must be concerned are of two kinds. In the first place we need to take into account the general difficulties that beset diplomatic conferences and negotiations, the necessary preliminaries to all inter-governmental undertakings. Among these are difficulties deriving from defective communication between national delegations and their home governments, from differences in language, from the need to be constantly solicitous of every nation's self-esteem, from the clash of national economic interests, and from the fact that all problems have to be approached through national channels even though that very approach may tend to make them less soluble.

Secondly, there are several hazards inherent in the organization and procedure of our own national government. Our federal structure, the separation of powers, the two-thirds rule in the Senate, the strong sense of prerogative in Congressional committees, the administrative individualism shown by most executive departments and agencies, and the limited integration which the State Department has achieved in its own internal organization—these features of our political system handicap the United States government in co-operating effectively with other nations. It will be useful to examine briefly the pitfalls in each class.

Consider the working situation at any international conference. In the case of world-wide undertakings, there will be spokesmen from forty to perhaps more than fifty separate national states. These men have to act as the embodiment of all the power and dignity and all the aspirations, interests, and preoccupations of their respective nations. Even, therefore, when individually they have the strongest urge to co-operate, agreement will not be easy. All the delegations save one will be in a foreign country and in something less than perfect communication with their home governments. They will have come with instructions varying greatly in character and detail. The various spokesmen will differ considerably in the facility with which they use their own national language and even more so in their mastery of the language of the conference. Each individual must weigh as best he can the forces at work in the assemblage, bearing in mind not only what the representative of Country X said for the record on

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Point Y, but also what he divulged privately regarding the willingness of his government to accept a compromise. And all the time every delegation must determine as shrewdly as possible how best to balance the claims of national interest and international welfare.

Note too that the more representatives each nation sends, the harder it is for the conference to arrive at a decision. For differences arise then not only between delegations but within them as well. Delegations with voting powers should be small, under definite leadership and discipline, usually limited to officials, with a staff of advisers and technicians.

The wonder is that positive agreement is ever reached. Even the highest common denominator of national interests and policies is likely to be too low to provide a genuinely sound basis of "agreement for action." Since, however, such agreement defines the very object and purpose of international consultation, the people of every country have a moral obligation to "bend" their own procedures and attitudes toward acceptance and support of the results of the negotiations. The most and best which has any chance of emerging from the process of intergovernmental negotiation is always in danger of being too little and too weak. Consequently if any government accepts a proposal in conference but does so with the intention of "whittling the thing down" later by attaching reservations or qualifications to its ratification, it is practically certain to reduce the agreement to nothingness.

Turning next to the analysis of those difficulties that are peculiarly American, we may note first the consequences likely to result from our failure to make proper allowance for the fact that it is of the nature of federal systems that certain powers and functions are reserved to their component units. A national government in a federal system may on that account find it difficult or impossible to enter into binding international commitments on many subjects. The United States, Canada, Australia, and India (in so far as India is an actual nation) all labor under such handicaps. We have a rather unsatisfactory record in ratifying the conventions worked out by the International Labor Organization for this very reason. After a full decade of membership in the I.L.O. the United States has ratified only five of the twenty-three conventions which have been

proposed during that period, chiefly because under our Constitution most of the subjects with which they deal fall within the jurisdiction of the states.

The checks and balances inhering in the separation of powers within our national government, however, comprise a far more serious obstacle. It should not be necessary to emphasize that a government in which powers are divided is less unified than one in which they are not so divided, but the significance of that fact is often ignored. What it means is that questions are seldom considered solely on their merits; they are also considered on the extraneous basis of the prerogatives and the prestige of the separate branches, particularly the legislative and the executive. The fortunes of the members of Congress and of the President do not rise and fall together. American voters can, and frequently do, use the same ballot to vote for one man for the Presidency and for other men, favoring different policies, for the Senate and the House of Representatives. Even in the case of members of Congress who belong to the same party as the President there is little discipline of the kind needed to provide a basis for governmental unity. If we had a provision that any disagreement between Congress and the President on a test question could be "taken to the country," the influence working toward such unity would be enormously enhanced. But there is no such usage in our system, and the factors productive of self-discipline remain for the most part intangible and weak.

