

**Insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir: A  
Strategy for combating it**

**A DISSERTATION**

**By**

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Place : IIPA, New Delhi

Dated: 24 Feb 08

  
Brig Y S Rawat  
(APPPA Participant)

**CERTIFICATE**

I have the pleasure to certify that **Brigadier Yashpal Singh Rawat** has pursued his research work and prepared the present dissertation titled, "**Insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir: A strategy for Combating it**", under my guidance and supervision. The dissertation is the result of his own research and to the best of my knowledge, no part of it has earlier comprised any other monograph, dissertation or book. This is being submitted to the Panjab University, Chandigarh for the degree of Master of Philosophy in Social Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the Advanced Professional Programme in Public Administration (APPPA) of Indian Institute of Public Administration (IIPA), New Delhi.

I recommend that the dissertation of **Brigadier Yashpal Singh Rawat** is worthy of consideration for the award of M. Phil degree of Panjab University, Chandigarh.



Supervisor

25/02/08

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**SELF-DECLARATION**

I declare that the dissertation titled, '***Insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir: A strategy for Combating it***' for the award of Master of Philosophy Degree in Social Sciences of Punjab University, Chandigarh is original research work and that this work or a part thereof has not been submitted for the award of any degree or diploma of either this or any other University.

Place: IIPA, New Delhi

Dated: 24 Feb 08

  
Brig Y S Rawat  
(APPPA Participant)

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
INDIA, GUY ENJAMME AND KASHMIR  
A STRATEGY FOR INDIA

"Fakhri is pursuing a multi-phased strategy to drive India out of Kashmir. Since the military coup of 1953, Fakhri supports the cross-border terrorism, has been..."

Recommendations of the Commission of Ministers (1991)

CHAPTER

INTRODUCTION



**KASHMIR  
LIES AT THE EDGE OF OUR BORDERS  
BUT  
AT THE HEART OF OUR CONSCIOUSNESS**

State of territorial violation in Kashmir 2001 - Report prepared by the Department of Information and Public Relations, Government of India

## **INSURGENCY IN JAMMU AND KASHMIR**

### **A STRATEGY FOR COMBATING IT**

*“Pakistan is pursuing a multi-pronged strategy to destabilise India and annex Kashmir. Since the military coup of Oct 1999, Pakistan’s support to cross border terrorism has intensified”*

-Recommendations of the Group of Ministers, Feb 2001

## **CHAPTER – I**

### **INTRODUCTION**

1. India has remained committed to developing and maintaining relations with all its neighbours. With Pakistan we look towards resolution of Kashmir problem, which have been a thorny and a most intractable issue during the last 50 years. Even after having fought four wars and reached a nuclear stand off, the issue remains unresolved. Any discussion on improving relations cannot and should not envisage rewriting of history. Relations have to move forward to a brighter and peaceful future.

2. Pakistan continues its agenda of proxy war in Kashmir. India is concerned about the continuing Pakistani support to terrorism in the state including its occupation of part of Kashmir (POK). India on its part has systematically withstood the onslaught of militancy and has now brought it to manageable levels. Pakistan stands isolated in the world politics and is now on the brink of civil war. The aftermath of 9/11, nuclearisation of the region and a spate of terrorist violence on its own soil do not permit it the luxury to continue

its tirade against India indefinitely. Hence, it is now involved in a composite dialogue with India.

3. India has made it clear that the solution to the Kashmir problem has to be found within the framework of the Constitution and there will be no redrawing of borders under any circumstances. It has also reiterated its earlier stand that all negotiations should be based on bilateralism and there will be no third party mediation. If the desire of the world community is indeed to ensure peace and stability and to permit the people of Kashmir the right to determine their own destiny in an atmosphere of peace, then it has to ensure that cross border terrorism is completely halted. India on the other hand, needs to seize this opportunity of internal turmoil in Pakistan and bring the terrorist activities within manageable levels by systematically following effective counter terrorism strategy. With the successful conduct of elections in Pakistan and the likely formation of a civilian coalition Government, stability may return to Pakistan, however its control over the Mullahs and ISI will need to be seen over the next few months.

### **Statement of the Problem**

4. The proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir is characteristically atypical. Historical perspective, fundamentalism, ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity within the state, special status (Article 370), UN resolutions to the dispute, aspirations of the local population, geographic contiguity to hostile Pakistan, porous border and involvement of foreign terrorists have added new dimensions to the complexities of the dispute.

5. First and foremost component of the Kashmir problem is the relentless proxy war, waged by Pakistan. Initially, she was able to enlist a large number of alienated youth however after nearly two decades of terrorism this war is now under the control of foreign mercenaries and so called Jihadis. The second problem initially was the alienation of the Kashmiri people, due to poor governance, corruption and political fragmentation, however, with the successful conduct of elections in Jammu and Kashmir in 2003 and the efficient functioning of the coalition Government there is now political stability.

6. **Objectives of the Study.** These were:-

- (a) Study the Kashmir problem, its causes and the present situation.
- (b) The counter terrorism campaign will be successful if it is based on a multi dimensional and multi pronged approach. There is a need to evolve a long term counter terrorism strategy with a view effectively eradicate the scourge of terrorism.
- (c) Outline various counter terrorist measures that are required to be initiated at various levels with a view to bring the alienated youth back to the fold and expose the nefarious designs of Pakistan.
- (d) Suggest ways to successfully conclude the 18 years long insurgency by incorporating measures such as effective unified command, good governance, no human rights violation, winning hearts and minds of people and effective counter infiltration.
- (g) On Pakistan front, there is a need to promote people to people contact and encourage bilateral trade. The concept of autonomy, integration and soft borders on the lines of European model seems to be

the most logical way out of the imbroglio. Development of the trust between the two countries, eradicating terrorism and improving trade seems to have the potential of ushering in peace and prosperity in the region.

7. **Hypothesis.**

(a) There are two basic issues to the conflict in Kashmir. The basic one is the alienation of the people of Kashmir, having roots in the political mishandling of the State and application of an overly military force. The second complicating one is the presence of jihad elements, either sponsored by Pakistan for its own geopolitical ends, or by forces furthering Islamist ideology.

(b) India had been more mindful of the presence of Jihadis in formulating its strategy towards Kashmir, rather than addressing the indigenous problem politically. The point being made is that the support the jihadis enjoy directly corresponds to the alienation of the populace from the Indian state. Therefore, if we have to meaningfully address the jihad elements, the thrust of our strategy must be towards regaining public confidence.

8. **Limitations of Study.** The study was conducted in the limited available time i.e. a period of 25 days.

9. **Methodology.** The study has been based primarily on the data collected from secondary sources such as articles published in various newspapers,

periodicals, and internet. Lectures given by prominent personalities on the subject have also formed the basis of some arguments in the paper. Over and above, an attempt has been made to collect additional data through primary sources by interacting with various senior officers at the Army Headquarters and with Commanders involved in the field in Counter Insurgency Operations.

## CHAPTER – II

### BACKGROUND

1. Developments internal to Pakistan, especially in the light of successive military regimes and the formation of a weak civilian coalition after the recent elections of Feb 08, are critical to India. These interests develop into serious concern when viewed against the backdrop of three Indo-Pak wars, Pakistan's nuclear status and, above all, the eighteen year long terrorist movement in Jammu and Kashmir, that is aided and abetted by Pakistan.

2. The problem of militancy has afflicted Jammu and Kashmir since the middle of 1989 and has already taken a toll of over **40,000** lives. The roots of the present problem can be traced to the Pakistani misadventure of trying to take over the State by force in 1947-48. The situation that we face in Jammu and Kashmir today is a continuum of the events that unfolded almost sixty years ago. Partition of India was an extension of the 'Great Game' orchestrated by Great Britain. The concept of Pakistan, as a separate Muslim country, was envisioned by the British imperial strategists as a friendly ally and a client state serving its strategic interests. In the scheme of things so planned, the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir was to become part of Pakistan, of course to be managed with India's consent as rest of the partition was secured. However, a chain of events set in motion by Pakistan between August and October 1947 resulted in the State's accession to India thus leading to war with Pakistan for the next fourteen months.

3. The Indian Army's presence in Jammu and Kashmir commenced with the signing of the **Instrument of Accession** by Maharaja Hari Singh, the then ruler of the State, with the Government of India on 26 October 1947. Troops had been moved to Srinagar and Jammu by the first week of November 1947. The Indian Army and State forces engaged the Pakistani tribal raiders and army regulars in many decisive battles. However, India also lodged a complaint with the United Nations (UN) on 01 January 1948, against the Pakistani aggression and a UN brokered peace process culminated even as the Indian security forces were militarily in a favourable position. Lt. Gen. Akbar Khan thus noted, "*on our side, we gained the knowledge that in certain physical conditions a small number of disciplined troops, properly combined with the Azads and the tribesmen could stop a much larger forces provided we had some compact positions around which the tribesmen could operate offensively*".<sup>1</sup>

#### The Last Eighteen Years

4. Pakistani inspired and abetted terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir has posed a direct challenge to India's security since 1989. The concept and execution of cross-border terrorism has been based primarily on techniques employed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Afghanistan, where the US used local pan-Islamic guerillas with Pakistani support to settle scores with the erstwhile Soviet Union. The Pakistani establishment which had acquired significant skills in irregular warfare since 1947 further honed its capabilities on the basis of experiences gained in Afghanistan's tough mountainous terrain and subsequently applied similar techniques in Punjab and later, with further improvement, unleashed terror and mayhem in Jammu and Kashmir, particularly in the Kashmir Valley.

<sup>1</sup> Akbar Khan, *Raiders in Kashmir*, Karachi: Pak Publishers, 1970, p.121.

5. Broadly categorised, terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir has run through six phases since 1989. The **first phase**, which occurred between the closing months of 1989 till mid-1990, can be termed as having witnessed the **eruption of terrorism**. Although sporadic and unrelated incidents had begun to occur since July 1988 onwards, terrorism escalated during the second half of 1989. The abduction of Rubiya Sayeed, daughter of the then Union Home Minister Mufti Mohammed Sayeed, and her release in exchange for five jailed terrorists of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) is generally construed as an event that marked the emergence of serious complexities in the internal security dynamics of the region. According to one commentator, "*The afternoon of 13 December 1989, changed everything. Five of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front men were set free in exchange for Rubiya Sayeed. The people saw in the exchange a surrender of India's might. The terrorists of yesterday became instant heroes overnight. Pakistan had scored a point: The Indian government could succumb.*"<sup>2</sup> During this period, minorities, especially the Kashmiri Pandits, were targeted and intimidated, forcing them to migrate out of the Valley. The ethnic cleansing of the Valley was pushed systematically and methodically by the terrorists. The Valley – particularly Srinagar – also witnessed large-scale demonstrations in what had the appearance, at this stage, of a mass pro-independence movement.

