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## CONCEPTS AND MODELS IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

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### I

#### THE USES AND LIMITATIONS OF MODELS IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

MODELS in the social sciences are intended to help in the understanding of human behaviour. But what are we to understand by models? In their simplest form they may be analogies or comparisons.<sup>1</sup> "My love is like a red red rose"; for this to throw light on the nature of the beloved, she should have sufficient red-rose-like characteristics (and not too many non-red-rose-like characteristics) for the model to explain the nature of her attractions. An "image", such as "party image" in the study of political behaviour, or "brand image" in advertising, also resembles a simple kind of model. The British Labour Party voter who says that "Labour stands for the working class", may be considered to have this simple picture in his head (stereotype) of the Labour Party.<sup>2</sup> Images may be visual. For instance, the life of a human being may be represented by drawing a cylinder which tapers to a point at either end. The

<sup>1</sup>Lectures delivered in December, 1963

ages of man are thus represented visually, from conception to birth, infancy, adolescence, maturity, senescence and death.<sup>3</sup> There are the simplest varieties of models. There are more complex varieties, sometimes quantitative, which I shall mention later.

Models are a way in which progress can be made beyond (1) the mere enumeration of facts or (2) the spinning of logical webs, unrelated to fact, towards a fruitful union of fact and theory. Without theory any factual discussion on bureaucracies which attempts to be comparative is reduced to an "in my country" approach, which is no more illuminating than an "in my firm" approach by a gathering of commercial travellers.

An obvious possibility is to compare the bureaucracy of one country with that of another through a classification and comparison of the social features of each, — to follow the well-established procedures of inductive logic. But this kind of approach will not work. If it were a question of comparing corresponding institutions, such as the bureaucracy, in two countries, finding only one significant difference and then looking at their respective social and economic backgrounds and again finding only one significant difference, we might say, *prima facie*, that there was an association, or even a casual connection, between the two differences. But things are never so simple as this. On investigating two countries we are in fact faced with a host of institutional differences between the bureaucracies and also by a multitude of differences in the social and economic background. So it is totally impossible to say which factors are attributable to which. Comparisons would be easy, if there were two countries which differed *only* in the fact that the bureaucracy of the one was significantly more corrupt than that of the other and that the more corrupt country had a "more extended" family system than the other. But, in fact, there are many differences to be observed. In addition to differences in the degree of corruption and in the family system, there would also be other differences, for instance in the length of colonial occupation and its intensity; the identity of the colonial power; size; the relations between politicians and bureaucrats; differences in the National Income per head; the amount of training given to civil servants; the size of minority groups and the proportion of them engaged in trade; the degree of corruption among *politicians*.

Another possible approach is to construct models, more elaborate than the simple analogies or "visual" models referred to earlier. There is a problem of terminology here, of how to distinguish between conceptual schemes; types or typologies; models; and theories. The "conceptual scheme" would seem to be more general than the others. In seeking to explain observed facts, it must be assumed that certain elements are in some way related. To identify such strategic factors and to define them would seem to be equivalent to the adoption of a conceptual scheme.

The other three terms are harder to disentangle. According to Professor E.W. Weidner, a model... "is based on an interrelated set of concepts and often utilizes classification and typologies. In its complete form, a model includes assumptions and theories as to how its component parts are related to one another. A model is essential to any explanatory or predictive research project, though there is great variation from project to project in the extent to which a model is formally worked out and set forth."<sup>4</sup>

On this view the model, "in its complete form", would use, or include, typologies and theories. But we have seen that models may also be extremely simple analogies or visual representations, which would not set forth explicit typologies or theories. So we can hardly say that a model is always defined as being more complex or explicit than a typology or a theory. It is perhaps true that models such as Riggs' *Agraria* and *Industria*<sup>5</sup> differ in one important respect from the best-known ideal type in public administration theory, Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy. It could be said that they were more explicitly related to societies at particular stages of economic and social development than Weber's ideal type. But, this difference does not seem to be sufficiently marked to justify us in making a clear distinction between the two terms. There is even less possibility of rigidly distinguishing "models" from "theories". One writer describes the role of both theories and models in terms of their use in providing "explanations". To "explain" is to show logical connexions between the facts to be explained and other facts that may be taken as data. A satisfying explanation must, as far as possible, contain only elements which are clearly definable and quantitative. A theory or model is a general abstract description of such an explanation which can be applied to a particular case by

providing the correct quantitative content to the empty boxes of which it is composed."<sup>6</sup> It is perhaps simplest to accept the term, model in a very wide sense, but then to proceed to make subdivisions of different varieties of models. Models have been "typed" or classified by various writers in various ways. Bensusan-Butt says<sup>7</sup> that they may differ according to whether or not they are static or dynamic; according to whether they are thorough or partial; and according to their degree of realism. Karl W. Deutsch has suggested<sup>8</sup> that the performance of a model can be judged by its organizing<sup>9</sup>, heuristic, predictive and measuring functions. Three other considerations in evaluating models, suggested by Deutsch, are originality, simplicity and realism. One might expect simplicity to vary inversely with realism. Presumably, also, a model could not be described as "realistic", unless it scored high in prediction and measurement. Also, for a model to be regarded as "operational", it would have to be realistic. Looking at the public administration models which have been constructed so far, we might say that they were inclined to be static, were reasonably thorough, usefully heuristic, not yet very realistic, certainly not to any high degree operational, weak from the predictive or measurement point of view.

Before attempting any evaluation or criticism of models in public administration, allow me to restate one or two of the leading features of Riggs' latest model, the "prismatic model", as I understand them<sup>10</sup>, and indicate a few comparisons with other similar models.

A. By definition, the "prismatic" society is more "refracted" than *Agraria*, but less refracted than *Industria*. "Refraction" is related to development. Development (which may be positive or negative) involves changes in the basic structural arrangements of a society or economy; one variable which is always associated with it, according to Riggs, is the degree of refraction. In any society we could find data on the degree of refraction by studying the extent to which roles in various organizations were exclusive, or permitted participation in other organizations. A greater degree of refraction would result either from an increase in the specialization either of labour or of roles. A low degree of refraction would imply an agglomeration of values, and a concentration of roles, and jobs, in particular individuals; thus it has been reported that in one

Southeast Asian country one government official holds no fewer than twenty-seven government positions (including committee assignments, (temporary and permanent of which eighteen are paid.

A similar approach is found in other writers. Near the start of *The Politics of the Developing Areas*<sup>11</sup> the authors make the point that in Western countries political control is more differentiated from other social control systems, such as the family, than in non-Western countries.

S.N. Eisenstadt,<sup>12</sup> too, some years ago took a similar standpoint in choosing the first items to list in distinguishing between "bureaucratic" systems and "primitive feudal" systems":

1. The extent to which the political hierarchy is distinct from the social and economic hierarchy;
2. The extent to which there exist specific administrative and political organizations that are not embodied in other social groups;
3. The extent to which there is a differentiation inside the political apparatus.

The emphasis here is plainly on differentiation, as it is in the prismatic model.

**B.** In prismatic societies nowadays typically the pressure towards greater refraction (for instance, in order to increase productivity), comes from outside. It is exogenous, hence, says Riggs, the society may be termed "ex-prismatic". This may be contrasted with England, France and Holland in the Eighteenth Century where the drive towards refraction was "endo-prismatic". The distinction is relevant, for instance, when considering the introduction of systems of local government in developing countries. In some of these, to be sure, there are long traditions of some form of local government, as in Indian panchayats or in the techniques of discussion and agreement used in villages in Indonesia. But even these examples probably worked successfully only when the "local government" area was relatively small. By and large there has been little enthusiasm for local government in many developing areas; its introduction may even be resented, because it is accompanied by higher taxes. The initiative to set it up is often overwhelmingly exogenous.

**C.** Riggs takes up the idea of a "plural society" (as treated by

Furnivall<sup>13</sup> and others), but prefers to term it "poly-communal". Certain ethnic groups are shut out from power, although they are permitted to engage in trade. But, in order to do so, they must pay "tribute" to the elite, drawn from the dominant community. The role of these "pariah entrepreneurs" has been further investigated by Dr. J.P.L. Jiang.<sup>14</sup>

**D.** Specifically on the bureaucracy, Riggs maintains that in developed (refracted) societies bureaucracies play a largely passive role, and that sociologists have consequently, correctly, neglected the bureaucracy as an object of study when looking for the sources of power in a society. But the situation is different where the prismatic society is concerned. In it, according to Riggs, it is probable that the bureaucracy will exercise considerable power. One consequence is that "Irregularities" in public administration make it necessary to impose checks and controls and these produce new sources of irregularities. To adapt the Latin tag, the question becomes, "Who will audit the auditors themselves?"

**E.** Another feature of the prismatic model is that the system seems to be over-centralized, in the sense that a large proportion of the work, and the decisions, eventually passes through the desks of a few top officials. But at the same time there is not a high degree of co-ordination. So the solution to "over-centralization" cannot be simply "decentralization", in the sense of the centre giving up any of its coordinating powers.

There are too many other aspects of the prismatic model to be to mention them here. The account I have just given, in summary form, does not do justice to the wealth of Riggs' knowledge or to his analytical inventiveness. However, among the more important implications of the model are the desirable pace of social change and the effects of foreign aid. Riggs suggests that if we desire to encourage more dispersed, democratic patterns of development, we may have to encourage a slower, more evolutionary pace of change rather than a faster, more radical pace. Similarly, foreign aid may enable the rulers of prismatic societies to remain in office without accepting accountability to the people they rule, when, without foreign aid, accountability would have been forced upon them, and political development, and in turn administrative development, might have been accelerated. In some cases, crudely

put, this line of argument might lead to a "let them stew in their own juice" policy rather than a "for God's sake give them aid to keep them from going Communist policy."<sup>15</sup>

In some ways Riggs' entire prismatic model is reminiscent of Lucian W. Pye's recent analysis of a "transitional society."<sup>16</sup> Pye's book is concerned mainly with Burma, but in a long introduction he considers features of the transitional society, many of which are similar to those in Riggs' prismatic model. It is noteworthy that the first point listed by Pye is that the political sphere is not sharply differentiated from the sphere of social and personal relations.<sup>17</sup> A later, related point is that roles are highly interchangeable, and, in particular, that the bureaucracy is not politically neutral, but has political party or interest group functions.<sup>18</sup> Pye's emphasis is rather more on the role of the politicians than on the role of the bureaucracy, but the general picture he conveys of the transitional society resembles Riggs' prismatic society.

An attractive feature of many of the public administration models developed so far is that they are ecological; they are related to the social, economic and political setting. They view the administrative system, not as a self-contained whole, but as part of a large system. "Pure" administrative theory, unrelated to any larger system, is a dream. It is like the vision nourished, in a novel, by the manager of a rubber company, "Sophia", who hankered after *the perfect* system of organization. "After devoting a great deal of thought to the many attempts made in the past, he had come to the conclusion that somewhere in the world there must exist an abstract system of organization, stripped of all material contingencies, an absolutely perfect, absolutely universal system which could be applied *a priori* and automatically to no matter what community of people, to Sophia as a whole and at the same time to the various sections, both present and future, within the organization itself."<sup>19</sup>

Models, then, are useful because they try to take account of the complexities resulting from the fact that the administrative system, in any country, is never isolated from the whole social, economic and political system. Of course, in order to take account of this background, it is not necessary to build models. Nevertheless, it is a merit of the model builders that they proceed

on this assumption. The stress is on the interdependence of, and the interaction between, the various parts of the system. It was, I think, Mary Parker Follett who said that on several occasions she had been told that an organization had just been "co-ordinated", but that the individual parts functioned largely as they had before. She refused to believe that this was possible, because, presumably, the parts of the organization were interdependent and interacting, and greater co-ordination at the centre must imply a change in the way in which the constituent units operated.

On this point Tocqueville, for once, is somewhat misleading; "...the more I study the former condition of the world and see the world of our own day in greater detail, the more I consider the prodigious variety to be met with not only in laws, but in the processes of law...the more I am tempted to believe that what we call necessary institutions are often no more than institutions to which we have grown accustomed, and that in matters of social constitution the field of possibilities is much more extensive than men living in their various societies are ready to imagine."<sup>20</sup> It is true that, in inventing institutions, the field of possibilities is wide. But the phrase to stress is "...institutions to which we have grown accustomed..." To become accustomed to institutions requires time, and this rules out any possibilities of effecting quick changes merely by altering institutions at the formal level.

In his writings on Burma, the former Netherlands East Indies and developing societies generally, J.S. Furnivall's entire thesis is directed against slavish attempts to imitate European customs in developing countries. Deep ploughing, in the European fashion, was taught to the rice cultivators in Burma, but it had the effect merely of breaking the hard "pan" of earth which performed the useful function of holding the water in the soil.<sup>21</sup> Similarly in the field of public administration, Furnivall attacked the fallacy that form gave birth to function. "If we would promote autonomy and therefore welfare, we must aim at adapting Western institutions to tropical society, on the principle that function will devise appropriate forms of government."<sup>22</sup> Edmund Burke, in his speech, at the trial of Warren Hastings, was arguing from premises which perhaps placed too high a value on British principles of government, but at least he had a healthy disregard for forms of government. He

spoke of the need to "govern on British principles; not by British forms, - God forbid; for, if ever there was a case in which the letter kills and the spirit gives life, it would be an attempt to introduce British forms and the substance of despotic principles together into any country."<sup>23</sup>

The whole history of Japan in the last hundred years is an example, on a wide canvas, of the unsought, but unavoidable, consequences of deliberately changing *parts* of a social structure. How was Japan to modernize and become a world power without changing the oligarchical character of her political structure? The formula was "Western technology and Eastern morals." But with the passage of time it became increasingly difficult to perpetuate old values in the face of industrialization and urbanization. The combination, it has been argued,<sup>24</sup> could be achieved only at a price, - a price in *malaise*, in increased cross-pressures and strains on individuals.