The difficulty is aggravated once more, in the case of agreements embodied in treaties, by the requirement of a two-thirds vote in the Senate. This means that the formation of positive foreign policy is vastly more difficult than positive domestic policy. Given the present distribution of our population, the letter of the Constitution enables one third of the membership of the Senate, representing only a small popular minority, to thwart the will of even a great majority of our people. We need also to be reminded that bicameral legislatures find it harder to make up their minds than unicameral bodies.

These three features—federalism, the separation of powers, and the two-thirds rule—all have a serious bearing upon the work of the State Department in carrying primary responsibility for the President for the conduct of our foreign affairs. But administrative in-

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dividualism among executive agencies complicates its task even further. Many questions arising in our international relations are of such a character that they call for interdepartmental consideration, but the tendency of each agency, not excluding the State Department, to insist on exclusive jurisdiction in its field is so strong that they seldom receive the joint attention they deserve. Even where there is adequate joint attention, the process of arriving at a total-government position and securing adherence to that position by all concerned is most inadequate. The result is that the officials who serve as spokesmen for the United States in international negotiations on questions of that type (they will usually be drawn from both State and the other agency or agencies) invariably labor under a great handicap compared with the spokesmen of other nations.

Finally, the United States government is handicapped in the conduct of international affairs by the State Department's incomplete adjustment to its new administrative needs. Its internal organization has been much too loose for effective administration and remains somewhat defective even after the reorganization announced a year ago. Its procedures are in many cases time-consuming to the point of absurdity.

It is not intended to suggest that the State Department merits indiscriminate criticism. Its underpaid Washington staff is probably, man for man, the ablest in the capital. In the past the Department has relied too casually on the knowledge and experience of its personnel, and too little on organized bodies of information, but much improvement has been made in this particular in the last few years. The Department's chief weaknesses are: inadequate internal organization and poor administration; in the field of policy, timidity, a lack of bold imagination on the one hand and an academic remoteness from political reality on the other; a stubborn retention of old notions of foreign policy in narrow terms of international law and formal procedures; a failure to systematize sufficiently its relations with other departments; and a Foreign Service still recruited and developed in the old legal and formal mold. Concerning relations with other departments there are two principal problems—exercising policy controls over foreign operations without unduly handicapping administration, and developing processes by which domestic policy as

formulated in the various departments influences and is influenced by foreign policy. This latter is extremely intricate and difficult business.

Events, not persons, probably should be blamed for present shortcomings. The job confronting the Foreign Office of each of the more important nations has grown suddenly and enormously. The situation has been especially difficult for the State Department because of constitutional and traditional factors peculiar to the United States. More internal progress has been made in recent years in the State Department, in my opinion, than in any other great Foreign Office. The intention here is simply to make plain the general outlines of the situation in which the United States must begin to function internationally in a new way.

Though this discussion offers no exhaustive analysis of our handicaps—I have not even tried to describe the uncertainties engendered by our Congressional committee system—it will at least help the reader realize how many a slip there is for Americans between a popular decision to co-operate internationally and effective action by their government reflecting that decision.

Our Dangerous Unawareness

Why, with public opinion so favorable to international co-operation, have our people given so little thought to the domestic implication of world organization? Perhaps one of the main reasons is to be found in the curious fact that even our most incisive writers have shown far less concern over them than they actually merit. After endeavoring in his *U. S. War Aims*, for example, to outline definitively what should be the future relation between this country, its allies, and its present enemies, Walter Lippmann summarized by saying: "This is the definite question that the makers of policy have to decide. This is what the people have to make up their minds about. The rest is negotiation, legislation and administration." His own study was devoted almost entirely to that fundamental problem of basic relationships. Certainly he would never suggest that "the rest" could be dismissed by mere mention. But certainly also no one reading his provocative study would ever learn thereby to appreciate that in-

ternational organization—whether on his plan or some other—necessarily entails a number of significant national adjustments.

Sumner Welles in *The Time for Decision* and Clarence Streit in his wartime edition of *Union Now* may give a trifle more attention to the question of the organizational adjustments and procedural arrangements required of each member nation to make their plans effective. Yet for the most part they, too, leave essential “details” to take care of themselves. All of these men may, and probably do, assume that first things must be argued first—that the primary need is to develop public understanding and popular conviction for organized co-operation within the community of nations. But this proposition has a corollary: second things must be considered second; they must not be ignored.