6. The **second phase** lasted till the end of 1992, and was particularly arduous as popular unrest combined with a sudden **upsurge in terrorist violence**. The terrorists systematically destroyed infrastructure, concentrating their attacks on

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<sup>2</sup> Arun Joshi, "Battle-hardened men take over from novices", *Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, January 29, 2001.

bridges and educational institutions. The efficacy of the Jammu and Kashmir Police (J&K Police) was seriously undermined, partly due to terrorist infiltration of its ranks, but more effectively by targeted acts of violence against the force. It was during this period that, in response, efforts were made to increase the presence of the Security Forces. Furthermore, the security presence along the Line of Control (LoC) was also augmented and counter-insurgency forces deployed in the interior regions. The intelligence gathering system, which had practically folded up consequent to the killing of various Intelligence Bureau (IB) personnel in the initial period, was re-established. Efforts by the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan's external intelligence agency, to enlarge the arc of terrorism to the southern slopes of the Pir Panjal and the districts of Rajouri and Poonch were defeated, even though there was a spillover of terrorist operations from the Valley into Doda district. The security forces were also able to consolidate their hold on various towns in the Valley.

7. The **third phase** i.e 1993 can be termed as a **turning point** both from the point of view of Pakistani operators controlling terrorist activity in Jammu and Kashmir as also that of the security force response. In the Valley, the contours of a new phase of terrorism were emerging with the increasing marginalisation of pro-independence elements and the local terrorist leadership. Hard-line pro-Pakistan terrorist outfits like the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM), Harkat-ul-Ansar (HuA) and Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) replaced them. More potent and vicious elements emerged in the form of foreign mercenaries, commonly referred to as the Afghanis. In fact, the terrorist leadership passed on from the local commanders to foreign mercenaries. It was during this period that the terrorists began to make heavy inroads into the districts of Doda and Rajouri-Poonch.<sup>3</sup> The period also witnessed the formation of the All Party Hurriyat Conference

<sup>3</sup> [www.satp.org/India/J&K/Timeline\\_J&K.htm](http://www.satp.org/India/J&K/Timeline_J&K.htm)

(APHC), a political front of 26 socio-political and religious groups to further the cause of Kashmiri separatism.

8. While steadily increasing pressure on the terrorists, the SF apparatus also registered significant strategic gains. Three of these deserve special mention. The concept of the Unified Headquarters, operationalised during the month of May 1993, brought under one roof the army, para-military forces, State police and intelligence agencies, enabling them to launch counter-terrorist operations in a more systematic and coordinated manner under the directions of the Security Advisor to the Governor. The month of November saw two significant achievements: the clearing of the Hazratbal shrine from the clutches of terrorists who had occupied it for approximately a month; and a successful operation during which Sopore town, which for a considerable period had been regarded as a 'liberated zone', was purged of the influence of terrorists. The swift operations carried out with surgical precision and deftness were a significant blow to the morale of the terrorist movement.

9. The **fourth phase** of terrorism spanning the years 1994 and 1995 can be termed as a phase of **consolidation by the state**. The security forces pushed through the advantage that had been seized consequent to the Hazratbal and Sopore operations and regained the strategic initiative. The result was that the terrorists began to avoid direct encounters with the forces and increasingly resorted to grenade attacks and shooting from a distance. Even as the terrorists were losing their perceived legitimacy, the security apparatus was significantly intensifying intelligence and information accumulation at local levels. Terrorist operations were further undermined as a result of the formation of counter-insurgency groups and the fratricidal clashes within the terrorist rank and file. The commencement of the year 1995 saw the security grid becoming more

effective, even as indications emerged that the Government of India was considering the proposal of conducting elections in the State.

10. Parliamentary elections were conducted in three phases in May 1996. The electoral process was conducted in a peaceful manner beyond the expectations of most of the observers and analysts as also to the utter surprise of Pakistan. Apart from its failure to disrupt or in any way hamper the process of elections in the State, Pakistan suffered a bigger rebuff as a record number of 110 candidates contested the polls, which saw an impressive turn out of 49.02% of voters in the entire State. The successful holding of parliamentary elections and an encouraging response from the people eventually paved the way for elections to the Legislative Assembly in the State after a gap of over nine years. These elections were conducted in four phases during September 1996 and a popular government headed by Farooq Abdullah of the National Conference (NC) assumed office in October 1996.

11. The restoration of a democratic system also coincided with the **sixth phase** of terrorist operations in the State. The installation of the democratic government heralded normalcy in the State and terrorists with greater participation and cooperation of the local population were marginalised. The figures for 1997 indicate that in comparison with the preceding five years, terrorist incidents were the lowest and the number of civilians killed was also the lowest. Yet another very credible electoral exercise was conducted in September 2002 during Assembly elections, when people wielded the power of the ballot with confidence to usher in a change in the State government. The latest event in consolidation of political structure was the 'Local Bodies' elections held in January 2005 after a gap of over 27 years.

12. The strengthening of political process and restoration of normalcy is a constant endeavor which the state government, with considerable support and understanding from the centre, has embarked upon. There has been appreciable all round improvement in the ground situation over the years and efforts continue to further consolidate the gains made so far.

1. A study of guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency in the West and a comparison with the situation in Jammu & Kashmir from a political perspective, in the context of the socio-economic and socio-political circumstances, religious fundamentalism and the external support that were and are being provided for insurgency movements, to provide a clear picture about the armed insurgency in Jammu & Kashmir as a whole, and the role of the state and the centre in the context of counterinsurgency.

2. Projecting deep into the heart of Asia, the zone of Jammu & Kashmir covers an area of 2,21,374 sq. km. which stretches 711-1,113 km. under the occupation of Pakistan (P.A.K.). This zone is directly adjacent to Pakistan to the west and the P.A.K. zone to the east. The balance area of 1,50,000 sq. km. is directly adjacent to the boundaries with China, India and Nepal. The P.A.K. zone is directly adjacent to the Central Asian Republic (C.A.R.) zone to the south. A detailed study of the geo-political strategy of the P.A.K. zone in the context of imperialism.

(3) The arguments of India and Kashmir in the P.A.K. zone in the context of strategic depth, access to China, access to the route to Afghanistan and the political, economic and social conditions in the

<sup>1</sup> Major Raza Wazir and Dr. M. A. Qasbi, Jammu & Kashmir State Government, Jammu.

<sup>2</sup> The Centre for Strategic Studies, Jammu & Kashmir State Government, Jammu.

## CHAPTER – III

### GEO- STRATEGIC OVERVIEW

1. A study of guerilla wars and insurgencies across the World highlights that it is essentially the factors such as geo-politics, historical perspective of a cause, socio-economic and socio-political discontentment, religious fundamentalism and the external support that stem and sustain a successful insurgency movement<sup>4</sup>. In order to obtain clarity about the current insurgency in Jammu & Kashmir an objective and dispassionate study of these and other related issues is necessary.

2. Projecting deep into the heart of Asia, the state of Jammu & Kashmir covers an area of 2,22,236 square kms, which includes 78,114(35.15%) sq kms under the occupation of Pakistan(POK), 5180(2.33%) sq km illegally ceded by Pakistan to China and 37,555(16.9%) sq km under illegal occupation of China<sup>5</sup>. The balance area of 1, 01,387(45.62%) sq km is under Indian control. Its boundaries with China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan and its close proximity to Central Asian Republics (CAR) give it a pivotal strategic location in the region. A detailed study of the geo-politico-strategic content highlights the following imperatives:-

- (a) The annexation of Jammu and Kashmir is vital for Pakistan for gaining strategic depth, avenues to China, alternative route to CAR, Afghanistan and for reciprocal transit facilities to these countries to the

<sup>4</sup> Maroof Raza, *Wars and no Peace over Kashmir*, Lancer Publication, New Delhi, 1996. pp90.

<sup>5</sup> Afsir Karim, *Kashmir the Troubled Frontiers*, Lancer Publications, New Delhi, 1994, p6



3. From the insurgency point of view an analysis of terrain, demography and prevailing environment at the Line of Control(LOC) reveal the following:-

(a) The difficult and inhospitable terrain in the higher reaches of the Kashmir Valley and districts of Kargil, Punch, Rajauri and Doda lends itself for rural insurgency and Guerilla Warfare.

(b) Urban/semi urban areas of Valley and Jammu are suitable for urban insurgency and terrorism.

(c) Demographic pattern in the State reveals that , in the Kashmir Valley 97 % people are Kashmiri speaking Muslims ,in Jammu region 67% are Hindus, in Ladakh 51% are Buddhists and in Kargil 78 % are Shias. Demographically, apart from the Kashmir Valley, the districts of Punch, Rajauri and Doda bear ethnic affinity to Pakistan and are susceptible to Sunni fundamentalism. Weaning away this community from militancy is the prime requirement in counter insurgency campaign. The legitimate aspirations of the people of these regions would merit serious consideration for lasting peace and normalcy in the State.

(d) The lines of communication in the State, viz, the Railway line between Pathankot - Jammu – Udhampur, and the National Highway between Udhampur via Banihal and Zojila Pass are highly vulnerable and susceptible to disruptions due to sabotage and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks.

(e) Kashmir Valley perse is land locked being surrounded by the Great Himalayan Ranges in the North and Pir Panjal Range in the

South. The Valley can be accessed only through surface routes from Muzaffarabad(POK) and across Banihal and Zojila passes.

(f) The contiguity of the State of Pakistan, porous and volatile LOC/International Border affords multiple routes for infiltration/exfiltration.

(g) The geo political situation in Jammu and Kashmir can be easily exploited by Pakistan to heighten insurgency and attempt to fuse it with a conventional military offensive to annex Kashmir Valley.



finally Dogra. It has lain on the fringes of the great invasion routes into the sub continent and at the very crossroads of Trans Himalayan trade. In the 16 th century the rich ethno-cultural diversity of Buddhism, Shaivism and Islam resulted in Kashmiriyat- a tolerant and genteel way of life.