Models, by underlining the interrelatedness of the various aspects of human behaviour, should also give warning of possible sources of *resistance* to administrative change. Two obvious examples are promotion by merit and performance budgeting. Regulations may make provision for promotion by merit or for performance budgeting; official statements may blandly affirm that they are practiced. But, on enquiry and investigation, these procedures are sometimes seen to exist largely in the realm of aspiration. This could partly be because these two devices are "exogenous", having been introduced from outside. They are examples of "exo-prismatic" changes, which have been "made" on paper, without any widespread enthusiasm or support having been mobilized for them. The application of laws and regulations can often be controlled only spasmodically and fitfully by the officials at the centre. There may simply be non-cooperation in the field. Orders are never questioned, - but neither are they always implemented. The old Spanish saying, "I obey but I do not comply" describes the situation accurately. In other cases there is a large amount of local discretion. In describing a rather underdeveloped part of Spain, Pitt-Rivers<sup>25</sup> is of the opinion that the executive process can be expressed in the form of a syllogism. The law provides the major premiss, that which in general terms the

legislature commands. The minor premiss is filled in by the local executive who determines to whom it does in fact apply.

The relation between the two premisses, in any particular case, is conditioned by the position of the administrator concerned in the hierarchy. The lower down he is, the less his concern with the logic of the policy, the greater his dependence on the local community in which the decision has to be made, - and "lived with". Pitt-Rivers cites the illustration that (major premiss) the legislature wishes to impose a tax on taxi-drivers. (minor premiss). The executive decides that X is a taxi-driver. (Conclusion) X must pay the tax. But under certain social conditions the following variation is possible: (minor premiss) it is said that X plies for hire with his motor car, yet when the executive authorities ask him to drive them he does not charge anything. (Conclusion) X does not require a licence. He is a friend. He need pay nothing.

This type of decision, in which great weight is attached to the feelings and reactions of the local community (in so far as the letter of the law can be squeezed to fit them) is particularly likely to be met within the bottom layer, or layers, of the bureaucracy. Eisenstadt<sup>26</sup> has referred to the existence of these layers of the bureaucracy in developing countries and to the fact that the bottom layer is the "pre-development" layer. The existence of these strata can be seen easily in a country such as Malaysia. Below the "colonial" District Officer is the traditional headman (penghulu), now paid and "bureaucratized"; below him is the traditional, still largely "unofficial" *ketuah*.

One aspect of the prismatic society which is referred to by Riggs is its preoccupation with procedural and legalistic ritualism at the expense of goal-oriented behaviour. This, of course, is a feature, a malady even, of bureaucratic behaviour everywhere. In the Nineteenth Century Dickens and Balzac described it even in societies which were then probably refracted rather than prismatic. There is a general problem of how to combine two things, - first, hierarchy and obedience to the authority of one's superior (which tends to emphasize procedures) and, second, the exercise of administrative discretion (which has reference to goals). Morroe Berger,<sup>27</sup> in his study of the bureaucracy in Egypt, did not disentangle, conceptually, these two features of bureaucracy, and

this somewhat takes away from the value of his study. However, preoccupation with procedures is especially pronounced in developing countries. Pye says that the British trained the Burmese Civil Service to be part of a machine, and that their performance became largely identified with adherence to ritual. The Burmese were actually trained only as clerks, while they believed that they were taking part in the decision-making process.<sup>28</sup> A rather similar sequence seems to have occurred with Malay bureaucrats under the Japanese occupation.<sup>29</sup> Of the former colony of French Indo-China it has been said: "...the behaviour of the native administrators itself altered somewhat upon contact with the French administrators. More and more frequently educated in law schools, they had a tendency to respect the laws and regulations so scrupulously that administrative action was often forestalled by the faulty wording of a document or by the expiration of a time limit."<sup>30</sup>

Apart from the fascinating question of how far legal education contributes towards slavish adherence to procedures, several observations suggest themselves. One is that it is always easier to teach procedures than goals, and in the process of development it is only to be expected that the former will be absorbed more readily than the latter. It is, for instance, easier to teach a man to type, or to use a filing system, than it is to teach him not to abuse his official position for private gain. Second, the prismatic model suggests that among the elite, and near-elite, in developing countries there may be considerable ambivalence about goals, and conflicts may result from the competitive pulls and cross-pressures of traditional and modern ideas. An easy way out for the administrator is to try to make his mind completely "value-free" and to take refuge in procedures – especially when they can be invoked so as to ensure the continuance of the *status quo*. Third, in a prismatic society, fear of allegations of corruption may lead to the desire to document and minute every procedural step in order to safeguard oneself, in case there is any intensive investigation of corruption at a later date. Fourth, some exogenous goals may exist, which are not really widely accepted within a country, but which it is desirable to *appear* to accept, either to secure the reputation of being up-to-date or as a condition of receiving foreign aid or support. Procedures designed to ensure the attainment of the goals are "accepted" in form, but

the goals themselves have never really been accepted.

The problem of social change now appears in a rather different light than it did to Sir Henry Maine in the last century. The Moslems, he said, detest change. The Chinese loathe and despise change. The enormous mass of Indians dread change.<sup>31</sup> Another authority on colonial societies was not so pessimistic. De Kat Angelino pointed out, with reference to what was then the Dutch East Indies, that customary law was not unchangeable, although change was generally slow. In the words of the proverb, "When the flood comes up, the bathing place is moved, when the Raja changes, the *adat* (customary law) changes."<sup>32</sup> Nowadays the difficulty is not so much to secure changes on the formal level as: (1) to ensure that the changes operate below and beyond the formal level; and (2) to ensure that the effects which will be produced in the system as a whole are not so harmful as to outweigh the beneficial immediate effects of the particular change which is being contemplated.

In constructing public administration models some lines of thought may be indicated, which, so far, do not seem to have been given much attention.

1. The history and cultural traditions of the countries covered in a model are important; so, in developing countries, is the nature of the colonial system, if any, which was formerly in existence. This has been brought out rather well, for India, in a recent contribution by Ralph Braibanti.<sup>33</sup>

The influence of former colonial system may be decreasing, but today it is still undeniably powerful. Of great moment, for instance, is the question whether colonial rule was direct or indirect. The revealing sub-title of Rupert Emerson's classic, *Malaysia* (in which, curiously in the light of current political events, he included Indonesia) was "a study in direct and indirect rule".<sup>34</sup> Bruno Lasker<sup>35</sup> points to the systems adopted by the respective colonial powers in Indo-China (outside Cochin-China), the Dutch East Indies and the Unfederated Malay States. The colonial powers, on the principle of interfering as little as possible with the local rulers, often enriched them immensely with the instrumentalities of modern wealth without also insisting on their observance of the laws and moral concepts by which the possession of social and economic

power is usually circumscribed in modern civilization. In Burma, however, the complete nature of British control accelerated social disintegration and destroyed the barriers to excessive exploitation of the poor by the rich that had been inherent in the traditional mores. Indeed, inside one country, Malaya, there were variations in the "directness" of rule all the way from direct rule in the Straits Settlements to recognizably indirect rule in the Unfederated States, with the Federated States standing somewhere in between. These variations have left their mark today on the respective territories, socially, economically and administratively.

Obviously, also, the effects of colonial occupation are determined to some extent by the way in which the colonialists regarded their occupation. Egypt, although not technically a colony, was nevertheless an example of "colonialism", in a broad sense. But the colonial power had quite a different set of objectives and attitudes towards Egypt than it had towards India. The government of India was a long-term project, - although not quite as long-term as some of the British once believed. But the Egyptians did not have any of the advantages (such as they were) of being governed according to a long-term policy. The country was used rather as a staging-camp for troops, the 1884 equivalent of "airstrip one" in George Orwell's novel, 1984.

Consider also the traditional cultural influences in various countries, attention should surely be given to these in constructing models. For instance, in the Philippines traditional cultural influences certainly existed, but they have not persisted, after years of Spanish centralization and Christianization and American education, to the same degree as, say, Hindu influences in India. The pull of tradition in Filipino social behaviour is markedly less.<sup>36</sup> Consequently, the cross-pressures on Filipino behaviour, including administrative behaviour, may be less than in, say, India. This observation might be even more applicable to some of the new states in Africa. From the cultural point of view the absence of strong traditional pulls in some newly-independent African states may amount to a deprivation; from the administrative point of view it may make things simpler, insofar as attempts at administrative reform may encounter fewer obstacles from preconceived ideas and habits. It could be argued, therefore, that for some developing African

countries the administrative model should be somewhat different from models of developing countries based on Southeast Asia.

2. The "poly-communal" aspects of models possibly require some refinement. In a society with an ethnic minority of, say, less than five per cent, which is largely engaged in retail trade (the Chinese in the Philippines or Indonesia, for example) one model may be suitable. But do the Chinese in Malaysia, who amount to forty per cent of the population, conform to the same model? From the occupational point of view, nothing like all of them can possibly be "pariah entrepreneurs". Moreover, a minority as large as this is able to wield some political power directly without having to resort to the devious tactics of pariah entrepreneurs. Other important questions to ask when constructing a model concern the country to origin of ethnic minorities (including pariah entrepreneurs), if any. What degree of loyalty or allegiance is felt by the minorities to a "homeland"? What is the role played by the "homeland" on the international scene? For instance, in the case of Chinese minorities, the influence of culture and the fact that China is a world power must be given due weight. But, in considering the role of the Copts in Egypt, or the Parsees in India, factors like these need not be taken into account.

3. The *size* of a country may be relevant when deciding on what kind of model may be applicable. Obviously, for instance, a federal form of government, other things being equal, is more likely to be preferred in a large country than in a small one. On the other hand, a *very* small country may not need to have so much differentiation in its organs of government as a larger one. Thus Singapore, which before it joined Malaysia in 1963 was internally self-governing, did not have any form of local government between 1959 and 1963.<sup>37</sup> In an area of only about 225 square miles this was judged by the Government to be unnecessary. Of course, on a strict definition, the absence of local government in Singapore might lead us to view it as a society with a low degree of refraction. But a more sophisticated approach might be to make allowance for size in estimating degrees of refraction.

Size must also affect other administrative features. One would expect that the larger the country the greater would be the difficulties of communication, and of administrative inspection, and

the slower would be the speed of decision-making. The hypothesis could also be put forward that in smaller countries politicians are more inclined to interfere in matters of administrative detail than they are in larger countries. To be sure, in some societies such interference might be attributed to the fact that the society was prismatic. The bureaucracy could not be trusted to be passive and neutral with the consequence that the politicians had stepped into the field of administration. But the experience of New Zealand suggests that another reason might simply be that, in small countries, there may not be sufficient policy matters to keep the politicians happily occupied and preserved from the temptation of becoming involved in administration.

4. Some more thought is surely needed on the power position of the bureaucracy. Riggs, in the prismatic model, maintains that the bureaucracy is not passive in prismatic societies. But in some prismatic societies, such as India and Malaysia, it does appear, nevertheless, to be at least relatively passive. Its members advise and recommend on policy, but the politicians can have the last word if they assert themselves sufficiently; and apparently they often do so. It is not hard to think of relatively refracted societies (notably the Third and Fourth Republics in France) where the bureaucracy was at least as powerful as in present-day India or Malaysia. Perhaps, for the account of the power of the bureaucracy in the prismatic model not to apply, at least two conditions must be fulfilled: there must be a tradition of civil service neutrality; there must also be a political system in which the politicians are powerful enough to be able to control the bureaucrats. In Pakistan the first condition obtains, but not the second; in the Philippines the second obtains, but not the first. However, as I think the examples of India and Malaysia show, it cannot be assumed that in prismatic societies politicians are invariably too weak to control the bureaucrats.

5. The prismatic model, although it properly emphasizes social and economic considerations, seems to underrate the influence of ideology, as it seems to underrate the role of history. Traditional beliefs and social habits are allowed for but not current ideologies. Some of these may be ephemeral and/or synthetic, for example the late President Diem's "Personalism" or Dr. Sukarno's alphabetical combinations, but others, such as Chinese Communism,

may be more potent. Is the influence of current ideas and ideologies not part of the total situation or system, which should be embodied in the model?<sup>38</sup>

6. The part played by the military deserves some exploration. Sometimes wide definitions of "the bureaucracy" include the military, but there is seldom any adequate analysis of it separately. Some useful ideas for model-making might be deprived from Professor Finer's recent study.<sup>39</sup> From the strictly administrative point of view it would be most informative (and helpful for model-making) to have a detailed comparative study of administration in a country, for instance in Egypt or Pakistan, both before and after a military system of government was set up. I do not know of any such study, although some suggestive points are made in the recent book on Egypt by K. Wheelock.<sup>40</sup>

To turn to the limitations of models in public administration, the first and perhaps the most obvious, is that they are lamentably non-quantitative. This has made some economists refuse to agree that they are worthy to be called "models". However, the data available in public administration, and in political science generally, are rarely sufficiently numerical to lend to themselves to quantitative treatment. There are a few exceptions, for instance the study of voting behaviour, or in public administration, the process of costing various governmental activities.<sup>41</sup> But the general difficulty is obvious. Perhaps the weakest part of a great book, Graham Wallas's *Human Nature in Politics*,<sup>42</sup> occurs when the author, in attempting to give illustrations of how to be quantitative in politics, cites as an example the problem of constructing the optimum size of legislative chamber, given certain assumptions about the degree of deafness and the clearness of speech of certain proportions of the legislators. An absurd "example" may underline the futility of any elaborate attempt to measure general standards of public administration. The administrative efficiency of a country could never be measured by some such "formula" as;

$$AE = N1^2 \times \frac{SF}{PTMEG} \times NSASC \times \frac{PM}{PS}$$

where:

AE = the administrative efficiency of a developing country.

NI = National Income per head.

SF = Strength of the 'steel frame' (higher civil service) built by the former colonial power.

PTMEG = Proportion of traders from minority ethnic groups (pariah entrepreneurs).

NSASC = Proportion of civil servants who have received training at a National School of Administration, a Staff College or the equivalent.

PM = Promotions by merit in the civil service over the last 15 years.

PS = Promotions by seniority in the civil service over the last 15 years.

To return from contemplating the absurd, public administration models attempt to provide a general impression, a conspectus, without claiming to be accurate in detail. Indeed, just because they take account of the whole social setting, this makes them more complex, and so in principle even less susceptible to quantification, than if they had been restricted to purely administrative data.