Patently the time has come to direct attention to some of the hard material requirements for the building and functioning of the proposed general international organization and its various supplementary agencies. It is acknowledged on all sides that their own structures and procedures should be conceived in terms of the functions they will perform. Is it of any less importance to recognize that a nation pledged to work with them and through them has to relate its own methods of organization and operation to its responsibilities under the agreements creating the agencies? The architecture of intergovernmental politics comprises more than the making of broad artists’ sketches for the utilities and shelters humanity needs for its welfare and security in this unsteady world. It also includes stipulation of technical specifications running down to the humblest details of construction, maintenance, and operation. Just as special contributions have been required from the people of the United States for the winning of this war, so special contributions will be required from them for the winning of the peace. Our citizens have come, with quite good grace, to understand why we cannot presently have our usual quota of cars and gas and tires. We now need to understand with equal clarity and to accept with equal grace that international co-operation for peace and plenty will require us to discipline some of our old habits and modify various former practices in our dealings with other countries. Hitherto we have been

rather oblivious of certain things that are essential to success in intergovernmental collaboration. That is a luxury we can no longer afford. The American people felt that they had made up their minds about what Lippmann calls the "definite question" of basic relationships in 1920. It was mainly failure in "negotiation, legislation and administration" that rendered their conclusion futile. We cannot let that occur again.

Every citizen of the United States has an opportunity to exert an influence on American membership in international organizations. If our people are to discharge the responsibility therein implied, they must avoid the error of becoming exclusively concerned—as Wilson was after the last war and as several of our leading architects seem to be now—with general political arrangements. The fact that the general conceptions of 1944 are probably more realistic than those of 1919 might turn out to be almost irrelevant. For no matter whose scheme is chosen, it will come to naught if it dismisses "negotiation, legislation and administration" as matters of minor consequence.

Many observers have remarked on the inexperience of the United States in international dealings and on its long immunity from the necessity of comprehensive organization for the handling of intergovernmental affairs. Some draw the conclusion that we have become incapable of effective participation in international collaboration. Their argument is that our national government has no capacity for handling the complicated details of international business. They prove too much. Their "realism" overreaches itself. We do lack experience. Our government does labor under certain definite handicaps. But the prospect is not hopeless. It will be hard for us to translate our national intentions to co-operate with other peoples into the actualities of practical, day-by-day intergovernmental collaboration, but it will not be impossible if we see what specific things are necessary and do them. Can we change our easy attitudes and awkward usages? If we can, we can make the necessary national adjustments for world co-operation.

But No Reason for Despair

Our aspiration for a world in which all peace-loving nations co-operate for their own security and welfare obviously runs ahead of

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prevailing attitudes and traditions not only here but elsewhere. The difficulties that bar the way to the formation of international organizations that actually work are solid and substantial. Yet if we use our wits within the limitations they impose, we can hold their disadvantage to a minimum and may even be able in some instances to employ their strength to gain a helpful leverage.

Take the matter of nationhood and nationalism. Nationalism is clearly a barrier to the creation of anything like an effective world government in the early future. Yet the peoples of the earth want—and need—to handle some of their problems internationally. If their national governments were not available to serve as channels for effectuating that co-operation, how could they proceed at all? Again, though many persons insist that it would be practicable to try to establish a super-state at this juncture in history, who can say that the world commonwealth will not be built sooner and better if, because of these obstacles, humanity is first obliged to experiment with a number of less ambitious organizations?

However bright or dark may be the ultimate prospect for a genuine world government, for the immediate future the task is to organize co-operation between ourselves and other *nations*. Granting all the things that are said about the evils of nationalism, no thinking man expects that the peace settlement after this war is going to involve the early disappearance, as such, of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, the Republic of China, or any other major country. The immediate questions concerning international co-operation, therefore, are these: What kinds of organizations are the great nations likely to form or support? (Obviously they will create or allow to be importantly effective only those kinds in which they could participate as nations.) On what terms will they participate? In what manner? By what means?