3. Pre Independence, Jammu and Kashmir was ruled by Maharaja Hari Singh, a Hindu Dogra. It was the largest princely state in India. It lay like a crown on the British Indian Empire. It shared indistinct and imprecise boundaries with Afghanistan, Russia, Independent Khanates, China, Tibet, and undivided Punjab of British India. A land of great mountain barriers, it was the source of life giving rivers, all draining into the Punjab and what is now Pakistan.

4. Post independent Kashmir's history has been punctuated with bitter controversy and conflict as under:-

(a) **Standstill Agreement.** Faced with the option of either joining India or Pakistan an indecisive Maharaja offered a Standstill Agreement to both countries. Pakistan accepted the agreement while India sought to discuss and negotiate the agreement.

(b) **Invasion by Pathan Tribesmen.** Kabailis (pathan tribesmen) invaded Kashmir on 22 Oct 1947 in an attempt to force accession to Pakistan -- a gross violation of the Standstill Agreement.

(c) **Maharaja's Appeal.** A distraught Maharaja appealed to India on 24 Oct 1947 for military assistance. India insisted that accession was a pre requisite for intervention.

(d) **Accession.** On 26 Oct 1947, the Maharaja signed the Instrument of Accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India. The Instrument of Accession was accepted by the then Viceroy of India.

5. It is also pertinent to understand the core issues that have shaped the Kashmiri psyche during the course of its chequered history.

6. **Sufism and Kashmiriyat.** The historic traditions of Hinduism and Buddhism and new brand of Islam i.e. Sufism was preferred by the people to orthodox Islam. It spread in the Kashmir valley under the influence of Hazarat Noorudin referred as Nand Rishi and his followers – an indigenous order of Muslim mystics. Notably, the ancestors of late Sheikh Abdullah were Kashmiri Hindus who adopted Islam during the Afghan rule<sup>9</sup>. The Rishi culture borrowed liberally from practices of Hindus ascetics known as Shiviats; they mostly followed the broad system of co-existence. Kashmiriyat is normally meant to imply the characteristics of a resident of the Kashmir valley. These characteristics include moral and ethical attributes, socio culture behavior pattern and a fellow feeling suffused by humanistic values.

7. **Dogra Rule Advent of Movement of Self-Determination.** Hari Singh became Maharaja in 1925. The Dogra rule discriminated against Kashmiri Muslims who were compelled to do forced labour (Begar), heavily taxed and denied opportunities to seek Government jobs and higher education. The Muslims of J&K resented Dogra rule and showed tendencies of separation. Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah in his autobiography, 'Flames of the Chinar' wrote, "*The year of 1930 dawned. How could I have known the nation was on the brink of eruption? The trampled pride and hope of people of Kashmir was*

<sup>9</sup> Abdullah Sheikh, *Flames of the Chinar- an autobiography*, Penguin Books Ltd, New Delhi, 1993, p2.

*like molten lava ready to flow. The embers of protest were smoldering inside me. It was left to me to take the lid off the volcano's mouth. The valley of flowers was about to burst into flames".* On 10 May 1946 the National Conference launched 'Quit Kashmir'. The tone and tenor of Sheikh's speech on 17 May 1946, *the tyranny of the Dogras has lacerated our souls. It is time for us to join Jihad as soldiers. Every man, woman and child will shout quit Kashmir. The Kashmiri nation has expressed its will, I ask for plebiscite on this question"*, echo the sentiments and aspirations of Kashmiri public.

### **The Partition and Aftermath**

8. **Flawed Instrument of Accession.** On 26 Oct 47, forced by the tribal invasion Maharaja signed the 'Instrument of Accession' with India and requested for immediate military help. Sheikh Abdullah and Muslim population supported this move. However, it is intriguing to note that the 'Instrument of Accession' and the Governor-Generals reply to it contained many loopholes. Maharaja inter-alia did not accept Indian Independence Act 1947, debarred any Indian to acquire land in the State and absolved himself of any obligation to accept the Constitution of India. Equally flawed was the Governor General Lord Mountbatten's reply, *"my government has decided to accept the accession of Kashmir to the dominion of India, consistent with their policy that in case of any State where the issue of accession has been subject of dispute, the question of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State. It is the governments wish that as soon as law and order has been restored in Kashmir and its soil cleared of invaders the*

*question of State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people*<sup>10</sup>. Pakistan and AHPC, to state their case, exploit these lacunae in the document.

9. **Indian Army Counter Offensive and UN Resolutions.** The Indian Army's counter offensive was progressing well and was poised to liberate the entire area of tribal Kashmir; ironically it was India, which sought UN intervention. After protracted negotiations, a cease-fire was finally effected on 1 January 1949, in accordance with a UN resolution. The salient points of the resolution are worth noting:-

(a) **Part I.** Cease-fire order 'Agreement on Cease-fire'.

(b) **Part II.** Truce agreement; withdrawal of Pakistani troops/tribals from Jammu and Kashmir State, followed by phased withdrawal of the Indian Forces.

(c) **Part III.** The Governments of India and Pakistan re-affirmed their wish that the future of State shall be determined in accordance to the will of the people<sup>11</sup>.

(d) Pakistan violated the UN resolution by non-withdrawal of her troops. However, she keeps blaming India for violation of said UN resolution.

10. **Anti Pakistan Kashmiri Feelings.** Sheikh Abdullah was the most charismatic Kashmiri leader who represented the aspirations of the people. There is enough historical evidence to suggest that Sheikh Abdullah was

<sup>10</sup> Jagmohan, *My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir*, Allied Publishers, New Delhi 1991, pp86

<sup>11</sup> Afsir Karim, *Kashmir the Troubled Frontiers*, Lancer Publications, New Delhi, 1994, pp 69.

strongly opposed to the merger of Jammu and Kashmir with Pakistan. In his autobiography, Sheikh himself acknowledges the hostility, which Jinnah displayed towards him and Kashmiri people. He writes, "*At that time, Jinnah was intoxicated with power. He thought it beneath his dignity to talk to a poor and resource less nation*". He further adds that during May 1944, during Jinnah's visit to Srinagar, when asked about the role of Kashmiri people in partition, Jinnah replied, "*Let the people go to hell*". On the issue of accession to Pakistan, Sheikh declared, "*I have never believed in Pakistani slogan*". In his famous speech delivered at UN Security council on 05 February 1948 on the issue of Pakistan sponsored tribal invasion he spoke, "*It is absolutely impossible for the tribesman to enter our territory without encouragement from Pakistan.....The Prime Minister of India made the plebiscite offer when; he had not slightest need for making it, for Kashmiris were in distress. I refuse to accept Pakistan as a party in the affairs of Jammu and Kashmir State; I refuse this point blank.....We have had enough of Pakistan.*" Anti Pakistan feelings of majority population were fully substantiated by the fact that people did not render any support to Pakistani infiltrators in 1948 and 1965 and fully cooperated with the Indian Security Forces. **What went wrong? What alienated the masses? The answers lie in poor governance and politico-religious developments that took place in the State after its accession to India.**

### **Political Development (1950-1990)**

11. Traditionally, Kashmiris have always longed for right of self-determination, not to merge with Pakistan, but to remain independent of Hindu

majority too. In 1950, Sheikh Abdullah held secret meetings with Ambassador of USA to India, to declare Kashmir as an independent State. During the foreign tours, he actively drummed up support for Kashmiris as an attempt to erode their identity.

12. **Erosion of Article 370.** Article 370 conferred a special status to Jammu and Kashmir. The Union's parliament had powers to make laws for State in matters related to defence, external affairs and communication. Any amendments to the Article 370 or power to finalise the constitutional relationship between the State and the Union specifically vested with the Constituent Assembly. However, in July 1952, Sheikh Abdullah signed Delhi Accord, wherein, the President of India was accepted as the Head of the State and the jurisdiction of Supreme Court was extended to the State. Article 370 was further eroded in 1964, wherein special terms like Sardar-e-Riyasat, etc were dropped. In another accord signed between the Central Government and Sheikh Abdullah in 1975, the parliament was empowered to make laws related to prevention of activities towards discriminating, questioning or disrupting sovereignty or territorial integrity of India etc.

13. **Power Politics and Changes in Political Structure.** The power politics played by the Centre and State governments, has been one of the major causes for political instability in Jammu and Kashmir. Toppling of popular leaders, political opportunism and installation of puppet Chief Ministers was a regular feature. Mir Qasim wrote, "*Whenever, New Delhi feels a leader in Kashmir is getting too big for his shoes, it employed Machiavellian methods to cut him to size....and instead of becoming a source of strength for us, the Congress*

*became the conduit of flow of all the country's dirt into Kashmir*"<sup>12</sup>. Towards the end, Sheikh Abdullah too came for criticism for showing nepotism and promoting dynastic rule. After the death of Sheikh in Sep 1982, Dr Farooq Abdullah came to power. Serious differences erupted between him and his brother-in-law GM Shah. Political intrigues and manipulation by the Central Government led to Farooq's replacement by GM Shah who too was later dismissed and the governor's rule imposed on 07 May 1986. However, in yet another move of political opportunism Farooq formed a coalition Government with the support of Congress (I).

14. **Rigging of March 1987 Assembly Elections.** In March 1987 Muslim United Front, a fundamentalist political party contested the elections and is widely perceived to have done well. However, there were charges of large scale rigging by Farooq. Eventually, the political turmoil led to imposition of the Governor's rule in January 1990.

### **Growth of Fundamentalism**

15. In Kashmir, shrewd political and community leaders have always played the religious and aazadi card to whip up anti Indian feelings to serve narrow political interests. Agitation launched on the loss of holy relic in 1963 and violence of 1973 on publication of Prophet's picture in British Encyclopedia are cases in point. Aware of the public sensitivity, mullahs embarked upon the programme of Islamic resurgence. A number of Madarsas came up teaching orthodoxy and religious intolerance. A new generation was being created for militancy and secessionism with primary class teaching that emphasized, "*you may be few and without any Army; but you must fight for Islam. Our country*

<sup>12</sup> Ajit Bhattacharjee, *Kashmir the Wounded Valley*, UBSD, Delhi 1994, pp218-19.

*is Kashmir-it is surrounded by India, China and Iran*". And, although both Sheikh and Farooq Abdullah fulminated against these schools, they did practically nothing to scale this tide of Islamic fundamentalism<sup>13</sup>.