There are further limitations inherent in the process of model-making, as I suggest earlier. Models in public administration are arrived at by a combination of induction and deduction. Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy, as one commentator has observed, was not "built up from empirical data by relevant inference."<sup>43</sup> It was essentially deductive, although Weber did use empirical data in giving details of patriarchal, patrimonial and feudal administration. And, although Riggs' models are primarily based on observation, and so to that extent inductive, the observed patterns are to some extent structured and put in the form of rational hypotheses. This must be so, obviously, otherwise the models would not contain generalizations. Every new term or concept used in the models is part of this attempt to "impose rationality". So the process is, as it were, a zigzag between deduction and induction. A conceptual framework is evolved. Data are observed and recorded. A model is produced as a result of imposing a (provisional) rational pattern. In this model relationships are suggested which need further empirical verification. So the model is checked against additional data, which leads to a new model (containing new hypothesis), to further checking and so on.<sup>44</sup> The process of constructing and testing models contains

both deductive and inductive elements. But implicit in it is the problem, similar to that which perplexed the Nominalists and Realists in mediaeval philosophy, - how far are generalization and abstraction permissible and desirable? The more elaborate and subtle the model, the more inaccurate will it be at particular points when applied to individual countries. It was on this score that Lavau<sup>45</sup> criticized Duverger's classic work<sup>46</sup> on political parties.

The problem, then, is to know where to draw the line. Do we desire large sweeping models which explain a few important features of a larger number of countries, or do we desire more restricted models that give a more complete insight into a smaller number of countries? F.J. Tickner criticized Riggs' earlier models, *Agraria* and *Industria*, as being too sweeping and abstract, although they contained many potential hypotheses. *Agraria* and *Industria*, according to Tickner, must be sharply reduced in both space and time before being put to the empirical test.<sup>47</sup> In the prismatic model there is a sharp reduction in time, the model is meant to describe only countries undergoing development in recent years; it is almost certainly usually confined to this century and probably, in some cases, to the last twenty years or so. But the prismatic model has not been reduced in space. It would seem to cover about three-quarters or more of all the countries in the world at present. One possibility is to follow the approach of David Apter in choosing "types" for the classification of political regimes.<sup>48</sup> "Each of these types relates to a larger structural system of variables. Briefly, they result from typical clusterings of variables which themselves are distributed in many different ways in the empirical universe. In that sense they may be regarded as developmental profiles." The clusterings suggest the limits of each type, or model.

An obvious move would be to try to group countries geographically in model-making, although this would not meet the points about historical and ideological differences mentioned earlier. Almond and Coleman, for example, chose five geographical areas, in their analysis of the politics of developing areas: South Asia, Southeast Asia, the Near East, Africa - South of the Sahara and Latin America. Even then, there are obviously substantial difference within each of these areas. Alternatively, in building models, we can keep an eye on "typical clusterings of variables" and use them

as a guide in deciding on the limits for each model. Clusterings may be varied, depending on the approach desired. For instance a "general" model might try to include many social factors. But, if our main interest in constructing a model were economic, we might group together countries in which pariah entrepreneurs played an important role, - this factor might suggest the limits for the application of the model. But, if the focus of interest were rather on administrative systems perhaps we might group countries according to their colonial administrative history, because of the influence on present administrative behaviour.

The problem of delimitation, of knowing where to draw the line, is of course related to the question of realism previously discussed.<sup>49</sup> Realism in a theory or model is "the perfection with which the form of its postulates permit them to accommodate all the facts of the particular cases to which the theory is to be applied. The postulates must not be so excessively general that all the cases they are intended to cover can get into a little corner of them like a handful of peas in the dome of St. Peter's. Nor so tight that no case from reality or only one or two can cram themselves in. The ideal of realism in a theory of some generality is that its assumptions should fit the facts comfortably."<sup>50</sup> The problem is that the number of prismatic societies is so small (although it includes the vast majority of existing countries) that the dilemma for the model-maker, as just stated, is apparently inescapable. The model is either wide but shallow, consisting of rather general statements about corruption, delays in bureaucratic procedures and so on;<sup>51</sup> or it is deep but narrow, describing in detail relationships which exist, however, in only one, or perhaps two or three, societies.

Some other difficulties which face the model-maker may be mentioned. How many new terms should be employed in model-making, - for instance should the word, "prismatic" be used instead of "transitional"? Pye uses the latter,<sup>52</sup> but Riggs makes out a case for using the former. In describing the prismatic society there is the problem of terminology as compared with the equivalents of *Agraria* and *Industria*. If one's social position in *Agraria* determined by "ascription" and in *Industria* by "achievement", then, says Riggs, in the prismatic society the determining factor is "attainment", a kind of bastard achievement, in which the important thing is not the

knowledge acquired in the course of obtaining a degree or diploma but the possession of the degree or diploma itself. In this context, the new term, "attainment" is neat and illuminating. But, if carried to excess, the search for new terms would merely become a word-puzzle, as in Urwick's *Elements of Administration*, in which "principles", "processes" and "effects" are put into "the perfect logical square summarizing the main aspects of administration."<sup>53</sup> In the wrong hands the search for new terminology could result in jargon. It is interesting to speculate on the form that the terminology of Bagehot or Bryce would take, if either were alive today and engaged in research on models in public administration.

Another limitation of the prismatic model has been indicated by Riggs. The word, "refracted" should not be used to imply value judgments. "More refracted" is not equivalent to "more desirable". It may be hard to avoid making this assumption. Even Weber at time seems to have come near to making value judgments when using terms like "fully-developed."<sup>54</sup>

An incidental advantage of models, from the practical point of view, is that a description of a country can remain anonymous. For instance, examples of corruption in a country may be conveyed in a model, which it might be inadvisable openly to attribute specifically to that country.

Finally, I would incline to take the view that the use of models in teaching public administration should be limited to those who have already been exposed to the subject of public administration. They should not be used to teach the immature, for example in first courses on public administration for students without experience in the public service. A simple novice in public administration, might assume that, if only he were to study a prismatic model applying to South or Southeast Asia, he could derive the administrative characteristics of any country in the area from the model alone, without ever making a direct study of the administration of that particular country.

I have tried to show how models may be useful in revealing more clearly the social, economic and political bases on which administrative institutions and practices depend. In public administration they are essentially impressionistic and non-quantitative. It is only if we understand their limitations, that we

can use models intelligently, and safely, to help us towards the understanding of administrative behaviour.

### References

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2. The concept of the image has been developed ingeniously, but almost to the point of the fantasy, in Kenneth E. Boulding, *The Image: Knowledge in life and society* (Ann Arbor, 1956).
3. E.R. Hilgard and D. Lerner, "The Person - Subject and Object of Sciences and Policy", in D. Lerner and H.D. Lasswell (eds.), *The Policy Sciences* (Stanford, 1951), p.36.
4. E.W. Weidner, "The Search for Priorities in Public Administration Research", F.W. Riggs and E.W. Weidner (eds.) *Models and Priorities in the Comparative Study in Public Administration* (Chicago, 1963), pp. 51-2.
5. See. F.W. Riggs, "Agraria and Industria - Toward a Typology of Comparative Administration", in W.J. Siffin (ed.), *Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration* (Indiana, 1957). In Agraria the main associations are primary ones, such as the family and the class. Status depends on ascription, not on achievement, and the status of the bureaucracy is high. In Industria secondary associations play an important role, achievement is the basis of status, and the bureaucracy has less power and less status than in Agraria. See also R.S. Milne, "Comparisons and Models in Public Administration", *Political Studies*, Vol. X, No.1, 1962.
6. D.M. Bensusan-But, *On Economic Growth: An Essay in Pure Theory* (Oxford, 1960), pp. 1-4. On the lack of quantification in public administration models, see below, pp. 19-20.
7. *Op.cit.*, p. 162.
8. "On Communication Models in the Social Sciences", *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 16, Fall, 1952, pp. 360-4, quoted by Weidner, *op.cit.*, pp. 60-1.
9. That is, its "generality or organizing power". This would, presumably, correspond to the "through - partial" distinction.
10. *Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society* (Boston, 1964).
11. By Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (Princeton, 1960), p.10. See also Gabriel A. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems", *Journal of Politics*, Vol. XVIII, No. 3, 1956.
12. "Political Struggle in Bureaucratic Societies", *World Politics*, Vol. 9, No.1 (1956).
13. Notably in *Colonial Policy and Practice* (Cambridge, 1948) and "Some Problems of Tropical Economy" in Rita Hinden (ed.), *New Fabian Colonial Essays* (London, 1959).
14. *Political Change and Pariah Entrepreneurship* (Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1962).
15. Donald Hindley, "Foreign Aid to Indonesia and its political implications", *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 36, No.2, 1963.
16. *Politics, Personality and Nation Building* (New Haven, 1962).
17. *Ibid.*, p.16.
18. *Ibid.*, p.25.
19. Pierre Boule, *Sacrilege in Malaya* (London, 1959), p. 283.
20. *Recollections* (New York, 1949), pp. 80-1.
21. *Colonial Policy and Practice, op.cit.*, p.327.
22. *Ibid.*, p.409.
23. Quoted in *New Fabian Colonial Essay, op.cit.*, p.69.
24. Nobutaka Ike, *Japanese Politics* (London, 1958), pp. 8-9.
25. J.A. Pitt-Rivers, *The People of the Sierras* (London, 1954), pp. 209-10.
26. S.N. Eisenstadt, "Problems of Emerging Bureaucracy: in Developing Countries and New States" (North American Conference on Social Implications of Industrialization and Technological Change, 1960).
27. *Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt* (Princeton, 1957).
28. *Op.cit.*, p. 216.
29. T.H. Silcock and A. Aziz, "Nationalism in Malaya" in W. Holland (ed.), *Asian Nationalism and the West* (New York, 1953), pp. 289-91.
30. Nghiem Dang, "Toward a Philosophy of Public Administration in Vietnam", *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. 7, No. 2, 1963, p.81.
31. *Popular Government* (London, 1897), pp. 132-133.
32. A.D.A. de Kat Angelino *Colonial Policy* (abridged and translated by G.J. Renier and the author, Chicago, 1931), Vol.1, p. 132.
33. "Reflections on Bureaucratic Reform in India" in R. Braibanti and J.J. Spengler (eds.), *Administration and Economic Development in India* (Durham, N.C., 1963).
34. (New York, 1937).
35. *Human Bondage in Southeast Asia* (Chapel Hill, 1950), p. 384.
36. See R.S. Milne, "The Uniqueness of Philippine Nationalism", *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 4, No.1, 1963.
37. Nor did it have any form of local government after its separation from Malaysia in 1965.
38. See, for instance, p. 42, below on the Singapore Government's attempt to bring ideology to bear on administrators via the "political Study Centre".
39. S.E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback* (London, 1962).
40. K. Wheelock, *Nasser's New Egypt: a critical Analysis* (New York, 1960). See also P.J. Vatikiotis, *The Egyptian Army in Politics* (Bloomington, 1961).
41. E.G. Clarence E. Ridley and Herbert A. Simon, *Measuring Municipal Activities* (Chicago, 1943).
42. (New York, 1921), pp. 161 ff.
43. C.J. Friedrich, "Some Observations on Weber's Analysis of Bureaucracy" in Robert K. Merton et al. (eds.), *Reader in Bureaucracy* (Glencoe, Ill., 1952), pp. 30-3.
44. To follow this up, in a "refracted" way, the tasks of model-making might be split among four types of researchers: producers or large-scale models; appliers of models to particular countries; searchers for "clustering of

variables" who would try to find the optimum scope for various models; collectors of data on various countries through historical research, case studies, etc.

45. G.E. Lavau, *Partis Politiques et Realites Sociales* (Paris, 1952).
46. M. Duverger, *Les Partis Politiques* (Paris, 1951). The comparison with Nominalists and Realists is made by Professor S.E. Finer in *Political Studies*, Vol. II, No.3 (1954), p. 273.
47. F.J. Tickner, "Comparing Administrative Systems", *Public Administration Review*, Vol. XIX, No.1, (1959), p.31.
48. *System, Process and the Politics of Economic Development* (North American Conference on the Social Implications of Industrialization and Technological Change, 1960). This has been re-issued under the same title, but with revisions, as "Reprint No. 224", Institute of Industrial Relations and Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1964.
49. See p. 4, above.
50. Bensusan-Butt, *op.cit.*, p. 163.
51. Cf. The Attempt to generalize from propositions about American voting, which produced "a series of very general propositions indeed, such as: 'people influence each other' (toward compatibility)". W.N. McPhee and W.A. Glaser (eds.), *Public Opinion and Congressional Elections* (Glencoe, Ill., 1962), p.4.
52. *Op.cit.*
53. *Elements of Administration* (London, 1943), p.18.
54. But see Alfred Diamant, "The Bureaucratic Model: Max Weber Rejected, Rediscovered, Reformed" in F. Heady and S.L. Stokes (eds.), *Papers in Public Administration* (Ann Arbor, 1962).

## II

## THE NOTION OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE CLASS

The stereotypes of what constitutes an "administrative class" are far from clear. To be sure, some countries are said to have an "administrative class" or its equivalent, while others are said not to have one. Thus, in Britain there is a well-defined group of this name, and it is easy to point to groups in other countries which roughly correspond to it, such as the Indian Civil Service (in the past), the Indian Administrative Service, the Civil Service of Pakistan and the Malayan Civil Service. Equally plainly, there is no closely-corresponding group in the United States. Briefly, the argument I shall advance depends on the thesis that the notion of an administrative class is based on certain characteristics, which the British administrative class is supposed to possess, but that in fact it no longer possesses all of these.

As a preliminary approach, we might consider what the nature of "administrative" work is. Some definitions of "administrative" are very wide, for instance Professor A. de Grazia maintains that all mechanical and technical skills which are applied in institutions would qualify.<sup>1</sup> However, such definitions would be too broad to enable us to make any fruitful distinctions between the functions of various groups of civil servants. It would be preferable to seek a more exclusive definition, such as Chester Barnard's view of essential "executive" functions.<sup>2</sup> According to him they are:

1. To provide the system of communication;
2. To promote the securing of essential efforts;
3. To formulate and define purpose.

This type of definition is closely related to the well-known statement of the functions of the British administrative class as being those concerned with the formation of policy, the co-ordination and improvement of government machinery and the general administration and control of the departments of the public service.<sup>3</sup> As I shall attempt to spell out in my next talk, the place of the administrator in the whole scheme of the civil service is that he is not a specialist but, as Sir Warren Fisher once said, "rather the

general adviser of the minister, the general manager and controller under the minister". The administrator is, so to speak, the link between the elective and appointive political service, on the one hand, and the professional and clerical services, on the other.<sup>4</sup> The views I have just quoted list *several* functions of the administrator. Another way of putting the point is to say, with Mackenzie and Grove,<sup>5</sup> that there are three *types* of administrative civil servant, not just one: "...there is the right-hand man of Ministers, the political adviser, the slightly cynical guardian of the State, so well-sketched by the late Mr. H.E. Dale; there is the academic man, devoured by the craving to put the facts straight and present them tidily and objectively; there is the manager, the best type of executive, the man who likes and understands large organizations and has the capacity to keep his own organization moving." Insofar as it is possible to allocate administrators to one or other of these three types, it would seem that the numbers in the second group would be relatively small. The proportion in types 1 and 3 would vary in different societies. For instance, in public service administration in New Zealand, it has been said that New Zealand is a small country with less complex problems than Britain. Consequently, the proportion of type 1 administrators required there would be lower than the proportion necessary in Britain.