All these essential new arrangements will have to be *intergovernmental* in character. This fact is of tremendous significance. We cannot begin the practice of international collaboration by bringing two billions of people into a town meeting; nay, not even that lesser number identified with but a single interest, such as labor or industry or agriculture. Most of the people of the world are organized in no other way than through governments. There simply is no way to by-

pass nations. It would be unwise to try to by-pass them even if there were, because national values and interests cannot be recognized and integrated excepting through intergovernmental mechanisms. For every person alive, therefore, national citizenship constitutes his one good ticket for membership and participation in international organization.

If all of the functions for which it were desired to create international facilities had to be lodged in a single, comprehensive intergovernmental agency—if, in other words, the various peoples of the United Nations were obliged to put all of their international eggs into one big basket—questions of procedure affecting national participation could not avoid taking on an equal importance in many cases with questions of substance. Happily that is not the prospect that confronts us. The United Nations contemplate the creation of a number of intergovernmental organizations. It should therefore be possible for member governments to consider their working relations with any one particular organization as of something less than the most vital significance. When separate agencies are created for different functions, nations will usually be willing to use a specific method of voting in certain fields and on some questions even though they might with good reason be quite unwilling to use it in other fields and for all questions. By the same token they will also be willing to share costs differently in different cases.

Thus even though as a people we are somewhat lacking in international experience and though our decision to co-operate with other nations for world security and prosperity must be expressed through the rather inflexible forms of intergovernmental collaboration, the problem of accommodating ourselves to international modes of action is not posed for us in its hardest aspect. With a chance of compensating ourselves in the agreement on Agency Y for overgenerous concessions made in negotiating the terms of the charter for Agency X, our diplomatic officials should be able to proceed with reasonable confidence and dispatch in working out with representatives of the other United Nations agreements covering each and all of the world's chief problem areas calling for international attention.

The United States is a Great Power, in fact, one of the Super Powers. Yet it also prides itself, and justifiably so, on its concern

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for the rights and dignities of little countries. Americans cherish an ideal of world order in which not only they themselves but small nations too will be able to find safe and satisfying places. Reliance on a number of intergovernmental agencies instead of one all-comprehending organization will make it easier rather than harder for us to realize that aspiration. Our people can contemplate increasing American participation in international administration without anxiety because the number and variety of organizations and procedures employed will mean fewer instances in which actions are determined by a few big powers and more in which they will be decided by truly representative deliberation and voting. It will induce more substantial collaboration all the way round. There will be encouragement not only for the forming of common views at the policy level but also for co-operation in the handling of day-to-day business at the working level—the kind of collaboration *in operations* that Sir Arthur Salter stressed so vividly in his history of *Allied Shipping Control in World War I*.

What it all adds up to is that this generation of Americans has something better than a bare fighting chance to help build a free world. Consequently we shall be doubly remiss if by weak or wavering support we make it impossible for our executive and legislative leaders to negotiate with foreign nations and to support international organizations and undertakings in a manner fully befitting our wealth and power and truly reflecting our ideals of liberty and fraternity. They in turn will be remiss if they fail to show that teamwork which is so indispensable to really effective government.

Defective Processes of Decision

An efficient government is one that succeeds readily in making its actions reflect the intentions of its citizens. In the field of international negotiation and legislation this is something the United States government often finds it difficult to do. Constitutionally, responsibility for the conduct of foreign relations is vested in the President. As a practical matter, most of his responsibility must be exercised by the Department of State. But the rest of the government is not organized behind the Department in such a way as to guarantee its effectiveness in the management of our international business.

The explanation for this regrettable fact lies largely in the several peculiar features of the American political system that have been analyzed in the preceding pages. Their combined effect is such that no other nation in the world, certainly none of comparable importance, has governmental machinery so hardly adjustable to the international responsibilities it will have to carry during the coming generation as does the United States.

In any organized undertaking processes of decision are of the essence, and, as Chester I. Barnard points out so well in his book *The Functions of the Executive*, these processes consist largely in techniques for narrowing the range of choice. Without appropriate techniques for first limiting and then reducing the number of alternatives, no action could ever be taken because no decision would ever be reached. This holds true equally for courts, for legislatures, for administrative departments, for chief executives, and for a government as a whole. It has powerful application in business; indeed, our constant and ungrudging recognition of it there accounts in no small measure for our phenomenal industrial accomplishments. Yet we show a curious impracticality with regard to the point when it comes to the top level in government, sometimes largely ignoring the need for narrowing the field of choice, occasionally almost denying it.