16. Fundamentalists were opposed to Kashmiri nationalism, favored secession and vigorously demanded that Kashmir should become a virtual Muslim state. They unleashed a cultural invasion and beauty parlors, video libraries and cinema halls were closed, Governments schools were burnt and women were forced to wear veil (Burqa). They also resorted to ethnic cleansing and caused exodus of Kashmiri pundits from the State.

<sup>13</sup> Balraj Puri, *Kashmir Towards Insurgency tracts for the Times*, Sangam Books, Orient Longman, New Delhi ,pp23.

## CHAPTER - V

### STATUS OF INSURGENCY IN JAMMU AND KASHMIR

1. Post Independence developments in Jammu and Kashmir bear ample testimony to Pakistan's absolute refusal to acquiesce in the accession of the State to India. Why? Is it because:-
  - (a) The accession calls into question the two nation theory- the very basis of the partition of the sub continent.
  - (b) In Pakistan's perception, India has robbed her of Jammu and Kashmir, through deceit, much against the will of the people.
  - (c) Of reasons more fundamental? The fears that one day India will deny Pakistan the waters of the mighty rivers that flow out of the state and into Pakistan - the Indus Water Treaty of 19 September notwithstanding.
2. Whatever be the reason, Pakistan's junoon(obsession) with Jammu and Kashmir is the major cause for its continuing and compulsive hostility towards India.
3. Between 1983 and 1989 growing political and economic discontent led to serious unrest in the state. This presented Pakistan with a golden opportunity, which it seized with both hands. This led to a slow and sure increase in the areas affected by terrorism. By 1995 however, the ideological support of the middle classes had worn thin and the JKLF, owing to its lack of convergence with Pakistan's aims (independence versus merger), had abjured the use of force. This forced Pakistan to play an increasingly dominant role through its proxies. The period signaled the advent of foreign terrorist and the criminalization of the movement. By 1998, there were visible signs of

disenchantment and fatigue and the mood of the people had begun to swing towards "peace with dignity". Since 1999, however, post Kargil, the movement has become captive to Pakistan and its proxies. Today, Pakistan's role in the conflict has dwarfed that of the Kashmiri separatist.

### **Strategic Objectives of Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir**

4. Pakistan's strategy in Kashmir has witnessed a shift from locally inspired mass movement, to state sponsored proxy war. Pakistan's main strategy objectives are:-

- (a) Desufisation and neutralisation of Kashmiriyat, by spreading Sunni Wahabi fundamentalism through Madrassas.
- (b) Portray Kashmiri militancy as jihad, as part of a greater Pan Islamic movement, against forced Hindu occupation of predominantly Muslim majority state.
- (c) Marginalise pro azadi militant groups by pro Pakistan militant groups.
- (d) Resort to ethnic cleansing, engineer migration of Hindu population.
- (e) Destablise the State Government and undermine its credibility in the eyes of the public.
- (f) Assassinate popular political leaders and intimidate pro-government elements.
- (g) Tarnish the image of security forces by accusing them of Human Right Violations.
- (h) Internationalise the Kashmir issue.

## 5. Contours of Pakistan's Support.

(a) **Recruitment.** Despite ISI's best efforts, local recruitment of Kashmiri youths has virtually dried up. Consequently, reliance has been on mercenaries/Islamic zealots from Pakistan, POK, Afghanistan, Bangla Desh, Yemen, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia.

(b) **Training.** Training is organized in approx 80 camps located in POK and Pakistan. The schedule of training is as under:-

(i) **Basic Training(Daura-e-aam).** This training is conducted for a period of 45 days and includes Swimming.

(ii) **Advance Training (Daura-e-khas).** This training is conducted for a period of 90 days with emphasis on weapon training and explosives handling.

(iii) **Commando Training.** This training is imparted for 180 days to selected terrorists and includes training on communication equipment and handling of explosives/IED.

(iv) Religious training and motivational lectures form part of the curriculum at each stage.

(c) **Terrorist Groups in Jammu and Kashmir.** In Jammu and Kashmir, Muslims belonging to different organizations took to terrorism for conflicting objectives. Groups, such as, Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front(JKLF) want independence for the State, including all the territory presently part of India, Pakistan and China. Others, such as the Hizbul Mujahideen(HM), want India's Jammu and Kashmir State to be merged with Pakistan. While those who want

independence project their struggle as a separatist one, those wanting a merger with Pakistan project it as a religious struggle.<sup>14</sup> The indigenous terrorist groups in Jammu and Kashmir do not believe in suicide terrorism either; it is a unique characteristic of Pakistan's pan-Islamic jihadi groups operating in Jammu and Kashmir and other parts of India, after they joined Osama bin Laden's International Islamic Front in 1998. Since then there have been 46 incidents of suicide terrorism carried out by Bin Ladens Pakistani supporters<sup>15</sup>.

(d) **Funding.** The funds are normally transmitted either through couriers or through the informal Hawala channel. When transmitted through formal banking channels, they are disguised as funding of NGOs and normally in small measures. The main sources of funding are<sup>16</sup>:-

- (i) Clandestine contributions from Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence.
- (ii) Contributions from religious, fundamentalist and pan-Islamic jihadi organizations in Pakistan.
- (iii) Contributions from ostensibly charitable organizations in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.
- (iv) Contributions from trans-national criminal groups, such as the mafia group led by Dawood Ibrahim.

<sup>14</sup> B Raman, <http://www.rediff.com/news/sunhom.htm>, *The Rediff Special*, April 04, 2003

<sup>15</sup> <http://www.rediff.com-the> Rediff Special, article by B Raman, "Terrorism: India's unending War".

<sup>16</sup> *ibid*

- (v) Extortions and ransom payments for releasing hostages.
- (vi) Collections -- voluntary or forced -- from the people living in the area where they operate.
- (vii) Narcotics smuggling.

(e) **Sanctuaries.** Religious terrorist organizations have their sanctuaries in Pakistan and Bangladesh, while non-religious terrorist organizations normally look to Nepal, Bhutan and Myanmar. Pakistan has given sanctuary to 20 prominent terrorist groups, including hijackers of Indian aircraft and criminal groups. Despite strong evidence of their presence in Pakistani territory, its government has refused to act against them. It has also ignored Interpol's notices for apprehending them and handing them over to India.

### **Important Events Since 1999**

6. **Lahore Visit.** The first major event was the 'Lahore Bus Yatra' undertaken by the then PM Mr Vajpayee in February 1999 which resulted in signing the joint declaration for improving ties between India and Pakistan. However, all hopes in this regard were shattered by the 'Kargil Conflict'.

7. **The 24 July 2000 Cease-fire.** With the escalation in terrorist violence and an equally efficacious response from the Security forces, the level of attrition in the terrorist ranks, particularly the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, increased rapidly from the onset of the year 2000. The terrorist casualties during the months of May, June and July were 140, 180 and 154 respectively. The visit of

the then US President, Bill Clinton in March 2000 to India and Pakistan, and his friendly overtures in India and blunt speaking to the Pakistani military regime, followed by certain reportedly behind-the-scene diplomatic maneuvers, also created pressures on Pakistan and the terrorist leadership to look for alternatives beyond armed struggle. The rising aspirations of the local population for the restoration of normalcy also created its own dynamics, stimulating an urge for peace. Consequently, at a press conference in Srinagar on 24 July 2000, Abdul Majid Dar, the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen 'commander' in the Valley, announced a unilateral cease-fire for three months.<sup>17</sup>

8. **Ramadan 'Non-initiation of Combat Operations' (NICO).** On 19 November 2000, Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee announced the Non Initiation of Combat Operations (NICO – referred to as cease-fire hereafter) by the security forces against terrorists during the holy month of Ramadan commencing from November 27. It was a bold and statesmen-like initiative, which brought about a qualitative change in the terrorism-affected State. Announced four months after the failed Hizbul mujahideen cease-fire, this peace initiative was of far greater significance, as it reflected the authority and prestige of the highest executive authority in the country. There was also a reported meeting between the Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) of India and Pakistan on 21 November 2000,<sup>18</sup> to de-escalate existing border tensions and the intensity of firing and shelling between troops stationed along the Line of Control (LoC) and the international border. The meeting succeeded

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<sup>17</sup> Hizbul mujahideen announces unilateral truce, *Daily Excelsior*, Jammu, July 25, 2000; See <http://www.dailyexcelsior.com/00july25/news.htm#1>.

<sup>18</sup> Delhi plays cool to Pak border truce offer, *Times of India*, New Delhi, December 3, 2000, [www.timesofindia.com/031200/03home1.htm](http://www.timesofindia.com/031200/03home1.htm)

in significantly bringing down the cross border incidents that had become a daily ritual between Army positions on both sides.

9. **Agra Summit**. The next event in this chronology was the ill fated 'Agra Summit' in July 2001 with General Parvez Musharraf, the outcome of which was only a public relations exercise, so efficiently managed by the Pakistani visitor.

10. **9/11 and Attack on the Parliament**. 11 September terrorist attacks were followed by the unleashing of American fury in Afghanistan. Terrorist attacks on the Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly on 01 October 2001 and the Parliament on 13 December 2001 constituted acts of grave provocation against the Indian State. Particularly, the attack on Parliament pushed the Indian patience to the extreme and India reacted by mobilizing and forward deployment of the Army under 'Op Parakram'.

11. **Terrorism Profile**. Statistical details regarding different parameters of militancy violence during the period of 1990-2005 is given at **Appendix A**<sup>19</sup>. Out of 40,160 civilians, security forces and terrorists toll, more than 35,000 are the Indian casualties making it clear as to why this effort is so much cost effective to Pakistan. The casualty figure of 4824 security personnel killed includes 803 lives lost by the rank and file of the Jammu and Kashmir Police<sup>20</sup>.

12. It is estimated that the number of terrorists operating in Jammu and Kashmir has come down from a high of 5,000 plus in the middle 1990s to 2000

<sup>19</sup> Dr Sudhir S Bloeria, IAS (Retd), "Militancy in Jammu and Kashmir", Strategic Analysis, Vol. 27, No. 1, Jan-Mar 2006, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, p 5.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid, p 7.

plus. About 45 percent of the terrorists in the Valley and about 50 percent plus of those in the Jammu area are Pakistani nationals. Between January 1988, and December 1999, the Indian Security Forces captured over 35,000 weapons and huge quantity of ammunition and other equipment supplied to the terrorists by Pakistan<sup>21</sup>. Refer to **Appendix B** attached.