However, this approach does not avoid some difficulties. The "administrative" functions we have just listed must be performed by some persons or other in any society which has reached a moderate degree of complexity. But whether or not they are performed mostly by a clearly identifiable groups, depends on the degree of specialization in the society, in Riggs' language, on the degree of "refraction". As I have argued in the previous talk, in some developing countries, such as India and Malaysia, they are indeed performed by an identifiable group. In others the functions of administrators, politicians and the military may not be clearly distinguishable. Even in societies with a relatively high degree of refraction, "administrative" functions may be rather widely spread *inside* the civil service. For instance, in Britain, after the last war, and also in other countries, there were attempts to transfer some types of work, previously done by administrative civil servants, to executive civil servants, a process inelegantly described as

"executivization".

I should now like to put forward some of the characteristics which people seem to have in mind when they speak of an "administrative class". This stereotype, or model, seems to be based on certain features of the British administrative class, which are believed to exist. However, I shall later go through these features in order to see exactly which of them now actually apply in the British Civil Service.

The stereotype would seem to have the following characteristics:

1. At the top of the administrative civil service, or its equivalent, is a group which is concerned with the most important administrative functions, as defined above. These administrators might be called the "Higher Civil Service". H.E. Dale<sup>6</sup> defined them in Britain as being of the rank of Assistant Secretary or above, although it would be possible to include some members of the next lower rank, in Britain Principals. It should be noted that unlike the United States, there are no intervening layers of *political* appointees between the politicians and the top career civil servants.

2. Holders of some lower positions, below the "Higher Civil Service", are also designated as being part of the administrative class, although their current functions are not of such outstanding importance. It is exclusively from their ranks that promotions to the Higher Civil Service are made. Thus rules out recruitment to the Higher Civil Service from civil servants outside the administrative class, for instance from clerical, professional or technical civil servants, or, in federations, from state civil services; or from outside the civil service altogether.

3. The members of the administrative class, when first appointed, are almost all taken direct from the universities in their early twenties.

4. They are recruited entirely on the basis of general intellectual ability and not because of any specialized ability, not even on the ground that they possess any special *administrative* ability.

5. Members of the administrative class are interchangeable between departments. It is possible to move them from one department to another because they are generalists. In fact they are transferred from one department to another, in the early stages

as part of their training, later to ensure that the very top positions in the Higher Civil Service may be filled by the best men available.

These are, I think, the features which constitute the stereotype, although they do not all correspond to the existing British situation. Some features of the stereotype are particularly repulsive to observers in the United States. First, the system as described is largely "closed". It depends on recruitment to the Higher Civil Service from *within* the service. United States practice, on the other hand, is based on "frequent interchange of men between private life and responsible non-political public service."<sup>7</sup> This raises the whole question of a "career service" to which I shall return later. Second, the British system rests on the acceptance of merit as the criterion of selection. An American writer, R.A. Dahl, wrote, as recently as 1947,<sup>8</sup> that this criterion was not yet completely accepted in the United States. Certainly, whether viewed as a consequence of patronage, or as a means of ensuring that top policy makers keep in line with the policy of the Administration, there are more "political" layers on top of the Higher Civil Service than there are over the British. So any United States equivalent of an administrative class would be further from "the political summit" than its British counterpart. This observation would also apply to the Philippines, where the American system has been followed. Dahl also argues that principles of recruitment for the United States civil service have been adapted to the educational specialization which is found in American Universities. On the other hand the British type of recruitment rests on a scholastic system which creates the educated non-specialist, namely the British University system which was established in the middle of the nineteenth century. It is significant that the British civil service "reforms" and the introduction of open competitive examinations in the middle of the nineteenth century were the result of "propaganda", not only by Macaulay, but also by Jowett, the Master of Balliol. The reform proposals were indeed to some degree a "schoolmaster's scheme". In other countries, too, the educational system and the recruitment policy to the civil service are related. The structure of the former may be quoted as a reason why changes should not be made in the latter. In 1933, the New Zealand Public Service Commission, in commenting on proposals for more favourable terms of entry into

Service for University graduates, based its arguments on the fact that most New Zealand degrees were part-time, acquired *after* entry into the public service. "New Zealand is essentially a democratic country, and no practice which might be inferred to give an undue advantage to those who can afford to continue full-time studies at a University is likely to meet with general approval."<sup>9</sup>

A further point was made many years ago by Lewis Meriam, a persuasive opponent of the generalist in the upper reaches of the civil service. In the United States, he said, emphasis on "professionalism" had been useful and necessary as a safeguard against patronage and "political" appointments.<sup>10</sup> Indeed the whole anti-patronage argument underlay the thesis of F.J. Goodnow's classic, *Politics and Administration*. "There are, then, in all governmental systems two primary or ultimate functions of government, viz., the expression of the will of the state and the execution of that will. There are also in all states separate organizations, each of which is mainly busied with the discharge of one of these functions. These functions are, respectively, Politics and Administration."<sup>11</sup> D.W. Smithburg has remarked that behind Goodnow's approach was the belief that, if it could be shown that only a few top positions were "policy-making", then lower positions could be filled through examinations to test "merit". These jobs would be "non-political" in nature, because their occupants would merely be carrying out the "political will", as expressed by President and Congress.<sup>12</sup> It follows that, in order to keep out patronage, "merit" must be *identifiable* in the clearest possible way. This can be done most easily and unambiguously by insisting on a professional or technical qualification. The arguments of Macaulay and Jowett, Northcote and Trevelyan would not have been persuasive across the Atlantic. The educational system was different, and emphasis on general intellectual studies would not have been a potent weapon against patronage. It was not possible to evoke respect for the principles of Northcote-Trevelyan, but it was possible to evoke deference for technical proficiency and efficiency, concepts which were believed to apply in the world of business.

Similar arguments have force in the Philippines, where the emphasis, in form at least,<sup>13</sup> is on technical qualifications. Any

relaxation of these would bring suspicion of an increase in the amount of patronage.

An additional consideration in United States opposition to the concept of an administrative class consists in opposition to "elitism". The British administrative class, it has been said, constitutes an elite, and any similar arrangement in the United States context would be "undemocratic". Indeed Dahl argues, in the same article, that a necessary condition for the existence of an administrative class in any country is a general acceptance of the hierarchical idea. It is not felt in Britain, according to Dahl, that an administrative class is "undemocratic". The inference might be that Britain is a "hierarchical democracy", while the United States is a "non-hierarchical democracy". Dahl also introduces an interesting argument. He claims that, for an administrative class to function successfully, it must have the prestige of an elite, otherwise it would not be able to compete successfully against other elites which may exist for the brains and abilities of the nation. This condition cannot be met, he believes, in the United States, because in that country, unlike Britain, prestige has accrued largely to material success. Dahl's argument is even more interesting, as is often the case, if it is stood on its head. Because most developing (prismatic) societies are in practice hierarchical, this would suggest that there would be little difficulty, from the point of view of hierarchy, in introducing an administrative class, or its equivalent, without seriously disturbing prevailing value systems. This has been observed, with reference to the Philippines, by Gregorio Francisco Jr. On the other hand, it could be argued that it would be too easy, and therefore too dangerous, to stress the elitist features of an administrative class in a developing country, because to do so would reinforce already existing hierarchical elitist tendencies and so hinder the attainment of an egalitarian, non-hierarchical democracy.

Some of the advocates of an administrative class, or its equivalent, in the United States have gone to great lengths to minimize its elitist features in order to gain acceptance for it. L.D. White, in a book published in 1935,<sup>14</sup> says that an American administrative group (*sic*) need not repeat the aristocratic and privileged features known to other countries. It can be built, he says, on the American doctrine of full equality of opportunity, with

no privileges for any class. And the American Assembly book, *The Federal Government Service*, in arguing for the creation of a similar group, under the heading, "Elements of the Career Idea", lists "status" as one of these, but hastens to add that in the United States attempts are being made to develop career systems without such status differences.<sup>15</sup> If Dahl's viewpoint is developed, we might, it seems, be committed to the hypothesis that, in any given country, it is either not possible to introduce an administrative class (because the proposed new elite constituted by that class could not compete successfully with existing elites); or that, if the conditions were favourable, it would be undesirable to introduce one, because the existing tendencies to hierarchy and elitism would be dangerously strengthened, perhaps to the extent of damaging democracy. However, apart from the "either-or" nature of this argument, two points need further investigation. Does the stereotype of an administrative class, which was put forward earlier, correspond to the existing situation in the country on which it was based, namely Britain? Also so far no clear account has been given of exactly what is meant by an "elite".

On the first of the two points, there were five headings in the original stereotype. Of these, numbers 1 and 5 do correspond to the existing practices in Britain. Number 2 is approximately correct, but there are slight exceptions. Number 3 is grossly inaccurate as a description of the British administrative class today. Number 4 has been breached in one significant respect, which might, if developed further, conceivably have far-reaching implications.

On Number 2, as in the original stereotype, promotions are made to the British Higher Civil Service (the ranks of Assistant Secretary and above) very largely from those in the next lower ranks of the administrative class (Principals). However, some appointments are made direct from the executive class to the Higher Civil Service, without first going through the lower ranks of the administrative class. There have also been a few similar appointments direct to the Higher Civil Service from professional and technical posts, and from other government services, for instance from the Colonial Service.

On Number 3 the stereotype is now completely wide of the mark. The lower ranks of the Administrative Class are *not* recruited

almost exclusively by direct entry from the Universities. In 1954, R.K. Kelsall found that only about fifty per cent of the entrants to the administrative class had come in through open competitive examinations for young men recruited from the Universities in their early twenties.<sup>16</sup> Even as far back as the beginning of the 1930's about a quarter of the administrative class had been promoted from other classes.<sup>17</sup> What is more, according to Kelsall, of the Higher Civil Service in 1950: only 44 per cent had come in originally by open competition; 36 per cent had entered by promotion from inside the Civil Service, mostly from the executive class; 14 per cent had come in by direct entry from outside the Civil Service, for example through competitive entry at the level of Principal; 6 per cent had come in from transfers, for instance from the Colonial Service.<sup>18</sup> These last two groups were perhaps exceptional, made necessary by direct recruitment from the Universities having ceased during the war and by the expansion of welfare, and other, services in Britain after the war. But the second category, promotion from inside the civil service, mostly from the executive class, was *not* exceptional. The proportion in it was only slightly below the proportion in the first category. Since these figures relate to the Higher Civil Service, it is clear that promotions from the executive class are not just a means of providing promotion opportunities up to only a limited point in the ladder. Such promotions actually do lead to a substantial number of promotions all the way up into the Higher Civil Service.

For comparative purposes, it may be noted that between 1948 and 1960, nearly 40 per cent of the appointments to the Indian Administrative Service were made by promotions from the State services.<sup>19</sup>

As regards feature Number 4 of the stereotype, this is still true in that in recruitment from the Universities the emphasis is Macaulay's – to recruit men who have been employed in studies "the effect of which is merely to invigorate and to enrich the mind". A very wide range of subjects taught in the Universities are examined in for entry into the administrative class, including Metaphysics, Engineering, Welsh Civilization, as recent examples. The important qualification consists in one of the features of the method of entry, first used in the Postwar Reconstruction

Examinations. Now known as "Method II" it is used for up to 25 per cent of the entries from Universities. Only general papers are set, as opposed to papers "in depth" on subjects taught in Universities. Method II also includes intelligence tests, psychological tests, short lectures by the candidates, group discussions and the "Island Story". This consists of role-playing, and tests one particular kind of administrative ability, namely effectiveness in committee work. So, although the Island Story is only one part of Method II, and not all recruitment is via Method II, some approach has been made towards testing administrative ability. It is no longer completely true to say that only general intellectual ability is being tested.

The conclusion must be that the stereotype of an "administrative class", although based on the British Administrative Class, no longer applies very closely to the actual situation in Britain.

On the question of what constitutes an elite, there are of course the classic references, Mosca, Pareto, James Burnham and so on. There seem to be four possible tests when considering whether or not a particular group is an elite. First, the group must be in a position to wield a certain amount of power, otherwise it would not qualify. Second, the social origins of the group are important; are they sufficiently restricted to justify the use of the term? Third, what is the prestige of the group in the eyes of others? Fourth, what are the attitudes of the group's members, is there pride in the group, *esprit de corps* or what?

The amount of power wielded by administrative civil servants depends on a number of things. It is obviously high where the top civil service of a colonial power is in question, although, of course, this power is less "monolithic" than it might appear to be at first sight, because, apart from any role played by the politicians, power is in fact shared between the civil servants on the spot in the country colonized and those at the "head office", for instance the India Office, in the colonial country. Ordinarily, in a developed (refracted) country, administrative civil servants would not wield such overwhelming power that, on this score alone, they should be classified as an "elite". In the last talk I mentioned that Riggs, in the prismatic model, thinks that the power of the top civil servants is high in developing countries, but I suggested qualifications to this view.<sup>20</sup>

The second point has been explored for various countries. For instance, the broad conclusion on the social origins of the Higher Civil Service in both Britain<sup>21</sup> and France<sup>22</sup> is that there has been some "democratization" of recruitment since the war, although the social origins are still well above average, or, to introduce a value judgment, not sufficiently representative of the lower social groups. There seems to have been a similar trend in India. One commentator says that in India the figures "indicate clearly a perceptible change in the social background of the IAS in the direction of a fairly rapid egalitarian levelling."<sup>23</sup>

It is not proposed to go over the findings in detail. But some of the value judgments, explicit or implicit, may be questioned. How far, for instance, *ought* democratization of recruitment to go? If the proportion of those entering the Higher Civil Service from the higher social groups falls dramatically, is this necessarily, on balance, progress towards "democratization"? Suppose, for instance, that it were accompanied by a corresponding increase in recruits of higher social origins entering other possible elite groups, and becoming, say, politicians or army officers? Or, might not a marked fall in the proportion of entrants from higher social groups indicate a severe loss of prestige in the eyes of others, thus suggesting that in some sense the Higher Civil Service had been incompetent or ineffectual?