Some of the methods for reducing choices and expediting decisions in our political system are so familiar that they are not seen in that light at all. Take the manner of electing our President. No candidate for that office from 1796 to 1944 would have received a popular majority had there been a completely unrestricted field, yet how many citizens realize that it is *only* when the choice is limited by the device of party nominations to a few principal contenders, and very preferably to two, that *any* candidate can win a majority? Incidentally it is germane to observe also that elections in which the voters are offered but two choices are far more likely to produce effective administrations than those in which the choices number three or four. John Quincy Adams was handicapped throughout his Presidency because the range of choice in the campaign of 1824 included, besides Jackson and himself, Clay and Crawford. Lincoln's efforts to avert the Civil War in 1861 were the more certainly destined

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to fail because of the four-way division in the campaign of 1860 between himself, Douglas, Breckenridge, and Bell. The election of 1912, with its three-way split between Wilson, Taft, and Theodore Roosevelt, generated so much tension and friction that even after thirty years the nation retains its disinclination for another campaign on that model.

The procedure by which choice can be limited sufficiently to make it possible to arrive at agreement for action is often very intricate and must be carefully developed. Congress, for example, is an institutional device for narrowing the range of choice with regard to policy. All of the elaborate Congressional rules and procedures have been devised to serve that one aim. They are, to be sure, abused and perverted at times, but it would be impossible to legislate without them. Of all the statutes in the code, probably none would have received a majority in a popular referendum if it had been submitted to the people in all its alternative forms.

The difficulty of decision is roughly in proportion to the number of persons who must reach agreement. Difficulties grow almost in geometric ratio with increases in the number and the independence of the officials or bodies involved. The co-ordinator's job is invariably tougher than that of the administrator; interdepartmental affairs are never as easy to handle as intradepartmental undertakings; international matters are always harder to manage than intranational activities. Here we have the explanation of why the conduct of foreign relations is more difficult for democratic governments than for autocratic regimes and more difficult for the United States than for other free republics; the number of officials or bodies having the right to have a say in the business is almost at a maximum.

Consider again the problem of reaching definite "agreement for action" at an international conference. By and large, representatives of other countries are able to act with assurance that what they say will be confirmed by their governments. Now and then, admittedly, they have to cable home for a new instruction or for power to make a certain concession. But generally they are in a position to say without much delay: "This arrangement will be satisfactory to my government" or "Subject to this change, the arrangement suggested will be satisfactory to my government." On the other hand, they

watch with amazement the hesitation and squirming of United States representatives, handicapped as our spokesmen are by want of an equal ability to speak conclusively for the American government. For who *can* speak with any final assurance about what the United States will or will not do? The head of an American conference delegation may readily discover what is satisfactory to his Cabinet chief and to the President, but to find what would also be acceptable to other interested executive agencies and to two thirds of the Senate—or to 49 Senators and to 218 members of the House—is slow, complicated and uncertain business. Again, to learn what will be “satisfactory to the President” cannot fail to be especially difficult every fourth year, and to find out what will satisfy Congress is bound to be especially conjectural every second year. An American delegation to an international conference is, in short, in such a situation as Congress itself would be in if its own enactments were binding only if approved by a majority of our forty-eight state legislatures.

Changing Our Ways

Organized international collaboration faces so many pitfalls just because it is international that no nation, least of all a leading one, can afford to place others in its path through neglect of defects in its own political or administrative processes. The people of every country and the government of each nation have the right and the need to influence the process of international decision. That process should moreover be accompanied by exploration, debate, agitation, and petition. But no one people and no one nation can or should *determine* the process or its conclusion. We accept the results of domestic elections in which we participate whether our party wins or loses. We must develop an equal willingness to accept the results of international negotiations in which our government participates even though our proposals are only partially accepted.