13. **Modus Operandi of Terrorists.** The modus operandi of terrorists will be to:-

- (a) Establish strong operating bases and caches for prolonged operation in the State.
- (b) Subvert and exploit local population for recruitment, sustenance and support.
- (c) Refine infiltration /exfiltration network and establish new corridors keeping in mind the Line of Control barbed wire fence.
- (d) Avoid direct contact with the Army yet harass isolated weak posts by suicide attacks, and target convoys by IED blasts.
- (e) Killing of informers, government officials, and influential political leaders.
- (f) Acts of sensational killings of members of minority community.

<sup>21</sup> B Raman, "Pakistan Sponsored Terrorism", South Asia Analysis Group papers, Paper No 192, p 9.

## CHAPTER - VI

### CURRENT SITUATION IN JAMMU AND KASHMIR

1. Pakistan has clearly adopted the strategy of covert war – the tactic of terror- and the instrument of the fanatical mercenary to achieve its politico-military goals in Jammu and Kashmir. Post September 11, there were many fluctuations in Pakistan’s stance- the detention of terrorists; the removal of sign posts from their premises; the closing down of offices and accounts; the relocation of camps; the dispersal of terrorists. But time has proved that these measures were cosmetic and temporary- to be turned off and on at will. The suggestion that Pakistan is “not in full control” is to be generous to Pakistan, and provide it with an “alibi” it seeks.

2. A total of over 40,000 people have lost their lives due to terrorism related violence in Jammu and Kashmir. However, since 2002, terrorism related fatalities, have shown a downwards trend. Even today, 75 to 100 lives are lost every month. Fatalities in terrorist violence in last six years are given in the table below<sup>22</sup>.

<b>Year</b>	<b>Civilians</b>	<b>Security Forces</b>	<b>Terrorists</b>	<b>Total</b>
2001	1067	590	2850	4507
2002	839	469	1714	3022
2003	658	338	1546	2542
2004	534	325	951	1810
2005	520	216	996	1732
2006	349	168	599	1116

<sup>22</sup> Database, Institute of Conflict Management.

3. There has been a decline in the violence levels but still the State continues to suffer from terrorist related violence and subversion. Pakistan has been forced to scale down its proxy war against India under intense international scrutiny but has not shown any signs of dismantling vast terrorist training infrastructure in PoK. Even though people to people contact and Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) are in full swing, the reduced level of violence in Jammu and Kashmir primarily presents a tactical rather than a strategic shift in Pakistani designs<sup>23</sup>.

4. The General Officer Commanding (GOC) 15 Corps in Kashmir valley, Lt Gen A. S. Sekhon, stated on November 1, 2007, that there were 1,500 militants operating in the State, including 700 to 800, in the Kashmir Valley. Earlier, the GOC 16 Corps of the Northern Army Command, Lt. Gen. T. K. Sapru, had disclosed, on August 23, 2007, that nearly 200 Pakistan-trained militants had crossed over to the Indian side of the LoC in the preceding six months, while at least 400 militants, including a large number of foreigners, were operating in the Jammu region.

5. Infiltration into Jammu and Kashmir during 2007 may have dropped marginally in comparison to the preceding two years. According to Sriprakash Jaiswal, Union Minister of State for Home, there were an estimated 499 cases of infiltration in 2007 (till October), whereas in 2005 and 2006, the figure was 597 and 573 respectively. Jaiswal disclosed further, on November 27, 2007, that

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<sup>23</sup> India Assessment 2007, an article on <http://www.Institute of conflict Management.htm>.

these figures pertained to those militants who had been apprehended or killed while crossing the LoC/borders<sup>24</sup>.

6. A.K. Mitra, Director General of the Border Security Force (BSF), on November 30, 2007, noted that, "A shift in the pattern of infiltration has been observed since 2005... the terror outfits infiltrate in large numbers across the international borders in order to succeed even after encounters with the Security Forces". He indicated that the risk involved in cutting the fence and making an entry point for a small group was the same as with larger groups. Due to the increased risk involved in crossing the borders, militants have tried unconventional methods and high-tech equipment for infiltration. Mitra disclosed that, "Though infiltration numerically has come down as compared to 2006, nevertheless the middle- or lower-level cadres continue to infiltrate through Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir." Official sources also said that, as infiltration attempts are more frequently foiled across the LoC, militants are increasingly using ingress routes via Nepal. Moreover, with the troops more effectively securing the conventional infiltration routes, the militants have reportedly changed tactics and now try to infiltrate through the "not-so-common" routes primarily in the hilly areas of the border Districts of Poonch (Mendhar, Balnoi, Balakote, Krishnaghati) and Rajouri (Bhimber Gali, Kanga Gali, Nowshera.

<sup>24</sup> "Jammu and Kashmir assessment 2008", Institute of Conflict Management

### The Pakistani Mind Set

7. Although the point has been labored before, it needs to be reiterated that Pakistan's policy of pitting itself against India since its inception has to be interpreted within the context of the political compulsions of the ruling elite of that country, who, consistently lacking legitimacy, create a mindset in which this conflict becomes an imperative of survival for them. Spreading hatred against India and keeping the Kashmir issue constantly alive and on the boil has been a major policy plank for the legitimization of successive regimes in Pakistan. Kashmir, in fact, has been a forceful unifying factor for the Pakistani polity and nationhood. Despite the failed attempts of 1947-48 and 1965, and the lack of any 'positive movement forward' during the violence-filled twelve years since 1989, this mindset remains unchanged. The Pakistani propaganda machine, charged and led by the Pakistani Kashmir Media Services and ably supported by the Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), has been working overtime to convince its people that the jihadis have been effective in countering the Indian Army's might and that victory, meaning thereby, the annexation of Jammu and Kashmir, is close by. The stridency of the fundamentalist right wing in Pakistan and the increasing inability of successive regimes, including the current military dictatorship, to contain them, have made Pakistan's body politic venomous. This explains the phenomenal rise of *Madrassas* (religious schools) as the "supply lines of *jihad*" and the increasing '*Talibanization*' of certain sections of society, which must be a cause of concern not only for India, but for Pakistan itself. Ved Bhasin, Chief Editor Kashmir Times, brought out that Kashmir was the core issue between the two countries and unless the people of Kashmir are taken into confidence there could be no solution. He mentioned that there were Confidence Building

Measures(CBMs) between the two countries but there were no CBMs in Kashmir.<sup>25</sup> He was of the view that there are human rights violations, killings, search operations, prisoners languishing in jails and exploitation of women in the Indian Kashmir<sup>26</sup>. Bhasin suggested that India should unilaterally enforce cease-fire and withdraw its forces so that concerns of Kashmiris can be heard in democratic environment.

8. No reference to Pakistani perceptions would be valid or complete without taking into consideration the current military regime's understanding of issues that have a bearing upon its posture towards India. It would be useful, consequently, to recapitulate a few important facets of the military regime's perspectives over the last few years. While Gen. Musharraf was the Chief of Army Staff, he propounded a security doctrine that had a number of components. There is no reason to believe that any change has occurred in these perceptions. The significant aspects of this doctrine are:

- (a) Nuclear deterrence in the hands of India and Pakistan reduces the chances of a conventional war between the two to almost zero.
- (b) Even though India has a conventional superiority, so long as its army is kept bleeding in Kashmir, it would not be able to undertake a war of aggression against Pakistan.
- (c) Even if the Kashmir issue was resolved, that would not mean peace because Pakistan, by opposing India's hegemonistic ambitions in

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<sup>25</sup> "Peace Process Fails To Bring Any Kashmir Solution" an article in '*The Nation*' (Pakistan newspaper), dated 20 September 2006.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

Asia, would continue to be a thorn in India's side. So long as it did so, Pakistan would have the support of not only China, but also of Japan, both of whom did not want India to emerge as a major power.

(d) The future Indo-Pakistan conflicts would be covert with the three 'Ks' – Kashmir, Karachi and Kabul – being the main theaters of their covert operations against each other.<sup>27</sup>

9. However, the ascendant fundamentalist forces within Pakistan pose a critical challenge to its military regime. The General and his administration have, on a number of occasions, tried to curb the activities of the sectarian outfits, but have been forced to beat a hasty retreat. The failure of the military regime to counter the sectarian groupings will be a major factor in formulating any strategy with respect to Pakistan and its military rulers.

10. Gen Pervez Musharraf's own constituency, the Army, has thus far not been a cause for concern. He has effectively kept the Army under his own control however with the handing over of the reins to the new Chief of Army Staff Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kiyani, and the formation of a civilian elected coalition government, certain changes may be expected in the near future. Gen Deepak Kapoor, the Indian Army Chief in a TV interview, said that Gen Kiyani is a professional soldier and that it was reassuring to have him as the head of Pakistan army. He further said that, with elections having taken place the security situation in Pakistan, if it now gets stabilized, should improve.<sup>28</sup>

11. **Earthquake and Thereafter**. The earthquake of 08 October 2005, provided a 'window of opportunity' for cooperation and improvement of

<sup>27</sup> Dr Sudhir S Bloeria, IAS (Retd), "Militancy in Jammu and Kashmir", Strategic Analysis, Vol. 27, No. 1, Jan-Mar 2006, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.

<sup>28</sup> *Sunday Times*, New Delhi dated 24 Feb 08, p 1.

relations between India and Pakistan, as assistance to civilians/army personnel was best possible through India due to breakdown of all internal routes of communication. This however did not happen on ground due to political upmanship. The terrorists however regrouped themselves and reinforced their support structures in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir at the expense of the Pakistan administration, which came in for a great amount of flak for its delayed and ineffective response to the disaster. They also seized this opportunity and provided relief and social aid to people thus earning tremendous goodwill from the local population.

12. The Indian Army in spite of having suffered casualties/damages, provided aid to the civil population within hours of the tragedy. Army rations and stores were used freely for providing relief. Thereafter, it carried out rehabilitation operations ensuring that all affected personnel were provided relief material. The civil administration disbursed the highest ever compensation to the victims of such a tragedy. This brought in a fact that the Kashmiris on the Indian side were promptly and well looked after and they were thus happy to be part of democratic India.