Incidentally, one method of judging social origin which should be used with care, is to take attendance at a University as a sign of high social origin. This is what was done in a comparative study of the civil services in Canada and Ceylon, when the argument that the administrative civil servants in Ceylon belonged to a "caste" was supported by the argument that the top administrative officers were drawn almost exclusively from Ceylon's small number of University graduates.<sup>24</sup> This type of reasoning may be valid in Ceylon, or elsewhere when entry to the University is restricted largely to the higher social groups, but it could not be applied legitimately to countries such as the United States, Australia or New Zealand where entry is not rigidly restricted in this way.

I shall not say much about the third test, prestige as judged by others. This tends to be low in developed countries, such as the United States<sup>25</sup> where there are numerous employment

opportunities in business which offer higher material rewards. It is obviously higher in developing countries.<sup>26</sup>

The matter of civil service attitudes, especially in developing countries, needs rather fuller treatment. Clearly a certain degree of pride in the service, of *esprit de corps*, is not only pardonable but is even necessary. This is seen more clearly if we substitute the term, "team spirit". The emphasis on *esprit de corps*, on integrity and on the behaviour of the whole man, not just the man during office hours, is seen from an address given to the elite of the civil service in Malaya by the Permanent Secretary of the Prime Minister's Department. "Most of you are members of the Malayan Civil Service, the most senior service in this country. Others of you are members of the Malay Administrative Service and the state Civil Services, but I trust that you also aspire, in your hearts, to eventual promotion to the Malayan Civil Service. The Malayan Civil Service is a body with great traditions which has produced many important figures in this country...."

"It will be impossible for you in your life outside the office to be regarded, by your friends and by the general public, in any other way than as an officer of the Malayan Civil Service. This status makes it essential that you should always behave in a manner befitting a senior Government officer...."

"I can assure you that your behaviour outside office hours will be almost as important a factor to your senior officers in recommending your promotion in the service as will your performance in office during office hours."<sup>27</sup>

The problem is how to foster a team spirit among administrative civil servants, without engendering feeling of superiority, without encouraging illusions of heavenly origins. What are the *legitimate* limits to the administrative civil servant's pride, pride in his work, pride in his corps? The problem is clearly most difficult in developing, prismatic societies. Quite apart from the possibility that the politicians may not have sufficient control over civil servants<sup>28</sup>, there is usually an absence of other counter-elites, for instance in business. There is also a tradition of paternalism in Government from colonial days, - the view of Government as all-powerful, as the universal provider and dispenser of favours. It is also unlikely that there is any knowledgeable vigilant body of public opinion strong enough to

protest effectively against official abuses. All of these circumstances increase the power of Government and therefore, potentially, of governmental administrators.

The first Indian Prime Minister wrote<sup>29</sup> that under the British there was a caste system in the civil services in India, rigid lines of distinction between grades, "the British, of course, being the topmost caste of all". He described the situation in the civil service, after Independence, in this way; "...one has to put a man in charge who has the capacity to do that job and who has the training and experience to do it. Naturally he will have great responsibility, but that does not mean that as human being he is superior to another human being. That does not mean that he belongs to a higher caste than another."

A.D. Gorwala has stated the point in stronger terms when describing India before Independence.<sup>30</sup> "The general administrator seemed on the whole to be a caste standing by himself, standing outside the people and different from it.... His outlook was often limited. Even when noted for scholarship and culture, he seemed incapable of seeing certain aspects. The eyes of his mind sometimes seemed to wear blinkers. Some among his class were also imbued with a special stubbornness, the obverse of the quality of standing firm. Acknowledgement of regret for some unfortunate happening rarely came easily. Hence the reputation for a peculiar adherence to a so-called prestige, which was the course of government in India for many years and in fact did irreparable harm."

Looking to the future, Gorwala said that the administrator of the future must avoid the tendency to regard himself as a separate caste, "as something distinct from the people, although coming of the people."<sup>31</sup> It is not exactly clear what he means by "the people". He seems to be assuming here that the administrators of the future will *not* be recruited from only a limited range of higher social groups. They would come apparently from a sufficiently enough cross-section of all groups in the population, high and low, for the administrators, so to speak, to "represent" them.

Professor M. Duverger, although writing of politicians, has made a rather similar observation. Towards the end of his book on political parties, he says that every government is oligarchical by nature, but that the origins and upbringing of oligarchs may be very

different and this will determine their actions. It is necessary, he says, to replace the formula, "government of the people by the people", by "government of the people by an elite sprung from the people."<sup>32</sup>

Of course, in acquiring *esprit de corps*, administrators may forget their origins. In trying to conform, they may become "more royalist than the king" in an attempt to compensate for what they consider their "inferior" origins. They would so cease to be "representatives". Gladden meant something like this by saying that the British administrative class was a "homogeneous group", in the sense that it easily assimilated recruits to the group, if they were not already assimilated to it.<sup>33</sup>

So a discussion of the fourth heading, attitudes of the administrative civil service, may be related to the first heading, the social origins of that service. But, before leaving the matter of attitudes, it should be remarked that there is a danger of going too far in breaking down alleged elitist attitudes. That way lies mediocrity. An acute American observer has said, referring to India, that the bureaucracy "...must be dominated by an ethos of courageous independent thought. Most bureaucracies do not have such disposition, but India is remarkably fortunate in this respect for the ICS tradition elevated the quality of independent judgement high above the retreat behind anonymity which results from carrying the concept of committee or group decisions to the *reductio ad absurdum*.... A bureaucracy without such a disposition is likely, under the guise of group co-ordination, to have courage replaced by psychological and spiritual compulsion to be popular with the majority. There results, also, an emphasis on procedure which excludes values and on consensus as an end instead of one of several modes of ascertaining truth and achieving justice.... The weight of uniformity rests heavy on the shoulders of all bureaucratic systems. Unless it is lifted, society cannot tap the genius of creativity and innovation which are vital to any organism."<sup>34</sup>

Gorwala also mentions the importance of training. The main issue has been stated in its essentials on John Strachey's *The End of Empire*.<sup>35</sup> He argues that, if revolutionary changes are required, then the old civil service must be broken up and replaced by a communist bureaucracy, as in China. But, if the revolutionary

method is not chosen, then a civil service like the ICS is a priceless asset to build on. The condition, however, is that the "asset" should be "convertible", that is trainable. An example of explicit political training occurred in Singapore in 1959 after the People's Action Party, at that time reputed to be "left-wing", became the Government. A few years previously Singapore had become independent, except for defence, external relations and internal security. The new Government thought that the administrative civil servants were still oriented towards serving a colonial regime. As a publication of the Government party but it, some local officials at the top "saw themselves as the new privileged caste entitled to all the favours and courtesies enjoyed by their white superiors".<sup>36</sup> So a "Political Study Centre" was set up, headed by a British officer, to give courses for civil servants on world history, nationalist movements, Communism etc. The idea behind the creation of the Centre was explained by the Minister of Finance. The Centre was necessary because of "past training and background of the Civil Service in the traditions of the British system, particularly the colonial system. As a result of this, the local Civil Service, through no fault of their own, have not been made aware of the importance of their keeping in touch with the masses, to understand their attitudes, hopes and aspirations. Civil servants, however, have not been equipped with an understanding of the political movements and the philosophies which inspire these movements. The present Government believes that the Civil Servants, although it must maintain its political neutrality, must be able to judge and assess any problem in the context of the political consequences of their actions. Only by being able to see their actions in the political context of our society will civil servants be able to implement Government's policy properly."<sup>37</sup>

This is an example of an explicit attempt by a Government to re-orient the Civil Service by something resembling a "crash programme". But, of course, it may be possible and preferable in some newly-independent countries to inculcate a different set of values more gradually and less directly through longer training courses, where the main focus is on administration. Thus, in some countries training of recruits to the administrative civil service includes the practice of sending them to work in different areas

inside their own country. This may be a means of supplementing each recruit's own experience. The practice is part of the training in the French National School of Administration (and also in the National Academy of Administration course in India). It has not been attempted in Britain. True, Britain is smaller than India or even France. But how many of the entrants to the British administrative class have ever seen, say, Wigan or Bootle, two Lancashire towns of less than overwhelming aesthetic attractions? It has been remarked that the British civil service might have shown a greater sense of urgency in dealing with the economic depression in the 1930's, if the Government departments concerned could have been transferred from Whitehall to the industrial North of England where conditions were rather grimmer.<sup>38</sup>

Certainly, if "re-orientation" is necessary, to take no remedial action will simply result in frustration and recriminations. In Ceylon it has been said that after 1956 the political leaders attacked the bureaucracy for obstructing the egalitarian social and economic programme of the Government, and that the consequence was bitterness on the part of the Public Service and a deterioration in its standards and output.

To return to the main argument, I think that the question of elites is important, particularly as regards the fourth heading, - the attitudes of the administrative class, or its equivalent. But it may be preferable, because it avoids emotional reactions to the term, elite, to put the question rather in terms of "open" or "closed" administrative services and of "career systems". Apart from egalitarian dislike of elites or castes, I think it is the "closed" nature of the British administrative class, and of the usual stereotype of an administrative class, that arouses United States' critics' fiercer objections. They are opposed to the notion of a career which is open only to *some* talents, - the talents of those already in the service.

There have been several attempts to promote a "career system" in the Federal Civil Service of the United States. One of the earliest was by L.D. White, whose book was actually called, *Government Career Service*. He proposed that there should be an "administrative corps", composed of the "highest permanent civil officials and the corresponding lower positions which lead by

promotion into these higher posts". Entry would be either from outside the civil service by open competitive examination using intelligence tests (until other testing techniques were developed and proved), or from inside the civil service, the candidate being judged on whether or not he had shown aptitude for administrative work. "Career positions" would be identified as part of a career ladder, and there would be wide scope for transfers.

Similar proposals were made by others later, the best-known being the Hoover Commission Report's proposal for a Senior Civil Service Group.<sup>39</sup> This was partially implemented, but without personal rank being given to those in the group, which meant that they were not completely mobile without risk of losing pay or status; that is, movements on the career ladder were somewhat restricted. In the United States steps have also been taken to recruit generalists at lower levels through recruitment for "Junior Government Assistants" and for positions with similar titles. But, without an extensive "career system", there is no guarantee that such recruits will have adequate career opportunities at higher levels.

The best account of the elements of the career idea is given in the American Assembly publication, *The Federal Government Service*.<sup>40</sup> They include:

1. The sense of belonging to an organization, that is to the civil service as a whole and not to any one agency in it;
2. Status, although it is immediately added that in the United States the aim is to develop career systems *without* status differences;
3. Planned upward progression, - a career ladder and plans for the growth and development of those who are expected to climb it;
4. Advance planning of staffing needs, particularly recruiting and training for anticipated leadership needs.

All these features, on a service-wide scale at least, were absent from the United States Federal Civil Service. It will be noticed that the first two points clearly relate to *esprit de corps* and status. The other two relate more specifically to the career idea. The situation on careers in the Federal Government Service was not so different from that described in United States industry a few years ago by Chester Barnard.<sup>41</sup> Leadership material nearly always

entered an organization through a "technical" channel. This resulted in a lack of mobility, because such leaders developed in a narrow field. Also, according to Barnard, when men concentrated on machines and techniques this diverted them from experience with men, organizations and social situations, the distinctive fields where leadership ability could be applied.

I should like to cite another, rather famous, account of the cramping effect of the lack of a career system. But, as the account is over a hundred years old, the new civil service entrants were stuck, not in technical jobs, but in routine clerical jobs. "The young man thus admitted is commonly employed upon duties of the merest routine. Many of the first years of his service are spent in copying papers and other work of an almost mechanical character. In two or three years he is as good as he can be at such an employment. The remainder of his official life can only exercise a depressing influence on him, and renders the work of the office distasteful to him...he not only begins with mechanical labour as an introduction to labour of a higher kind, but often also ends with it. When more important offices are vacant often some outside person is appointed over the heads of men who have been many years in the public service." It is also stated that the existence of many departments and of merely departmental promotion encouraged narrow views and limited the acquisition of experience. This was the situation, reported on in the Northcote-Trevelyan Report of 1854,<sup>42</sup> which led to the reform of the British Civil Service. To meet the defects described above, two distinct civil service "classes" were proposed, the "intellectual" and the "mechanical", the former the ancestor of the administrative class of today. To overcome "departmentalism" and purely intra-departmental promotions, Northcote and Trevelyan also drew attention to the need for a proper system of transfers from one part of the service to another to provide experience and to enable each member of the intellectual class to make himself "master of the whole of the business".

The crux of the matter, I think, is that the British administrative class, and systems in other countries which resemble it, are best understood, not as elite systems, but as career systems. The essence of a career system corresponds to the second of the five features of the original stereotype, - namely that the holders of

some administrative positions below the Higher Civil Service are also designated as being part of the administrative class and that it is *largely* from these that promotions are made to the Higher Civil Service. From one point of view this marks out a career path for those admitted to the lower ranks of the administrative class. Also there is a way open for promotion from within, from the executive class, which provides, by promotion, forty per cent of the administrative class. From another point of view, it is still largely a *closed* system as regards entry from outside the service (with the exception of some *ad hoc* recruitment to meet postwar expansion), and even from professional, scientific and technical personnel *inside* the service. The careers of some are made more predictable by denying, at later ages, changes of career *into* the civil service for others.