Acceptance does not involve moral, individual, or national stultification any more in the one case than in the other. Acceptance can go along with continued agitation for reversal or change. But there must be acceptance of a process for arriving at decisions. Internationally as well as nationally there can be provision for checks on power, and for the reserve right of veto. But these provisions

have to be devised most carefully and exercised with caution. For in the end a nation will have to choose between the general plan agreed upon and the alternative of no agreement and therefore no international action. This does not mean that the United States need give up the least bit of its sovereignty or surrender the right of decision. It simply needs to understand the nature of its part in any decision as less than a determining part. Understanding this, there will be only one decision that it can make with utter freedom and complete precision: Will it participate in the organized handling of world business or will it go on paying the price of an unorganized world? In either case there will be decisions to be made; in neither will they be exclusively ours to make. But in one instance, we can participate in the decisions and influence them; in the other, the Hitlers will make the decisions for us.

Every knowledgeable citizen knows that we have only partially developed the civic attitudes and governmental usages essential to full-scale American co-operation in international efforts to promote security and welfare. Yet though we learn slowly and painfully, we do learn. Surely there are fewer people today than ever before—whether citizens, legislators, or administrators—who do not realize the risks, both for America and for the world, that lie in indecision and ineptitude. Of all the potential tragedies of politics in our age, the greatest would be for this mighty and friendly nation to botch mankind's present opportunity to achieve world organization, and we know it. We are, therefore, not nearly so casual or indifferent with regard to handicaps inhering in the structure or procedure of our own government as we were a quarter-century ago.

The real test of whether we are going to capitalize on the opportunity that is coming with victory in World War II lies in what we do to improve American governmental usages and facilities for international co-operation. Federalism and the separation of powers are fundamental in our system of government; they will not soon be changed either legally or structurally. We can, however, make our federalism more co-operative and less competitive than it has been in the past. And we can keep separation of Congress and Executive from degenerating into opposition, if we are determined to have it so.

The President and Congress can and must work together more closely on questions of foreign policy and international organization than they do at present. What more the President can do is especially difficult to see. Foreign affairs are not nonpolitical; they are thoroughly political, and for this reason it is hard to believe that they can consistently be handled on a nonpartisan basis. To inform opposition-party members of Congress fully about pending issues is to equip any who may be so inclined to make effective attack on what is being done. A few at least will be so inclined often enough to make the transaction of international business on a basis of nonpartisan consultation with Congress most difficult. There is no simple formula for a Presidential method. Each situation, and Congressional relations in general, must be given most careful and constant attention.

Congress for its part must give fresh thought to the nation's new need to be equipped for international decision and action. Failure in this would do more than anything else has done to damage the esteem and ultimate function of the Congress. Ideally, the Congress would recognize the special Constitutional responsibility of the President with respect to foreign policy, and the practical necessity for concentrating the power of decision, by permitting the President to name Foreign Affairs committees, subject only to party representation on the usual basis. Making these appointments an honor at the bestowal of the President might provide sufficient disciplinary unity. This could be done without Constitutional change, but it is most unlikely that Congress would agree to the proposal. Ideally, too, with appropriate safeguards the Congress should authorize the Foreign Affairs Committees or, preferably, executive subcommittees, to make commitments on behalf of Congress on specific matters requiring Congressional approval. Practically, perhaps as much as could be hoped for in the next few years would be some simpler reforms clothing the two committees with somewhat enlarged powers, providing that the two committees be elected by special party caucuses to make them especially responsible to the whole Congress, and employment regularly in the handling of international business of the procedure technically described as the legislative veto. This procedure, once advocated by the late Senator Robinson for general

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use by the Congress, has been adopted on occasion for the transaction of domestic business. Under this procedure the Senate and House would in appropriate measures indicate generally the positions that they thought the nation should take on pending issues; specific actions then would be reported to Congress, and failure of Congress to veto any entire action within a stated period of time would constitute legislative concurrence.

It would, in my opinion, be most desirable if the two-thirds rule were abolished, but failure to do so need not prove fatal in every case. With chastened views and tempers among the members of the Senate and an appreciation of the strength of the popular desire for international co-operation to prevent another war, it is quite possible that the charters and covenants for the general international organization and the pending functional organizations will receive the two-thirds majorities required for treaties in those cases where even under present practice the treaty procedure would seem to be indicated.