13. **Kashmir and its Talibanisation** . The Various terrorist's tanzeems are part of the United Jihad Council which has its Headquarter at Muzaffarabad. These tanzeems are controlled, equipped and funded by the Pakistan's ISI, from Madrassas across Pakistan. It provides these recruits with military training before pushing them across the LoC.<sup>29</sup> Foreign mercenaries infiltrated these tanzeems around 1996 to bolster the insurgency and with the number of local

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<sup>29</sup> Rahul Bedi, [http://www.janes.com/security/international\\_security/news/misc/janes](http://www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/misc/janes), Jane's Intelligence, 05 October 2001.

terrorists declining the control of militancy shifted into the hands of foreign terrorists thus Talibanising the Kashmir militancy.,<sup>30</sup>

14. **Political.** At the political level, there has been a smooth transfer of power from PDP coalition to Congress party coalition in November 2005. The demands of the people of Leh district regarding powers to AHDC (Autonomous Hill Development Council) have been resolved. Elections to the local bodies' have been successfully in January 2005. The peace process initiated in 2003 is progressing and the LoC has remained peaceful with both sides maintaining a ceasefire. The bus bonhomie and the opening of additional train routes have further improved people to people contact leading to improved trade.

15. **Development.**

- (a) Building of infrastructure and social services in Kashmir including opening and up gradation of schools and colleges.
- (b) Improvements in communication system like introduction of the mobile phones.
- (c) Opening of Community Informatics centers in the State ushering an era of IT revolution.
- (d) Increased funding and assistance for development of industries and handicraft/ handlooms in the State.
- (e) Provision of better education and health facilities through BADP/Sadhbhavna projects being undertaken by the Army in remote areas.
- (f) Execution of approx 2000 micro hydel projects in remote and far flung areas.

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid

(g) Setting up of Baghlihar (450MW) and Sawalakot Hydel Project (600 MW) in spite of reservations from Pakistan to improve the power scenario in the State.

(h) Construction of the Mughal Road over the Pirpanjal Range as also the four laning of National Highway between Pathankot and Srinagar<sup>31</sup>.

(i) Work on extension of railways line from Udampur to Baramulla to be completed by 2010. With these projects, the psychological disconnect between the Valley and the mainland will disappear.<sup>32</sup>

16. **Jammu and Kashmir Police.** Due to sustained anti terrorist operations and with the neutralisation of the terrorists to a great extent by the security forces, the confidence level and the morale of the Police force has improved considerably and they have now started undertaking operations in urban areas independently.

17. **Village Defence Committees (VDC).** VDCs were first launched in 1994 for the people of Kashmir to defend themselves against cross border terrorism. Villagers and ex-servicemen from the minority communities were trained and organized into small self-defence cells to guard their villages from terrorist's attacks and deter the terrorists from cleansing Jammu and Kashmir from non muslims. There are approx 1500 VDCs all over the State. They however need to be equipped and trained for better functioning.<sup>33</sup> VDCs can perform a salutary role provided they are empowered, trained and equipped.

18. **Empowerment of Women.** The mother is the most dominating personality in a Kashmir household. She keeps a well knit family. Today most

<sup>31</sup> Dr Sudhir S Bloeria, "Militancy in Jammu & Kashmir", USI journal, Jul – Sep 2006. p- 282

<sup>32</sup> Ibid, p 283

<sup>33</sup> Sreeram Sundar Chaulia, "Counter-Insurgency in Kashmir: Bolstering VDCs", <http://www.kashmirherald.com/featuredarticle/counterinsurgency.html>

of the girls are going to schools and colleges. A No of girl's schools have been opened in the remote areas to impart education to the girl child. In addition the Army has taken up upon itself to provide basic knowledge and skills to the Ladies thereby empowering them. In urban areas, women are increasingly going to schools and colleges. Dukhtaran-e- Millat, a woman militant organisation has the image of burqa clad, faceless and voiceless religious icon that utilizes intimidating tactics<sup>34</sup>. They are advocating creation of a culture which is devoid of any freedom, which the Kashmiri women traditionally enjoyed. Thus there is a need to promote gender sensitivity, provide opportunities to women for education and develop skills with the ultimate goal of empowering them. The saying that if you '*educate a girl child you educate a family*' cannot be truer than when applied to a Kashmiri woman.

19. Talks between India and Pakistan continue as per the composite dialogue being undertaken by both countries. Pakistan is continuously complaining about the slow pace of progress on issues it needs to resolve in its favor on the negotiating table, having failed to achieve anything through four wars and over 18 years of proxy war. The peace process has not been able to make any discernable progress. The stance adopted by the two sides on Kashmir remains unbridgeable and whatever progress has been made is in peripheral areas. Even though the two countries are talking to each other but their stated stance on Kashmir has not undergone any change. Therefore, it is unlikely that there will be any major discernable change on ground with regard to terrorist violence.

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<sup>34</sup> Nyla Ali Khan, Tearing the valley, *Hindustan Times*, 15 Jan 07

CHALLENGE

CONSTITUTIONAL STRATEGY

**A JUST AND EQUITABLE  
POLITICAL SOLUTION  
WITHIN THE  
FRAMEWORK OF THE  
CONSTITUTION ENSURING  
PEACE WITH HONOUR AND  
DIGNITY**

## CHAPTER - VII

### COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGY

1. This scribe agrees with General K V Krishna Rao, who has candidly expressed his views on the appropriate mix of political and military ingredients that ought to go into Indian Counter Insurgency Strategy. "*Insurgency*", he writes, "*is basically a political struggle and needs political actions to eliminate it. The use of force or military means on their own will not solve the problem. Force is essential, an early necessity, to bring the situation under control. Nevertheless, it is, essential that the insurgents are isolated and that the bulk of the population not alienated. Consequently, political, economical, and sociological measures will have to be taken to deal with the main causes of insurgency. Thus it is a combination of requisite force and political efforts that could bring insurgency under control and restore normalcy. It is vital that there is a great understanding, cooperation and coordination between the civil, and military, for the success to be achieved in counter insurgency operations. The constitution should be scrupulously observed, and whenever possible, problem should be resolved through democratic process. All possible assistance, should be given to the state in the way of requisite forces , development of the area, solving unemployment problems, giving good administration, removal of poverty and literacy and so on. The effort should*

*be to educate the people about the futility of carrying out insurgency and, to win over by resolving their problems*"<sup>35</sup>.

2. The threat from terrorism to India's national security is real and alive. From isolated individual acts, the groups are now resorting to mass murders. Other contributions to the changing nature of terrorism are attributable to radical changes occurring in the attitudes of different groups in society towards each other, particularly with regard to attitudes and authority<sup>36</sup>. When participation is denied, authority may be challenged with terrorism as a viable option. Ethnic disharmony, rebel movements and insurgencies threaten approximately one-third of all the present member-countries of the United Nations.

3. It is necessary to correctly perceive the intricacies of the changing world order and its repercussions on the society so that meaningful strategies can be formulated. As long as terrorism was considered a type of criminal behavior, counter-terrorism was considered a task of the police. Mr A K Antony, the Raksha Mantri said, "*we don't want to use the Army in operations against Naxalism. We are totally opposed to it. The Army can give the logistical support by way of training to Police forces but we do not want to involve it directly. The Army should be only used as the last resort. We have to be very discreet in using Army for Civilian (law and order) purposes*"<sup>37</sup>. This is entirely appropriate for incidents of domestic terrorism. Unfortunately,

<sup>35</sup> K V Krishna Rao, *Prepare or Perish, a Study of National Security*, Lancer Publishers, New Delhi, 1991, p 528.

<sup>36</sup> Annual Report 2005-06 of Ministry of Home Affairs, Para 2.1, p-5

<sup>37</sup> *The Times of India*, New Delhi, 05 Feb 08, p 12.

terrorism that India is facing in Jammu and Kashmir is international terrorism and it has assumed the characteristics of unconventional conflict.

4. Based on his field experience as an Army officer this researcher is of the view that resolution of the internal conflict in India calls for two essentials. **Firstly**, the formulation of a long term aim, strategy and plan which is all encompassing-includes political, diplomatic, social, economic, military and psychological aspects; ending- like foreign policy; it should demonstrate a degree of consistency and flexibility- capable of responding to developing situations. **Secondly**, "unity of effort" of the various instruments of the State –a unity of effort that goes much beyond mere cooperation. It would be pertinent to highlight that the overall aim of any strategy should clearly be tailored to achieve "**Conflict Resolution**" and not "**Conflict Management**". All of this is far easier said than done. Democratic states are notoriously slow to recognize and, even slower to respond to internal threats to national security. The task of restoration of normalcy in internal conflict situations is beset with numerous difficulties as a consequence of the inherent contradictions in the system. **Under Schedule 7, lists 2 and 3 of the Constitution, law and order is a state subject and yet internal conflict, which poses a threat to national security, goes much beyond the maintenance of law and order.**

5. Conflict situations invariably demand firm authoritarian rule that will deliver on both counts- security and administration- and yet popular rule must be allowed to prevail as it is an expression of the people- a victory of the ballot over the bullet. The Central Government views the problem from a national perspective whilst a popular State Government has its own compulsions, and the two are not always in consonance.

6. The aim and essentials of strategy for resolution of the conflict in Jammu and Kashmir should be:-

(a) **Aim.** To restore normalcy in Jammu and Kashmir. (Normalcy is the point where democratic institutions of the state are able to function unimpeded and State Police assisted by Central Police Organizations are able to effectively enforce law and order).

(b) **Essentials of Strategy.**

- (i) Deter Pakistan from continuing covert war.
- (ii) Seek peaceful resolution of internal conflict.
- (iii) Fulfill political and economic aspirations.
- (iv) Ensure sanctity and integrity of the Line of Control.
- (v) Suppress and neutralize terrorists groups.
- (vi) Prevent spread of conflict to unaffected areas.
- (vii) Synergize functioning of Government and various instruments of the State.
- (viii) Ensure sound administration and good governance.
- (ix) Mould public opinion.

7. **Key Issues.** The key issues that need to be addressed for solving the proxy war in Kashmir are:-

- (a) Autonomy.
- (b) Good Governance.
- (c) Military Strategy and Operations.

(d) Diplomacy.

8. **Autonomy.** As long as Pakistan thinks that it can bleed India through Kashmir, there is little hope for permanent peace. But given the fact that both countries are nuclear powers, no revision of the territorial status quo is possible between them. Giving more autonomy to both sides of Kashmir will make the border soft. Over a period of time, this would de-emotive the issue. Kashmir will become a zone of economic prosperity and opportunity and after a time people will forget the problem. Political maturity and sincerity in approach could help in evolving a model of cooperative federalism within the overall national constitutional framework.