Lewis Meriam asks two pertinent questions. Would the term, "career service" still apply if the top administrative group positions could be filled, not only from the lower administrative group positions, but also from professional, scientific and technical positions?<sup>43</sup> Second, according to Meriam, the English system works because the administrative class is a caste which occupies a whole range of positions, from top to bottom. Would it also work if there are real competition between two or more divisions for upper positions?<sup>44</sup> The questions can be answered, - even although they may have been intended to be rhetorical. It has been said above that there are a few exceptions in Britain to the rule that all higher administrative class positions are filled from lower administrative class positions. And 5 per cent, 10 per cent, or 20 per cent exceptions would not affect the essence of the system as a career system. But, clearly, if "real competition" existed, then the exceptions would be sufficiently numerous to disturb the pattern and make it impossible for us to say that a career system existed. The point is that in Britain competition exists at the point of entry into the lower reaches of the administrative class, and for promotion into the administrative class from the executive class. Viewed from one angle, this is a "closed" system: from another it is relatively a "career" system. But there is too much competition in the system to justify the use of any term such as "caste". The British system is only *relatively* closed, because there are promotions and transfers to the

administrative class, mainly from the executive class. There are, of course, systems which are more nearly completely closed, for example the Malayan Civil Service. To begin with, the MCS has a quota system which favours Malays. There are direct appointments of graduates, but promotions from within the service are limited. Apart from a few promotions from the State services, promotion is practically restricted to the numerically small Malay Administrative Service. The MAS itself may be reached by promotion from below. But its membership is limited to Malays; so those of Chinese or Indian origin must enter the MCS direct from outside the civil service, unless they come in from one of the State services. Those of Chinese or Indian origin already in the civil service are not promoted to the MCS. To create a career system along the lines of the British administrative class is to opt for certain advantages, while also accepting some disadvantages. One great advantage is that the future administrator is "recognized" (in two senses) at a very early stage. He is clearly identified and is also singled out for special consideration for promotion. His time is therefore not wasted, nor is his enthusiasm blunted with "mechanical" work until he has a heart grown cold, a head grown grey in vain.<sup>45</sup> The complaint has been heard that in Australia, although the bias against recruiting arts graduates as future administrators has been partly overcome by the use of various *ad hoc* recruitment measures, such recruits are nevertheless given too much routine work to do in their early years.<sup>46</sup> Government service, in many countries, offers less financial return to those in the higher positions than does industry. With the rise of private pension schemes and other fringe benefits, it may not offer substantially more security as a compensation. One consequence of the non-recognition of young capable civil servants in New Zealand a few years ago was that many of them left the Public Service, partly because they had no firm assurance that they had been marked out for rapid promotion. The career system principle also makes it possible to transfer a recruit over a wide range of posts and for his movements to be planned with a view to providing him with the right background of varied experience for high administrative positions in the future.

The concept of an administrative class, while it may be regarded in terms of an elite, is more intelligently discussed, I think, in terms

of these crucial lower positions in the class, which are designated as "administrative", but are still below the Higher Civil Service, and in terms of their possibilities of promotion to Higher Civil Service positions. Thus the New Zealand "administrative division", which consists of the permanent heads of departments and a few deputy heads, has nothing at all in common with an "administrative class", as considered above. Fortunately in as small a country as New Zealand, where the Public Service Commission can identify talent easily, there can be a substantial degree of career planning even without the designation of an "administrative civil service". The climate of opinion in New Zealand is decisively opposed to any designation of this kind. *Public Service*, a New Zealand civil service journal, showed a remarkable capacity for missing the point of the argument for an administrative class in New Zealand in an article which appeared a few years ago. "The present Administrative Division...is perhaps more suitable in the New Zealand setting. Though graduates be needed and welcome, it might be better in our service not to segregate them in a class of their own. They can and should eventually enter the Administrative Division when they reach Permanent Head Status on their merits."<sup>47</sup> This conclusion begs the question. *Will* the graduates concerned ever get to the top, or get there quickly enough, *unless* their talent is observed, encouraged and developed and unless they are assured that they will receive this treatment?

Some of the disadvantages of an administrative class should also be mentioned. If there is a great amount of mobility in the society from one job to another, a "closed" system in the civil service may conflict with the customs of the society. This is one of the reasons for opposition to the notion of an administrative class in the United States. One drawback of the British system, which is obvious to me personally, is that until recently British University teachers could not move into and out of the government service except in wartime. The Second World War was responsible for enabling some of our greatest academic experts in Public Administration to gain actual experience of Whitehall. It was only a few years ago that a new scheme made it possible for a selected number of university teachers to enter the civil service as Principals for a short period.

The closed nature of the British Civil Service also means that normally there is no British equivalent of the "ideas" men introduced into the American system to advise a President directly, for example the Brain Trust under F.D.R., or, more recently, men such as W.W. Rostow or McGeorge Bundy under Kennedy. Professor Max Beloff has advocated a similar infusion of fresh ideas into the British civil service from time to time, on the ground that in the last few years there has been a weakness, on the policymaking side, in understanding the "ideological" premises on which the policies of other nations are based. "To put it crudely, what has been asked of the Foreign Office is an interpretation of what are in essence policies of a strongly ideological flavour, that is to say, policies based upon definite and systematic interpretations of the contemporary world scene and of a particular country's role within it. And it can even be argued that the only viable answer to such policies is to be found in making something of the same kind of analysis for oneself."<sup>48</sup> To do this, says Professor Beloff, fresh brains should be brought into the service.

The leader of the British Labour Party, Mr. Harold Wilson, recently said that, although the British Prime Minister did not need anything nearly as elaborate as the White House organization, he thought the Cabinet secretariat, under a Labour Government, should be strengthened from within the Civil Service and also perhaps, by the inclusion of one or two outsiders. He would also like to see some studies made by *ad hoc* groups on particular projects, such as Germany, and the Middle East, like some of those President Kennedy had initiated. The National Economic Development Council was indeed a "project study", but it did not go far enough. Also if, under a Labour Government, new ministries of production and technology were set up, these should be staffed partly from outside the Civil Service.<sup>49</sup> The Conservative Government's practice seems to have been to make use of outside help and advice, for instance from the Universities, but in an informal way without actually taking the outsiders away from their existing jobs.<sup>50</sup>

To summarize: my thesis is that there has been a good deal of confusion about the concept of an administrative class. This is mainly because the British administrative class has been taken as a stereotype, while during the last few years conditions in Britain

have changed. One of the essential points in the British system, which has been present consistently and which still obtains, is the "career service" aspect. In this I can see considerable advantages and also some disadvantages. I do not think that the British administrative class is an elite, in the sense of entry to it being reserved for those of higher social origins only, or of being closed to promotions from the executive class. The term, "caste" is certainly out of place. As regards the members of an administrative class having "elite attitudes", I do not think this is so in Britain, although in some developing countries this may be the case, because of the absence of other powerful social forces to oppose and act as a counter-weight to the bureaucracy. But even in developing countries I would oppose an all-out attack on such attitudes, on the ground that certain other qualities, valuable and desirable in administrative civil servants, might be destroyed in the process.

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49. On 'Gallery' BBC Television, 2<sup>nd</sup> January, 1964, quoted in *The Guardian*, 3<sup>rd</sup> January, 1964. Some Fabian Society suggestions were contained in *The Administrators* (London, 1964), In the 1964 Labour government a few outside persons were brought into the service as advisors, notably Dr. Balogh, Dr. Kaldor and Sir Solly Zuckerman (*The Economist*, 31<sup>st</sup> October, 1964), pp. 475 and 476).
50. Mr. Iain Macleod, *ibid.*

## III

## ADMINISTRATORS AND EXPERTS IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE

This topic is closely related to the previous one. One might, for example, expect certain attitudes on the present question to coincide with attitudes expressed on the previous question. Supporters of an administrative class would be likely to urge the claims of administrators over experts; opponents of an administrative class might be thought to be more likely to take the side of the experts. This would be broadly true of "typical" British attitudes, pro-administrative class and pro-administrator, and of "typical" American attitudes, anti-administrative class and anti-administrator. However, such an expectation would not fit such countries as Australia or New Zealand. There is no administrative class in either of these countries, but neither is there whole-hearted support for the expert as against the administrator. Many permanent heads of departments are generalists, not experts, but they are not drawn from an administrative class.

By "administrator" in the public service, I mean much the same as in the last talk, - a civil servant who is responsible for advising on policy and/or is a manager or organizer on a fairly large scale. An "expert" is a person who has become specialized by acquiring more knowledge or experience in a particular field of his work in the civil service than a person who is not so specialized. He would nearly always have a technical or professional qualification. In the well-worn phrase, he is the man who has come to know more and more about less and less.

To be sure, "administrator" could be defined in an extremely broad sense, to include the "technical administrator", as it were. On such a definition, if one expert had two other experts reporting to him, then, he would be "administering" them. However, I am not using the term in this sense. It was used in this way, misleadingly, in an advertisement for recruits to the New Zealand Department of Inland Revenue some years ago. "You can be an administrator.... The emphasis today is upon administration. Look at newspaper, advertisements. The demand is for accountants, auditors, taxation

specialists and legal officers. The Department of Inland Revenue offers you a satisfying career as an expert in these specialized professions." This advertisement begins by appealing for future administrators, but ends by appealing to prospective experts.

However, there may come a time when an expert is promoted and his functions transformed; when he is required to look after, not, say, two other experts, but the whole organization of an Atomic Energy Authority. He is now charged with looking after more and more people who know more and more about less and less. He may pride himself on having "kept up with" his profession. He may be convinced that without his professional grounding he would not have been qualified for the new job. But at least 75 per cent of the work is "administrative", not "professional". He has in fact been given an administrator's job. This may create problems. Should an expert be allowed to become an administrator in this way? Should not a general administrator be put over him to do this largely administrative job? If he is considered for the job, should he be allowed to become an administrator in this way, *only if* he has demonstrated that he possesses administrative skills, or should he be given the job practically irrespective of these, because of his "technical competence"? The latter alternative has often occurred in the Philippines.<sup>1</sup> In either case should he be given training, and, if so, what kind of training?

Except in countries where the expert's position is strong compared with that of the administrator, experts frequently have grievances, which might be placed under four main heads: pay; "frustration" by the administrator; too small an allocation of permanent secretary positions (departmental headships); status and prestige. Pay scales are sometimes higher for the administrator than for the expert. Even if they are the same, sometimes, because of the time which has to be spent in obtaining technical or professional qualifications, experts may be older than administrators when they start work, and so may be a year or two "behind" them. At the other end of the scale the range may be effect be limited for the expert, if Permanent Secretary positions are in practice nearly always given to administrators.

Two different approaches to the question of pay were taken by two committee reports in Malaya before independence. A

Committee on Professional Officers' Pay in 1950<sup>2</sup> said, "In this age of specialization there are no grounds for differentiating between the usefulness and responsibilities of Administrative Officers on the timescale, and Professional Officers, on the timescale. Each has comparable duties and responsibilities". Yet only in the previous year Committee dealing with civil service salaries in general had maintained that there should not be parity between the two, because "the top Administrative Officer has the higher responsibility to discharge"<sup>3</sup>; so the "professionals' committee" backed the experts; the "general committee" backed the administrators. There may be "frustration" if the expert finds it difficult to gain access to the politicians. Apparently this has happened in the past in Britain, although only exceptionally.<sup>4</sup> A good working arrangement for ensuring that the views of the expert are available, and handy, for the Minister is described by the British Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Transport. The views of the engineers (experts) in any question would be placed on the file given to the Minister for him to see. "I can think of no case since I have been in the Ministry when we have had to call on the Minister to resolve a difference of opinion between the Chief Engineer and myself. Should such a difficulty arise I should certainly regard it as my duty to represent as fairly as possible the views of the engineers and, indeed, these would be on the file for the Minister to see."<sup>5</sup> The view still persists, however, that the expert has sometimes not been consulted in the early stages,<sup>6</sup> when his advice might have been of value in shaping policy instead of in just refining and polishing it. When it was announced in 1963 that Dr. Jacob Bronowski would leave the post of Director-General of the British National Coal Board to work in America, he was reported as saying that "From Whitehall to industry, the present system tended to call in the scientist to give a sort of an oracular judgment" only after the question had become hopelessly biased by the time it reached him.<sup>7</sup>

It is possible, of course, that sometimes the question of access to the minister is not important in itself but becomes *symbolic* of the matter of the respective *status* of experts and professionals. In several countries permanent secretaryships are filled almost entirely from the ranks of the administrators.

This top position is probably, although not necessarily, also the

highest paid in the department, and it also obviously provides access to the political head. In Britain in each department this post is almost always held by an administrative class civil servant, although there are a few exceptions, where professional or scientific staff have been promoted to be permanent secretary. The former engineer-in-chief of the British Post Office was appointed to be its Director-General some years ago.<sup>8</sup> The pattern in Britain is also found in India, Pakistan and Malaysia. It is not found in the United States or the Philippines. Elsewhere there do not appear to be rigid rules; in New Zealand and Australia for instance, the top man may either be a generalist or an expert. Some departments are held to be more "technical" than others, and so are believed to require a "technical" head. For instance, this is true of the administrative head of the New Zealand Ministry of Works and also of the New Zealand Valuation Department. In Australia the scope for the generalist, as such, is limited. But some graduates, who in Britain would be reckoned as "generalists", for example graduates in economics or psychology, can make use of the protective colouration of experts. Masquerading as specialists they can be promoted, step by step, and eventually fill posts which call mainly for administrative qualities,<sup>9</sup> including some permanent secretary posts.

An interesting process occurs when, in preparation for independence, a colony's system of government undergoes conversion from a central Secretariat plus a number of outlying executive "Departments" to "Ministries" each under a Permanent Secretary. Thus, in Singapore in 1955 there were the Colonial Secretary's Office, a kind of miniature Whitehall, and 39 Departments, which "were the operative agencies for executing the policies and decisions of Government and were each constituted not only to deal with a technical or specialized subject or group of subjects, but also to provide and administer the actual services and institutions, relating to these subjects."<sup>10</sup> It was decided that the Secretariat and the Departments were to be converted into a smaller number of Ministries each headed by a Permanent Secretary. But this could be done in two different ways. In some cases the head of a former Department (often an expert) became the Permanent Secretary, with some additional administrative

strengthening provided at lower levels. In other cases a new Ministry headquarters unit of a Permanent Secretary and Assistant Secretaries, all drawn from the Administrative Service, was set up over the combination of technical and professional Departments which now formed the "body" of the new Ministry. These arrangements were not intended to be permanent. A Permanent Secretary drawn from a technical service might in future be replaced by a layman, or vice versa.<sup>11</sup> After a year's working it was evident that in some of the cases where a technical Department Head had been made Permanent Secretary (for instance, Medical Services and Education), he was having great difficulty in combining the duties of Permanent Secretary with exercising the major control of the technical operations of the Department.<sup>12</sup>

This example has been referred to at length, because it shows how, by trial and error, solutions were sought for the most workable relationship between administrator and expert when new Ministries were being set up. A detailed case-study of the process would be of great value. A rather similar administrative problem, of the integration of ministries and departments, occurred when Nigeria gained independence. Once again the issue was raised of relationships between the Permanent Secretaries of Ministries and the former departments' heads, who were often "professional".<sup>13</sup>

On the last point, status and prestige, where an administrative class exists the expert may feel dwarfed and overshadowed by the administrator. In developing countries this may be because there is already a serious shortage of experts, qualified professional, scientific and technical men, which may be intensified by the superior status and attraction of administration. Hence the following remarks by the Prime Minister of India, which complement the quotation made earlier from him about administrators. "As I told you, our work becomes more and more social and economic. The person who is becoming more and more important today is the engineer, the technical man, the scientist. In the old days, the person who was most important was the administrator. Now I do not mean to say that the administrator has become less important. Of course, he is important. He has to deal with human beings.... But the fact remains that the other types of specialized workers like the engineers and the scientists are becoming more and more

important. It may be that you can get an administrator relatively easily; it is very difficult to get an absolutely first class engineer or a first class scientist."