The cure for jurisdictional cleavage among executive agencies having an interest in foreign relations (which includes practically all of them) is easy to prescribe but hard to apply. It is at once the clearer assignment of functions to each agency and the devising of better machinery and procedures for inter-agency consideration of problems involving the responsibilities of several departments. Establishment of the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy represents the most promising development in this field during the past year. It is only a beginning, however. And it should be understood that jurisdictional cleavage is only one aspect of the problem of organizing total-government policy in the foreign field. In public discussions much has been made of shortcomings of the State Department, while not enough attention has been paid to the insularity and other limitations of the other departments as contributors to adequate foreign policy. Their responsibilities and outlooks are overwhelmingly intranational. The pressures on them are almost exclusively internal pressures. In consequence they are inclined to be excessively nationalistic and narrow when dealing with international matters. There is therefore a considerable gap between the State Department and other departments, and State Department policy

often is left too little modified by realistic internal considerations. In other instances the State Department is elbowed out of its proper role by an aggressive Cabinet member who attempts to project his own attitude in a single field into governmental foreign policy in that field.

Leadership in the development of foreign policy, even in specialized fields, must be exercised by the State Department. The development of a total foreign policy sufficiently influencing total internal policy and sufficiently reflective of relevant internal policy can be a principal duty only of the State Department.

Complete national adjustment to international organization, therefore, calls finally for rather extensive changes relating to the State Department itself. The personnel and facilities which it had in 1939 will never again be adequate to the nation's needs. Funds must be provided so that the Department will be able to secure new staff and additional equipment to handle its increasing responsibilities both here and abroad. The Department must discover how to integrate its own organization and expedite its internal procedures. It must help its employees to widen the horizons of their interests, and deepen their understanding of the nation they serve and of the times in which we live. This is especially true in the case of the Foreign Service. The range of its interests, its capacity, and its concern should be as wide as that of the government itself. It will be if it lives up to its name, for it is, officially, the Foreign Service of the United States. The Department of State should never need to be reminded that it administers that Service as a trust from the whole government.

The great new administrative necessity in the conduct of our foreign relations is the effective organization of the resources of the United States government behind the Department of State. The effective organization and administration of the State Department itself is, however, a plain prerequisite to the satisfaction of that need.

The Choice before Us

The most important single fact for us to understand today is this: In our generation the only arrangements that are possible for world peace and world order and for collaboration between the nations

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of the earth are the arrangements that are now being developed in the process of international negotiation. These arrangements are not going to be perfectly satisfactory, either to the President, to the Secretary of State, to the Senate, to the House, or to the general public. But we shall have to take them as they come out of that process or take nothing.

Every citizen can, and should, have his own vision of the kind of international order he thinks desirable, and work for its adoption. Members of Congress and executive officials need the influence, stimulation, and restraint that come from serious popular discussion and agitation. But citizens and officials alike should avoid, as they would the plague, any tendency to become dogmatic, doctrinaire, or unyielding in their positions. For perhaps the greatest danger facing the world right now is that the people of the United States will become divided into firm and opposing schools of thought on the question of the way in which this nation should co-operate in international organization. If very many Americans take the position that they are for the purpose of what is planned, but flatly against the method proposed for its accomplishment—that will be the same as deciding to do nothing. Our practical alternatives in the international field are always going to be limited. We shall have to choose between acceptance and adjustment of a proposed method or downright rejection of it. If we accept, we can look forward with good hope to the erection of a stable and thriving world order. We can go on sharing responsibility for peace and progress in the same practical way we have been sharing responsibility for winning the war. And, in due course, we can help to make those arrangements better and more effective. But if we decide the other way, we forfeit the right to expect any of these things.

A NOTE ON THE TYPE

The text of this book is set in Caledonia, a Linotype face designed by W. A. Dwiggins, the man responsible for so much that is good in contemporary book design and typography. Caledonia belongs to the family of printing types called "modern face" by printers—a term used to mark the change in style of type-letters that occurred about 1800. It has all the hard-working feet-on-the-ground qualities of the Scotch Modern face plus the liveliness and grace that is integral in every Dwiggins "product" whether it be a simple catalogue cover or an almost human puppet.

The typography is by Stefan Salter and the book was composed, printed, and bound by H. Wolff, New York.



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