9. **Governance.** What the Kashmiris require is good governance, because *“to solve the problem of Kashmir, you must solve their problems in Kashmir”*. The civil administration in the State has been a weak link in the government machinery. It was corrupted and irresponsible to the needs of the people. There are four essential pre requisites for good governance:-

- (a) Strong and stable infrastructure to help the entrepreneurial potential of the people of the State as well as generate employment.
- (b) An accountable, streamlined and people-sensitive administrative machinery.
- (c) A speedy grievance and redressal system that includes an upright and effective Judiciary.
- (d) A revival of Kashmir's traditionally tolerant society and its expression in the form of 'Kashmiriyat'

10. **Military Strategy and Operations.** National security embraces not only external security contours, but also internal security. Deployment of forces in

Jammu and Kashmir to combat militancy and insurgency is at the cost of Army's preparation for war. It is also a drain on the economy forcing the State to divert scarce resources to a non-productive fight.<sup>38</sup> Some of the causes of terrorism in are extreme poverty, unemployment, low levels of literacy, poor health services, non-functioning of democracy; years of misgovernance, suppression of human rights and the alienation of whole cultural or ethnic groups<sup>39</sup>. It is suggested that to eradicate terrorism, the home-grown terrorist elements should be brought to the mainstream, pluralistic societies should be maintained, effort should be made to maintain good bilateral relations, refrain from exaggerating terrorists threats from other nations in the region to pursue obscurantist and chauvinistic domestic political agenda and invest in each others prosperity.

11. States sponsor terrorism with the aim of weakening the adversary militarily, economically, socially and politically. Such states do it with full knowledge of the consequences and should not be allowed to escape under the advantage of denial. *The US action against Afghanistan and Al Qaeda is an indication of the extent to which a victim state can go against perpetrators of terrorism.* Ajai Sahni recommends that India's target of a counter-terrorism strategy should be our adversary's enduring strengths and weaknesses.<sup>40</sup>

12. The Indian response has been two-fold i.e. political and military. It is clear that India has preferred non-military solutions and tried to reach a political solution. The military option has been used to inculcate a sense of security

<sup>38</sup> N.S. Jamwal, "The Problem of Kashmir and the Problem in Kashmir: Divergence Demands Convergence Strategic Analysis", Vol. 27, No. 1, Jan-Mar 2003, p 213.

<sup>39</sup> Dubey, Muchkund, *Anatomy of Terrorism in South Asia-II. The Hindu*, January 02, 2003.

<sup>40</sup> Sahni Ajai, "Countering Terrorism: The 'Core issue' is Pakistan", *Defence and Technology*, January 2003, 2 (9).

amongst the affected people, wear the rebels down and bring them to the negotiating table. Whilst this approach has been reasonably successful in the past, it is not likely to succeed in a situation where foreign nationals (terrorists) are waging a war against the State. Therefore, there is a need to adopt a policy that includes eliminating the cause of militancy, resorting to international diplomacy, and making it too expensive for Pakistan to exercise this option.

13. We need to clearly spell out our counter terrorism strategy / doctrine. This should tackle the causes and not just the symptoms. The aim of military operations should be to create a secure and suitable environment, so that social, economic and political issues can be addressed effectively<sup>41</sup>. Seeking political solutions to accommodate the aspirations without fully eliminating the terrorists, their structure and support bases only results in a 'fire fighting' situation and actually prolongs terrorism.. The aim should be to increase the cost of proxy war to Pakistan. Effective intelligence system, surveillance and management of the borders to check infiltration is mandatory. This should be achieved through technical means of surveillance, backed by highly mobile, specialized forces as 'reaction capability'. The Police and the Para-military should be equipped and trained to handle internal security.

14. The main aspects of the Military (Counter Insurgency) strategy should be:-

(a) Check infiltration by establishing posts all along the Line of Control. Utilise the LC Fence (barbed wire) as an effective obstacle system and neutralise all terrorists at / in the fence.

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<sup>41</sup> Ibid, p 08

(b) Maintain a dynamic counter insurgency grid with Rashtriya Rifles in rural areas and Para Military forces and Police in the urban areas thereby preventing terrorist related violence/incidents.

(c) Launch integrated and coordinated operations based on hard intelligence. Ensure use of minimum force and no violation of human rights.

(d) Protect vulnerable areas and vulnerable sections of the population.

15. **Diplomacy.** A stable and democratic Pakistan is in India's long term interest. The severe economic crisis faced by Pakistan, as a consequence of coercive diplomacy may compel her to seek peace with India. Therefore, the core of India's policy towards Pakistan must be multi faceted programme of constructive engagement. National prestige and security should however not be compromised. As long as Pakistan thinks that it can bleed India through Kashmir, there is little hope of peace. Therefore we should make its engagement in Kashmir, a cost prohibitive option. The following aspects need consideration:-

(a) **Economic Cooperation.** At the heart of the strategy of cooperation and engagement with Pakistan must be economics. India has traditionally stressed the importance of economic cooperation in the process of normalization and reconciliation.

(b) **Negotiated Settlement of Kashmir Issue.** BG Deshmukh, ex Cabinet Secretary observed,<sup>42</sup> "No political party in power can openly take the position that LOC can be negotiated to be converted into an International Border. The moment any party says so the opposition will

<sup>42</sup> BG Deshmukh, "Settling the LOC", *The Times of India*, 18 July 1998.

jump up and build a popular opinion against it." This gets further compounded in the present scenario of coalition politics. However there is a school of thought that conversion of the LOC into an International Border is the only pragmatic solution for conflict resolution.

(c) Improvement of relations with US, China and the Muslim world thereby persuading them not to support Pakistan in her proxy war in Kashmir.

16. Some other issues that need to be considered are :-

(a) **Judiciary.** The Indian judicial process against terrorism is not very effective. Trials take a long time due to frequent adjournments and lack of legal provisions to prevent intimidation of the witnesses testifying against the terrorists. The result is a low conviction rate. Hence, there is a need for setting up of special terrorist trial courts armed with appropriate counter terrorist legislation such as POTA. It has been often seen that a terrorist gets released immediately after his arrest due to lack of witnesses.

(b) **Police/ Para Military Forces.** While the terrorists have been equipped with the latest weapon system and communication equipment the security forces particularly the police have lagged behind. Modernization of the security forces needs no justification<sup>43</sup>. The police forces must be extensively trained to take on the terrorists otherwise we will continue to face problems like those in Orissa and Madhya Pradesh.

<sup>43</sup> Laqueur, Walter, "Terrorism and History, the New Terrorism," Oxford University Press; New York, Oxford. p.11.

(c) **Intelligence.** Intelligence plays the most important role in counter terrorist operations. However, actionable intelligence is lacking which results in a lot of unnecessary operations and inconvenience to the public. What is required is a central intelligence coordinating agency which is responsible of sifting information and then passing it to the concerned security force for launching the operation. Existing modes of intelligence apparatus are tedious and time-consuming and by the time the information reaches the security force it is late. The game of one up man ship must be totally avoided.

(d) **Surrender cum Rehabilitation Policy.** The policy has been implemented. Surrender of militants is encouraged to give them an opportunity to join the mainstream. Normally, such militants are offered financial incentives to lure them to surrender. The dilemma for the state is "*how do we ensure that we actually are not rewarding terrorists? How do we ensure no misuse?*" It has been seen that in some cases militancy becomes a means to get a job on surrender. In some cases militants have either rejoined militancy or become informers<sup>44</sup>.

<sup>44</sup> Pachnanda, R.K., "Terrorism and Response to Terrorist Threat", UBSPD, New Delhi, pp 158-197.

## CHAPTER - VIII

### THE WAY AHEAD

1. Having discussed Pakistan's likely aim, strategy and capabilities vis-à-vis Jammu and Kashmir and keeping in mind the strengthening of relations with the US as an aftermath to the Sep 11, it can be fairly assumed that she will need to tread a very fine line between being a responsible member of the "global war against terror", while continuing with its covert war and support for terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. Unable to abandon its Kashmir policy owing to domestic compulsions, it may have to modify its approach and methods – ensuring "deniability" and, citing her "inability" to effectively control the terrorists groups. *And, safeguarding all this, without crossing the threshold of conventional war, with India.*
2. While Pakistan based terrorist groups are likely to continue their "Jihad" for as long as finances and religious motivation exist, the weakening resolve of the local terrorists, could present with opportunities that can be exploited. The people of Kashmir remain alienated. Small sections of the people may cling to dreams of "Azadi" but the vast majority seeks "peace with honour and dignity". The belief is that much can be righted with corrupt free people friendly "good governance".
3. Commencing with instigating and inspiring local terrorists during the early phases of the movement in Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan worked itself up to the creation of anti-Indian terrorist outfits within Pakistan. These *jehadis* are educated, groomed and moulded in the *madrassas* of Pakistan, which have mushroomed across the country during the last two decades. From a modest

number of 137 in 1947, their number grew phenomenally to 8000 in the year 1998. Their current strength is estimated in the region of 40,000 and 50,000.<sup>45</sup> The support that a significant part of the lower middle class and poorer sections of the Pakistani society provide to the 'supply lines for *jihad*' has lent a certain 'legitimacy' to the tide of religious fundamentalism currently sweeping Pakistan. A leading Pakistani daily *Nawa-e-Waqt* underscores this, observing that, "India is frightened of *Jehad* and is now trying to mislead the world by declaring unilateral cease-fire. Pakistan should not deviate from *jehad* as it is a religious binding on us."

4. A significant development relating to the proliferation of the 'schools of hate' is the autonomous character that these *madrassas* are widely perceived to have acquired. Although the roots of the proliferation of *madrassas* and creation of jihadi outfits are traced to Zia-ul-Haq's vigorous use of Islam for state legitimization, these vitriolic outfits have broken progressively free of the constraints of their sponsoring agencies. The principal-agent character of the 'schools of hate' is witnessing considerable uncertainty, with many analysts indicating that the interests and alignments of the two are increasingly ambivalent. Moreover, the capacity of the jihad factories to churn out terrorists is certainly well above the level of attrition that the Indian security apparatus has been able to inflict. Thus, counter-insurgency measures ought not to fall victim to the numbers game, as a few hundred additional jihadis killed over a particular period of time is not an appropriate indicator – particularly of the non-Kashmiri terrorists – of the strength of the jihadi structure.