"There is a tendency, again derived from the British days, of treating the administrator at the top as far superior to a person employed in any other occupation like engineering, science or education. That is not a good tendency. Because today our country is becoming more and more technical minded."<sup>14</sup>

As I see it, this extract seeks to "redress the balance" in two ways, by warning against the habit of regarding administrators as "superior" and by stressing the deficiency in the supply of technical men.

I should now like to turn to the respective roles of the politician, the administrator and the expert and to their relative positions in the hierarchy. Clearly, expertise is relative. To the politician the administrator may appear to be an expert, but to the specialist the administrator is a layman. This illustration could be extended. Consider the case, mentioned before, of the technical man promoted to be head of a large organization, whose work in that post is largely "administrative". To the person above him in the hierarchy, whether politician or administrative civil servant, he is still an "expert". But to those below him, who have more specialized and up-to-date technical data than he, he is a layman.

At the top of the hierarchy is the politician, who is concerned with "policy" in the widest sense, with any matter which may affect the national interest. He must be sensitive, with a wide-ranging mind capable of perceiving relationships on the broadest scale. Here is a description, as seen by the Permanent Under Secretary of how the intelligence of Ernest Bevin worked when he was Foreign Secretary.

"For him, no matter of foreign policy that came to him for decision ever stood alone. He would not come to his final conclusion until he had assured himself what effect each of the possible alternative courses of action would have on other questions and in other places. He would call his advisers together and go round the map with them and look at the question at issue from the point of view of each of the other governments concerned. Again and again he would perceive connections which none of us had thought

of; and, if, as sometimes was the case, they were invalid, he would expect us to tell him so. In his exploratory peregrinations he had no ordered method of procedure. He might start from some remote point, wandering round and round the subject, moving gradually nearer the centre, making up his mind as he went along, opening up his perplexities to us. There were the fruit of cogitations in the watches of the night or of perusal of the papers in the early hours of the morning. Before going in to him, we would ask ourselves: "Where is he going to start from, this time?" But wherever the starting point might be, however unrelated it might seem, we learnt that it could not be lightly disregarded. As his mind cleared, he might put up some unacceptable solution and wait for us to give him our reasons for knocking it down. When these preliminaries had been exhausted, he would gather himself together and come to his conclusion. It might not always be very accurately formulated, but we knew his mind well enough to be able to interpret it and to translate it into executive terms. Some Secretaries of State stimulate; others devitalize; Bevin nourished."<sup>15</sup>

It is also possible for the politician to pick out a few particular aspects of a subject and master them – a selective process by which he may sample and test the quality of the information and recommendations passed up to him. Thus, Lord Randolph Churchill when he took over the India Office, at first played no part in departmental meetings, but sat in the Presidential chair, quite silent. But then he used to go through the agenda to pick out the subjects on which he wanted to use his influence, mastered these thoroughly and made decisive interventions on them. The other subjects, which he had not studied, he did not touch.<sup>16</sup>

What the politician must *not* do is to fancy himself as an expert. A member of the New Zealand cabinet who became Minister of Health some years ago is supposed to have been active in recommending the type of brooms to be used in government hospitals on the basis of "expertise" believed to have been acquired from previous experience with hospitals. This approach is undesirable, because, even if a minister had ever been expert, his knowledge would probably have become out of date. It also indicates a confusion of function; a concentration on expertise must distract the minister's mind from being occupied with the broad relationships

with which he ought to be concerned. Lord Attlee had this principle firmly in mind when he once said that, as Prime Minister, he would never appoint a man to a Cabinet post in a field where he *thought* he knew all about the subject matter.

In considering the relation between politicians, administrators and experts we may start from Paul Appleby's remark that the "process of administration – especially large-scale administration – is the process of moving matters up and down to and from successive levels of abstraction."<sup>17</sup> This implies that the hierarchical pattern should be based on the degree of abstraction or generality involved. Consequently, in the hierarchy logically the politician is at the top, with the administrator below him and the expert below the administrator.

In a more complete analysis, of course, politicians could be divided into types, in the same fashion as administrators; for instance, they might be classified as "expressive" and "instrumental".<sup>18</sup> The former perform functions of national integration, while the latter are concerned with problems of resource output and allocation. The expressive leaders, of whom Mr. Nehru and Tunku Abdul Rahman would be good examples, deal with matters at a higher level of generality than the instrumental leaders, such as Vallabhbhai Patel and Tun Razak.

The point about generality, or abstraction, could also be put in terms of "purpose" and "process". H.A. Simon says that there are differences between "administrative" functions and the "technical" functions at the lower levels of the hierarchy. The decisions of the higher administrator deal with more ultimate purposes and more general processes. What are the *purposes* of the man lower down in the hierarchy are the *processes* of the higher administrator.<sup>19</sup> Thus drawing up a regulation against dogs who bite postmen is *purpose* in the work of the legal draftsman; to the administrator who has decided on it in the interests of human (as opposed to animal) welfare, such regulation-making is a *process*.

The administrator may be viewed as a "translator" between the expert and the politician. This is the justification for interposing him in the hierarchy. He is no more superfluous in the hierarchy than the retailer is in the economic system, although this is not to say that particular retail systems (or particular hierarchical

administrative systems) may not be inefficient. The whole sequence of the governmental process consists in the general wishes of the people being translated into government programmes. The politicians undertake this task, but he needs the administrator's help. If the politician were to accept the advice of the expert uncritically, he would be given, in many cases, rather raw "unprocessed" advice, saying what technically be superior, but tending to neglect the cost aspect and any sacrificed alternatives, and to disregard possible political repercussions. "A great many scientists have a trace of the obsessional.... To be any good, in his youth at least, a scientist has to think of one thing, deeply and obsessively, for a long time. An administrator has to think of a great many things, widely, in their interconnections, for a short time."<sup>20</sup> On the other hand it is part of the job of the top administrator to know the politician's general approach and objectives, and so he is able to frame recommendations in terms of these. It is then up to the politician to make a final judgment, altering the recommendations of the administrator if he has in any respect misjudged his goals or in the light of any new directions which government policy has recently taken but of which the administrator was unaware.

On occasions the politician may deal direct with the experts. This may be useful as a check against "errors in translation", so to speak. It may also be used in exceptional circumstances by exceptional politicians. Of the year 1940, when impending German air attacks made radar rather an important subject for British national defence, Churchill wrote, "I knew nothing about science, but I knew something of scientists, and had much practice as a minister in handling things I did not understand."<sup>21</sup> Perhaps this has to be translated from the Churchillian language. The last part does not mean exactly what it says, because, in order to "handle" these things, obviously he had to understand their implications; knowing something of scientists enabled him to grasp these. Generalising, we might say that the administrator, in making decisions which depend on technical premises, must take into account the characters and temperaments of the technical men who advice him. He should, for instance, make an appropriate "discount" for those who are habitually over-sanguine in their appreciations.

The above quotation does not quite tell the whole story. Churchill goes on to mention the role of Professor Lindemann (Lord Cherwell) in advising him on scientific matters. This is an alternative way of doing things, similar to the method I mentioned in the last lecture, - the United States practice of bringing in Presidential policy advisers, most prominent on the part of F.D. Roosevelt and Kennedy. This is what Professor Max Beloff has now suggested for England.<sup>22</sup> In the United States it also is used in less spectacular ways than in the case of the more widely-publicized policy advisers. For instance, for the last twenty years there has been a body called the Council of Economic Advisers. The three Council members (who are not permanent civil servants) have the task of advising the President, on economic policy. According to a former CEA President, Dr. Nourse,<sup>23</sup> the economic advisers are "economic synthesizers", who need to be: (1) competent technically; (2) "realists" in fitting the mechanics of the theory to the human peculiarities of the persons through whom the economic process is being conducted; (3) persons with a broad and deep social philosophy to enable them to weigh and consider the relative claims of various interest groups. This is the ex-CEA Chairman's view. He goes on to say that there are, in his opinion, three process involved, which are, in ascending order of generality: (1) economic analysis; (2) economic synthesis; (3) political synthesis. (1) would be almost purely technical. (2) Would be a synthesis amounting to a "comprehensive, realistic and objective many-faceted policy based strictly on criteria of economics as a social science." (3) would be "an active political policy designed to combine strictly economic considerations, with others which cannot be ignored." According to him (3) would be the personal responsibility of the President.

Presumably economic analysis, (1) would be done by the technical staff of the CEA and the staff of those other government organizations from whom they obtained economic information. (2) economic synthesis, would be done by the three members of the CEA themselves.

This is an example of a hierarchy in which, the higher the top persons are, the more they deal with abstraction and generality. But it does not quite correspond to the British system where the administrator performs a translation function. If the account of the

CEA given by Nourse is correct, then even the CEA members would stop short of *political* synthesis. The administrator in Great Britain, in "translating" the views of economic experts, would almost always go further, because he would take political, as well as economic, factors into account in his appreciation of the situation. To a limited extent, the terminology of Almond and Coleman in *The Politics of the Developing Areas* applies. Almond and Coleman contrast "articulation" and "aggregation". Articulation is the mere voicing of demands on government, and usually occurs through individual pressure and via interest groups, minority parties etc. Aggregation, the weighing up and placing in order of priority of a large number of conflicting proposals, is done partly by the administrator and partly by the politician. *Inside* government the expert also "articulates", in a sense, but he does not, to any appreciable degree, perform an aggregation function.

From this account it should be clear that administrators deal largely in "values", while experts do not do so to the same extent. This, I think, explains the importance and the fascination of case studies<sup>24</sup> in public administration. A purely technical case study would be likely to have a limited number of solutions. But in Public Administration the range of solutions is wide because of the large number of possible value judgments. This is why the administrator's job is so difficult. To my knowledge no one has ever made a full-length film on the technical problems of building a bridge. But an extremely long film was made, *The Bridge over the River Kwai*, on the value judgments involved in British prisoners of war building a bridge for the Japanese.

These reflections are somewhat general. They do not touch directly on many practical problems. The role of the minister may be clear in principle, but when forms of government become more complex, for instance through the creation of committees, there is no one obvious solution to some organizational problems. For instance, nothing I have said would enable us to give a conclusive answer to the question, - should the Minister of Finance be a Member of the Indian Planning Commission? This would be a question that would need individual study.

Nor do I want to enter into the question of whether it is preferable to recruit top administrators from the lower ranks of

administrators or from experts. As the previous lecture indicates,<sup>25</sup> there is much to be said for a "career system" in which future top administrators are identified, encouraged and developed early in their careers. But this does not rule out experts from being brought into the career stream at a rather early age. It is true that when this happens there is apparently a "loss" of a professional, in other words a "waste" of professional training. But to argue in this way is to take a rather narrow view. There is such a shortage of men capable of becoming really top administrators, that, on balance, there is a gain, not a loss. This is a different problem from the other one I have indicated, that of the rather older professional who, in the course of successive promotions, has gradually found that he is having a larger and larger proportion of administration to do in his work. This occurs whether or not he is formally reclassified as "administrative". An outstanding feature about this latter situation is that the range within which the civil servant's career can be continued is usually much narrower, and is customarily limited to those jobs in which his own specialism plays a part.

However, I wish to try to draw some broad conclusions on education and training and on the changing role of the administrator as societies become more and more specialized.

On education and training, the educational system of the country, as opposed to any special education or training for the *civil service*, is important. There should not be too early specialization at school, or indeed in universities. This may help to prevent any division into two cultures,<sup>26</sup> or indeed into three cultures, if the social sciences are recognized as a "culture". In Britain, certainly, specialization takes place too early. In the universities the pattern of the University of North Staffordshire might be more widely followed, where in the first year arts students must take some science subjects and *vice versa*.

Inside the civil service three kinds of training are relevant:

- (i) Training of administrators;
- (ii) Training of experts who are going to be converted into administrators or undertake functions which are largely administrative;

- (iii) Training of experts who are *not* going to be converted into administrators or undertake functions which are largely administrative.

To some extent (i) and (iii) can be promoted by the use of joint conferences designed to render each group (administrators and experts) more conscious of the other's problems and point of view. Residential Conferences along these lines, using case studies, have been tried by the British Treasury in recent years.<sup>27</sup> Fruitful interchange of views of this kind is also possible through courses in Administrative Staff Colleges.