<sup>45</sup> Jessica Stern, "Pakistan's Jihad Culture", Foreign Affairs, Washington, Nov/Dec. 2000, [www.foreignaffairs.org/issues/0011/stern.html](http://www.foreignaffairs.org/issues/0011/stern.html). p.119.

5. Security agencies monitoring the evolution of terrorist groups in Pakistan have identified that terror groups like Jaish-e-Mohammed, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and Harkat-ul-Jihad-Islami are now pooling resources, banding together for joint operations. This trend has been clearly discernible after Pakistan Army's disastrous Lal Masjid operations in Islamabad in July 07.<sup>46</sup>

6. Taking an overall view of the existing scenario in the State, one finds that the ground situation has shown an overall improvement in almost all spheres of activity. However, it is almost certain that Pakistan would make all efforts to keep the pot boiling and hamper, frustrate and create road blocks in the State's endeavor towards peace. Keeping this consideration in mind, in conjunction with the decreased level of infiltration, the likely scenario that emerges is that Pakistan would strive at low scale and high value terrorist strikes. At the same time, it is also likely to make efforts to train local militants in order to bolster their strength and to give impression to the outside world that the so called freedom movement is indeed home-grown. As the number of active militants in the State reduces further due to effective counter infiltration measures it would make it more difficult for Pakistan to keep the pot of militancy, "boiling at the right temperature".

7. On the Indian side, it should be understood that peace can only be achieved from a position of strength, and such strength must be demonstrable and demonstrated. No adversary, particularly of the jihadi kind, will negotiate for peace when it perceives itself to be in a stronger position – an illusion that is currently dominant amongst the terrorist outfits. Moreover, an over-emphasis on the credence and faith of the international community and the hope that Pakistan will mend its ways under diplomatic pressure or economic burden

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<sup>46</sup> Joint Operations by Pakistan Terrorist groups worry India, *The Times of India* 25 Feb08,p7.

brought to bear upon her may be ill-founded. Pakistan has been impervious to such pressures in the past, a stance unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.

8. One of the oft-repeated solutions put forth to the Kashmir issue is the conversion of the LoC into an International border. Certain political establishments of the State have consistently followed this line of thought ever since 1947, and continue to pursue such an agenda. A dispassionate evaluation, however, exposes serious pitfalls and the irreparable damage to the national interests that could be done if this course is adopted. Hypothetically, even if the LOC does become the international border, this in itself does not guarantee an end to the problems in Jammu and Kashmir, and would still leave intact the demands for autonomy, as also the possibility that such a 'concession' may well encourage extremists to adopt and pursue a more ambitious agenda. Furthermore, the internal dimensions of the problem would remain unattended and may even be exacerbated. Such a course of action is also fraught with certain geo-strategic dimensions that impinge upon India's security. Accepting the current border as a permanent dividing line between the two countries, in effect, would mean the renunciation of India's claims to the territories comprising not only Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) but also the entire Northern Area, regarded as areas of "vital importance."

9. Peace is not only a desirable objective, but is a necessary goal in the context of the current situation in Jammu and Kashmir. However, peace should not be pursued through compromises on vital issues of national interest and ideology. The Indian strategy should, rather, follow two-pronged imperatives: effective counter-insurgency measures combined with purposeful efforts and programme to redress the legitimate grievances of the people through good governance. The Indian state will have to devise a set of strategies far more

coherent and effective than such a gamble, if it is to thwart Pakistan's designs and murderous proxies in J&K.

10. The ongoing development projects and the various "Confidence Building Measures" (CBM) and the likely course of events, leads one to deduce that certain convergence is likely to take place in near future. Based on the current trends, militancy has been brought down to manageable level and one can reasonably hope that the peace process, initiated by the two countries, would be heading towards the point of deliverance, especially so with the latest changes in Pakistan's polity after the assassination of Mrs. Benazir Bhutto and the election results thereafter..

11. The Indian state will have to devise a set of strategies far more coherent and effective if it is to thwart Pakistan's designs and murderous proxies in Jammu and Kashmir.

12. A combination of circumstances – both external and internal present us with a unique opportunity to move forward decisively towards resolving the conflict in Jammu and Kashmir. There is a need to step up efforts to bring about a mind change among the people and find a solution which is not only valley-centric but Jammu and Kashmir-centric.

A photograph of a mountain range with a red horizontal band across the middle containing the word 'CONCLUSION' in yellow. The mountains are rugged and appear to be covered in snow or ice, set against a dark, clear sky. The red band is a solid, vibrant color, and the word 'CONCLUSION' is written in a bold, sans-serif font. A thin yellow line is positioned directly below the text.

# CONCLUSION

“ **INTERNAL CONFLICT IN ALL  
ITS VARIED  
DIMENSIONS, PRESENTS THE  
MOST SERIOUS THREAT TO  
THE SECURITY OF OUR  
COUNTRY TODAY.**

**MOST OF US RECOGNISE  
THIS FACT, SOME ARE  
UNAFRAID TO SAY SO, BUT  
VERY FEW ARE WILLING TO  
DO MUCH ABOUT IT ”**

## CHAPTER - IX

### CONCLUSION

1. Jessica Stern has most appropriately described the conditions currently prevailing in Pakistan, *"Pakistan is a weak state, and government policies are making it weaker still. Its disastrous economy, exacerbated by a series of corrupt leaders, is at the root of many of its problems. Yet despite its poverty, Pakistan is spending hundreds of millions of dollars on weapons instead of schools and public health. Ironically, the government's "cost-saving" measures are even more troubling. In trying to save money in the short run by using irregulars in Kashmir and relying on Madrassas to educate its youth, Pakistan is pursuing a path that is likely to be disastrous in the long run, allowing a culture of violence to take root... Most important, Pakistan must recognize the militant groups for what they are: dangerous gangs whose resources and reach continue to grow, threatening to destabilize the entire region. Pakistan's continued support of religious militant groups suggests that it does not recognize its own susceptibility to the culture of violence it has helped create."*<sup>47</sup>

2. However, despite a host of problems that Pakistan is facing today, including internal instability, a precarious economic situation, the lack or collapse of nation building institutions, etc., it is clear that the Pakistani state is not likely to 'go under' in the foreseeable future. Policies and strategies that are based on the presumption of Pakistan's disintegration are hazardous. Any dialogue or peace process with Pakistan must, consequently, take into account

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55 Stern, *Pakistan's Jihad Culture*, pp. 125-6.

the abiding status and power of the Pakistani Army and must also accommodate the fact that this status and power is, in turn, dependent upon a continuation of the conflict in Kashmir. This seemingly contradictory requirement and impasse can only be broken if the Pakistani Army is made to realize that, contrary to its belief, the cost of its continued involvement in fostering terrorism in J&K would be prohibitive. Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Satish Nambiar articulates a more aggressive version of such a strategy *‘the proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir has crossed the limits of tolerance. Pakistan must be made to pay a price for it. Any overt violation of LOC or border must be used as an opportunity to hit at the militant bases and training camps inside Pakistan and POK with whatever weaponry is considered necessary including the Airforce. This may result in escalation to a full-fledged war and we should be prepared for it. If the Pakistan military leadership, wants war, let them have it. It would be preferable to fight that war than bleed slowly as in the present proxy war.’*<sup>48</sup>

3. Professor Yossef Bodansky ,former Director of the task force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare of the US Congress observes,” *for Pakistan a crisis in Kashmir constitutes an excellent outlet of frustration at home , as an instrument of mobilization of the masses, to gather support of the Islamic parties , the Army and the ISI,... to a sacred mission to liberate Kashmir, the only unfulfilled task since partition and formation of Pakistan”*.

4. On the Indian side, it should be understood that peace can only be achieved from a position of strength. The time has come for India to stop being defensive and agree for a bilateral dialogue towards a permanent solution to this problem.

<sup>48</sup> Satish Nambiar, "Make the Army Fighting Fit, Paddy", *Hindustan Times*, August 20, 2000.

The issue needs to be resolved taking into consideration all the stake holders and the problems of the local populace.

5. The roots of terrorism need to be removed through good governance. Political corruption and lack of good governance is a basic contributor<sup>49</sup>. This has to be addressed immediately by striving to achieve economic well-being, social justice and political aspirations of the populace. We have to put in a sustained effort to initiate, plan for and implement such efforts seriously.

<sup>49</sup> Bajpai, Kanti P., "Roots of Terrorism, 2002", Penguin Books; New Delhi. p.58.

**Appendix A**

(Refer to Para 11 of Chapter V)

**Parameters of Militancy Violence 1990-2005**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Incidents</b>	<b>Civilians</b>	<b>SF/Police</b>	<b>Terrorists</b>	<b>infiltration</b>
1990	4211	1000	155	550	1280
1991	3780	906	173	844	1400
1992	4882	1069	189	819	3045
1993	5273	1057	198	1310	3280
1994	5851	1069	200	1596	2625
1995	5946	1202	237	1332	3200
1996	5023	1424	189	1209	3230
1997	3437	1030	216	1075	3185
1998	2940	967	268	999	3720
1999	3073	937	407	1082	3050
2000	3091	942	482	1520	3455
2001	4536	1098	613	2020	3545
2002	4038	1050	539	1707	1729
2003	3401	836	384	1494	1313
2004	2565	733	330	976	516
2005	1990	556	244	917	231
<b>Total</b>	<b>63997</b>	<b>15876</b>	<b>4824</b>	<b>19460</b>	<b>38804</b>

**Appendix B**

(Refer to Para 12 of Chapter V)

**Quantum of Arms and Ammunition Recovered between  
Jan1988- December 1999**

1.	AK series rifles -----	21,165
2.	Sniper rifles -----	312
3.	Pistols/revolvers -----	8,363
4.	Machine guns -----	1,167
5.	Rocket launchers -----	923
6.	Grenades -----	38,611
7.	Rockets -----	2,964
8.	Rocket Boosters -----	1,786
9.	Mines -----	5,874
10.	Grenade launchers -----	268
11.	Mortars -----	88
12.	Ammunition -----	30,56,000 rounds
13.	Explosives -----	20,382 Kgs
14.	Bombs -----	1,957
15.	WT sets -----	1,974

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