On the training of administrators two main considerations seem to be relevant. First, they need to be trained in "general administration". Weber makes the point, although not in a very clear way.<sup>28</sup> Only persons who have qualifications to serve are employed, he says. But what are these qualifications? "The management of the office follows general rules, which are more or less stable, more or less exhaustive, and which can be learned. Knowledge of these rules represents a special technical learning which the officials possess. It involves jurisprudence or administrative or business management." The use of the word, "technical" may be confusing, also some of the emphasis seems to be on learning the rules and jurisprudence. This, surely, would correspond, not to learning to *play* cricket, but rather to getting to know the contents of the cricket rule-book. But learning administrative or business management would indeed correspond to training in general administration. The need for such training, with the emphasis on training to take decisions through the use of the case-studies and the syndicate method, is now generally recognized. It is particularly important in the context of the present subject because of its *indirect* effect on the attitude of the expert to the administrator. It may be hard for an expert to respect an apparently "unlearned" administrator. He may more readily accept being co-ordinated by an administrator who is known to have received formal training.<sup>29</sup>

But this is not enough. Surely the general administrator also needs some training to understand the specialties (and the specialists) with which he will have to deal. This is behind the remark of a writer on South Vietnam who says, "Specialized

administrators must be mobilized, of a sort far removed from the dilatory traditional bureaucracy."<sup>30</sup> Two ideas are combined here, and the criticism of the traditional bureaucracy may not apply to all countries which have gained independence, but the first point is valid enough. The same approach is behind the questions put by the writer on India who asks if the old-time Collector or Deputy Commissioner is trained to understand the problems of economics, labour etc.<sup>31</sup> The old-time civil servant was suitable for a *laissez-faire* period, "but is he now any more an expert than the political leader whom he has to advise in matters regarding international trade, industry, labour etc."<sup>31</sup> Britain has been backward in attempting to give any technical background to administrative civil servants.<sup>32</sup> The general educational system is partly to blame. "The usual difficulty", says Chapman, "is that of finding adequate members of civil servants with sufficient specialized training to enable them to control modern government services. In Europe Britain has had a unique disadvantage in this field. No other country has emphasized to the same extent the strange division between science and the humanities; a system based on the temporary nineteenth-century need to produce proconsuls, from which she has never recovered. This educational pattern has led to a division between 'practical' men and civil servants."<sup>33</sup> This disadvantage has been perpetuated in the comparative lack of training *inside* the civil service, although a very recent development has been the institution of fourteen-week courses for assistant principals who have completed two years with a department. "Courses will supplement departmental training in a variety of ways. They will convey the basic concepts of economics and statistics to those who have entered the civil service with degrees in other subjects and introduce subjects such as the structure of British industry, trade unions, the operation of business enterprise, the relation of government to science and technology, and international affairs. There will also be lectures on the social services and their organization."<sup>34</sup> Specialized training for administrators, in the sense, not of giving them training designed to turn them into experts, but of introducing them to some aspects of a technical milieu is perhaps found in its most thorough form in the French National School of Administration. While in the school,

entrants are assigned to one of four divisions: General Administration; Financial and Economics; Social Administration; Foreign Affairs.

I should also like to refer to what might be called "pseudo-specialist" training for administrators. The basis for this is to be found in Appleby's story<sup>35</sup> about the head governmental researcher in the United Kingdom who was asked how valuable he thought his training in science was for his new high administrative post. He replied that it gave him nothing "except a readier acceptance of me by my subordinates". An example of "pseudo-specialist" training to meet this kind of situation occurred a few years ago in New Zealand. It was arranged that a man from the New Zealand Railway Service, after completing his two-year Diploma course at the University, should be posted as station master in a provincial town for about a year. The idea was not so much to train him, in the usual sense, as to enable him to gain acceptance, in his future administrative career, as a man who had actually had experience working on the railway.

An obvious point in helping administrators to deal intelligently with technical problems and technical advisers is to let them "specialize" to some degree in a particular field — such as foreign trade or security. Because an administrator is a generalist and has mobility within a career system, this is not a reason for moving him around all the time. He should indeed be moved, particularly in the early stages, for training and subsequently to reap the advantages of a career "ladder". But in both India and Pakistan the complaint has been voiced that general administrators have been moved around much too often.

A major problem is the conversion of experts into administrators. If the expert is young enough, he may be "injected" into the career stream without much difficulty. At a later age the transition may be more painful; "...administrators voice the constant complaint that technicians show a decided inability to operate effectively in the 'administrative climate'". As a result, a problem of considerable size lies in the search for technicians with administrative ability who are sufficiently expert to understand the work of a scientific bureau and sufficient 'administrative' to make it function smoothly."<sup>36</sup> Again it is possible to do something

to meet this by training, as described in a recent article in *Public Administration*.<sup>37</sup> One important point is that experts who are likely to be promoted to positions in which the work will be mostly administrative, should be warned of this, and prepared for it by training, *in good time* at a sufficiently early age, otherwise they may not be sufficiently flexible mentally to meet the change. This preparation should be attempted whether they are actually going to be promoted to positions designated as "administrative", or whether they are to be posted to positions still described as "professional" but involving a high proportion of "administrative" work.

Societies are becoming more specialized, in Riggs' terms, more "refracted". This is happening both in societies which are prismatic and those which are already refracted. This puts a premium on the services of specialists, on experts. The demand for their services has greatly increased, and is often very difficult to meet, because of lack of training facilities or of suitable persons to be trained.

But this problem raises still more problems. Refraction surely resembles the "division of labour" in that neither of these terms tells the whole story. They fail to convey the importance of knowing how to *co-ordinate* what has been refracted or divided. Yet, if the division of labour, or refraction, increases, there must be co-ordination or there will be chaos. *And this co-ordination can be achieved only by the administrators*, working, in a democracy, under the politicians. Because the responsibilities and the strain placed on administrators have increased, the standards of ability required in top administrators have been raised. This was seen by a British Government Committee, shortly after the last war, in giving reasons why the salaries of Higher Service should be improved. "The subject matter of their work became more complicated as modern society itself became more complex..."<sup>38</sup>

The increasing complexity of the administrator's task is seen, in many countries, not only at the centre but also in the field. The French prefects have had difficulty since the war in maintaining control over an increasing number of increasingly-technical officers.<sup>39</sup> And District Officers in several countries have had

new functions given to them in recent years, including co-ordination of Government development plans, which have made their task of co-ordination more complex.

It follows then that, far from specialization (refraction) and the need for more professionals having "devalued" the work of the administrator, they have raised it to new heights of complexity. The more specialized the mechanism, and the more interrelated and interdependent its parts, the more catastrophic the failure may be if co-ordination is not highly efficient.

It seems that there is a very limited supply of people capable of the kind of high-level co-ordination required. The type of ability needed is not very different from the quality of statesmanship, as described by Plato in *The Statesman*. "...Thus we may learn from our review of all the sciences we have named that none of them discloses its identity with statesmanship. In fact it is not for the genuine art of kingship to undertake executive work itself, but to exercise sovereignty over the arts which can do this work...that which is sovereign over them all superintends the law and the life of the state, and weaves the whole duty into one, may have its functions comprehended under a title taken from the common character of all, and it is this, it should seem, that should most properly be called statesmanship."<sup>40</sup> True, some of the functions of the statesman are performed by politicians, but they require to be supplemented by the similar, although subordinate, exercise of "statesman-like" functions by administrative civil servants. I am as firmly convinced as Plato was that this function is "superior", in the hierarchical sense, to technical functions. I also think that it would often be superior in market value in a free market, as has been indicated by the salaries commanded in many countries by administrative civil servants who take up jobs in industry after retirement. This estimate of the relative status of *functions*, need not conflict with the view that human beings are equal, insofar as they are considered as *persons*. We need not regard the surgeon in charge of a team for an operation as *personally* superior to any of the members of that team. But I believe in the administrator's superiority of *function*, and that this is implicit in the concept of hierarchy.<sup>41</sup>

## References

1. Gregorio Francisco, Jr., *op.cit.*, p.398.
2. "Willan Committee", referred to in *Straits Times*, 29<sup>th</sup> September, 1950.
3. Special Committee on Salaries, *Report on Revision of Salaries in the Public Services of the Federation of Malaya and the Colony of Singapore* (Kuala Lumpur, 1949), p.21.
4. Sir Arthur Newsholme, *The Last Thirty Years in Public Health* (London, 1936), pp. 49 and 64-5.
5. Sir James Dunnitt, "The Civil Service Administrator and the Expert", *Public Administration*, Vol. 39, No. 3 (1961), p.229. Sir James asserts that in practice the administrator and the engineer need not "have much difficulty in living together" and that in their dealings neither side "is troubled by any philosophic doubts about the proper role or *raison de'etre* of each other."
6. As recommended in report of *Royal Commission on the Civil Service, 1929-1931* (Cmd. 3909, 1931), p.51.
7. *TheTimes* (London), 17<sup>th</sup> September, 1963.
8. *Report, Royal Commission on the Civil Service, 1953-1955, op.cit.*, p.128. The House of Common Estimates Committee has recently advocated that it should be made easier for members of the scientific class to be promoted to higher positions in the administrative class (*Fifth Report, Session 1963-64: Treasury Control of Establishments* (H.M.S.O., London).
9. Howard A. Scarrow, *The Higher Public Service of the Commonwealth of Australia* (Durham, N.C., 1957), p.137.
10. A.A. Williams "Administrative Adjustment of a Colonial Government to Meet Constitutional Change", *Public Administration*, Vol. XXXV, No.3 (1957), p.270.
11. *Ibid.* p.277.
12. *Ibid.* p.287.
13. Taylor Cole, "Bureaucracy in Transition: Independent Nigeria", *Public Administration*, Vol. XXXVIII, No.4, 1960, p.330.
14. Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, "A Word to the Services", *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. I, No. 4 (1955), p.298.
15. Lord Strang, *Home and Abroad* (London, 1956), pp. 292-293.
16. Sir Winston Churchill, *Lord Randolph Churchill* (London, 1951), pp. 363-364.
17. Paul Appleby, *Big Democracy* (New York, 1945), p. 66.
18. Gayl D. Ness, *Expressive and Instrumental Leadership and the Goals of Government in Malaysia*, paper read at the UNESCO Symposium on "Leadership and Authority", Singapore 1963, adopting teams used by Amitai Etzioni, *A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations* (Glencoe, Illinois, 1961).
19. *Administrative Behavior* (New York, 1957), p. 246.

20. Sir Charles Snow, *Science and Government* (London, 1961), p. 72.
21. *The Second World War* (London, 1959). Vol. II, p. 338. The Churchill-Lindemann relationship would seem to approximate to the United States practice (p. 50 above). On the dangers of having a single scientific adviser, see Snow, *op.cit.*
22. See p.50 above.
23. Edwin G. Nourse, *Economics in the Public Services* (New York, 1953), pp. 496-503.
24. For a recent collection, on a developing country, see Raul de Guzman (ed.), *Patterns in Decision-making* (Manila, 1963).
25. See p. 46 ff. above.
26. Sir Charles Snow, *The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution* (Cambridge, 1959).
27. Z.M. Tarkowski and Avice V. Turnbull, "Scientists Versus Administrators: An approach towards Achieving Greater Understanding", *Public Administration*, Vol. XXXVI, No.3, (1959).
28. H.H. Gerth and C.W. Mills, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (Routledge, 1948), p.198.
29. I have developed this point in "Administrators, Experts and Training in the Civil Service", *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. 6, No. 3, (1962).
30. Nghiem Dang, "Toward a Philosophy of Public Administration in Vietnam", *op.cit.*, p.71.
31. R. Dwarkadas, *Role of Higher Civil Service in India* (Bombay, 1958), p.63.
32. Note that very few of the British administrative civil servants recruited direct from the universities have science degree. To some extent this reflects the greater attractions of competing jobs in which scientific qualifications are obviously useful and advantageous.
33. Brian Chapman, *The Professional of Government* (London, 1959), p.97.
34. *The Times* (London), 2<sup>nd</sup> October, 1963; "Treasury Centre for Administrative Studies", *Public Administration*, Vol. 41 (Winter, 1963), pp. 388-392. The Report of the Committee on Higher Civil Service Remuneration (Cmd. 7635 of 1949) had recognized the importance of additional training for higher civil servants; "...growing general knowledge of the techniques of administration requires them to undertake new studies and to develop new talents in the organization and management of their Departments and Branches" (para 22). But there was no perceptible immediate extension of training.
35. Paul H. Appleby, *Public Administration For a Welfare State* (Bombay, 1961), p. 58.
36. Reinhard Bendix, *Higher Civil Servants in American Society* (Boulder, 1949), p. 49.
37. S.A. Bailey, "Training the Technician in Administrative Practices", *Public Administration*, Vol. XXXIII, No.4 (1955). See also E.A. Missen, "Expert

- into Administrator", N.C. Angus (ed.), *The Expert and Administration in New Zealand* (Wellington, 1959), pp. 95-97.
38. *Report of the Committee on Higher Civil Service Remuneration, op.cit.*, para. 22.
39. Brian Chapman, *The Prefects and the Provincial France* (Allen and Unwin, 1955), pp. 168-169.
40. Plato, *The Sophist and the Statesman* (translated and with an introduction by A.E. Taylor, London, 1961), p. 334.
41. In a recent article Dr. V. Subramaniam ["Specialists in British and Australian Government Services: A Study in Contrast", *Public Administration*, Vol. 41 (Winter, 1963), pp. 357-373] defends the relatively important role assigned to specialists in decision-making in Australian Government. But it could be argued that one of the chief defects in Australian and New Zealand Government was that interests were imperfectly aggregated, and that one way to help to remedy this would be to lay more stress on the role of the administrative civil servant. Because the topic is related to the previous one, those who hold extreme views on the question of administrative generalists are also inclined to hold similarly extreme views on the desirable relation between administrator and expert. Such views have recently been expressed by Professor Presthus, although his title, "Decline of the Generalist Myth", [*Public Administration Review*, Vol. XXIV, No.4 (1964)] is misleading because his main complaint is that the "generalist myth" far from having declined, is showing too obstinate a tendency to survive in Britain. Complacency is, of course, a common British vice, but it is unlikely to be cured by criticism, unless it is reasonably well-informed and sensible. The compound growth rate of the British gross national product is compared unfavourably with that of other countries by Professor Presthus, but he is curiously reluctant to affirm *post hoc ergo propter hoc*, although he is quite willing to imply it. "Although it is impossible to demonstrate here that the more pragmatic orientation of higher civil servants in Germany and Italy accounts for these sharp differences (in growth) (a systematic consideration of this question poses an exciting research problem in comparative administration), it can be shown that within Britain the administrative class had a critical role in economic affairs during these years, and that its performance has been strenuously questioned by competent observers" (p.213). This falls a little below the level of reasoned and documented argument. In fact most of the material Professor Presthus uses for ammunition comes from Dr. Balogh, Professor Chapman and his own investigations into British European Airways. Within five pages Professor Presthus contrives to quote Dr. Balogh, who recommends the end of job rotation at senior levels between departments in the British Civil Service (p.216), and also Professor Chapman who says of job rotation that "...for many years it has been nothing more than a piece of mythology" (p.212, quoting *British*

*Government Observed*, p.23). To support the contention, reasonable in itself, that "an administrator must know a good deal about the technical field with which (sic) he is working". Professor Presthus quotes a view that the kind of person employed by the Ministry of Aviation as a technical cost officers is often years out of date in his technical knowledge (p.215). Such confused polemics do little to clarify the problem.